Geopolitics

ASEAN seeks centrality with regional alliances to offset Beijing
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 16 Feb , 2022

While the world is stands fixated on the Ukraine Imbroligo, the interplay of regional alliances and maritime law enforcement is taking place. Regional powers and QUAD are slowly making head waves in the Indo-Pacific. It has been almost six years since the international arbitral tribunal ruling against Chinese hegemonic claims in 2016; Not much has changed as China continues to consolidate and infringe on the recognized EEZs of most of the South China Sea’s littoral states with impunity.

Indonesia

Recently, Indonesia signed an agreement to acquire 42 Rafales from France. It is the latest sign of warming ties between Jakarta and Paris, as France rethinks its Indo-Pacific strategy after the AUKUS fiasco. Indonesia is significantly engaged with The US, South Korea, and India to deepen its military ties and modernize its military and upgrade its air power in the region. Recently, Beijing again demanded Jakarta to stop drilling for oil and gas near the Natuna islands inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as it falls within the so-called nine-dash line claimed by China. The provocation prompted the Indonesian Head of the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), Vice Adm. Aan Kurnia, to invite maritime security officials from Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam to discuss a possible joint response against China’s growing assertiveness in the region.

Jakarta’s bold move as a de facto leader of ASEAN comes as a surprise as it decided to break the studious silence and put up a united front against China. Constant objections from China have put an end to the quantum of solace that Jakarta enjoyed before in the South China Sea, and is reportedly interested in boosting its airpower.

The Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia

Indonesia is not the only country flexing its muscle for modernizing its naval power. Philipines and India just signed a contract last month for three batteries of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to strengthen its coastal defense. It is noteworthy that New Delhi is looking for exporting the missiles and security assistance to ASEAN countries having a dispute in South China Sea. India has extended defense and security assistance to Vietnam, training its navy in Kilo-class submarines.

In addition, India has also provided Lines of Credit to Vietnam to buy Indian defense equipment. India is building 12 High-Speed Guard Boats for Vietnam. Malaysia and Singapore also added momentum to their military modernization, sensing festering pressure from China in the region.

Changing airpower projection

It is hard to overstate the importance of the Centrality of ASEAN in the era of great power rivalry between the armada of democracies and China. There are simmering differences between airforces in the region ranging from the advanced RSAF(Royal Singapore Airforce) to the aging Philippines airforce. The air forces in the region urgently require ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platforms and better A2D (Area Denial) capabilities to ward off any PLAAF attacks in the future.

ASEAN’s airpower is no match for the PLAAF. ASEAN countries are looking to balance this asymmetry by partnering with the US, France, and India to beef up their capabilities against future Chinese aggression.

Taiwan, and QUAD

Taiwan is modernizing its military arsenal from F-16s to mine delivery systems. US and allies like UK and Japan have continued with their Joint drills in the Taiwan Strait. So far, Taiwan has seen 36 airspace violations by the PLAAF this year. Recently the US has approved a possible sale of the Patriot missile system to Taiwan. Taiwan has increased its defense budget by $8.6 billion to match Chinese adventurism. With the US shifting its focus to Indo-Pacific with adherence to rules-based regional order, it has become more pronounced and definitive that Washington is likely to put a web of expansive security structures is at play.

Integrated deterrence is the cornerstone of the US’s approach, with AUKUS and QUAD complimenting each other. QUAD has emerged as a front runner in the region, but still, ASEAN countries are reluctant to engage with QUAD directly QUAD+ because they see it as an anti-China grouping. ASEAN is more interested in AUKUS as they see it as a security umbrella in the region that can help in deterring China. ASEAN is also trying to achieve strategic heft by engaging in bilaterals with QUAD nations on a positive and productive memo in shaping the post-COVID strategic balance.

Chinese Lawfare

Chinese strategic scholars have renewed their focus on the concept of “Four sha” from the nine-dash line claims. Four sha or (four sands archipelagos) are the four island groups in the SCS region over which Beijing claims it has historical rights. The Chinese call them Dongsha Qundao, Xisha Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao, and Nansha Qundao (Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank area, and the Spratly Islands).

This lawfare strategy shift by Beijing is a UNCLOS-like justification for control over the South China Sea, with some legal basis. Psychological operations such Chinese fishing fleet anchoring on the Philippines reef compliments its lawfare tactics. In addition to this, China is also using its expansive grey zone operations by funding election candidates and utilizing political and business elites to prioritize the benefits of not antagonizing Beijing within ASEAN nations.

Fractured ASEAN questions centrality

Chinese have weakened the authority and relevance of UNCLOS in the absence of a coordinated and unified regional stance supporting its rules in principle and practice. ASEAN’s role in the disputes remains hamstrung by internal divide over its responsibility as a regional grouping for protecting individual state maritime rights, despite its various statements affirming UNCLOS as the basis for resolving maritime entitlement disputes. ASEAN is a house divided among fence-sitting members like Cambodia and Brunei that are not directly affected by the South China Sea disputes and do not want to antagonize China, making it harder to arrive at a common ASEAN position.

Conclusion

China continued assertion of its unilateral maritime laws has compelled ASEAN and QUAD to work in tandem towards rule-based order for a free and fair Indo-Pacific vision. There are some positive signs of bilateral cooperation on maritime law enforcement with ASEAN states settling their overlapping EEZs boundaries. There is an assertion of maritime rights and a clear rejection of Chinese claims from parties involved which attracts great capacity-building and regulatory support from the Quad states and others like France and the UK. The Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia have begun to push back against China.

The centrality of ASEAN is imperative for effective regulation of fishing rights and can augment their joint capabilities and complicate the Chinese two-ocean strategy. QUAD can also improve interoperability, ISR capabilities, and shared logistics for power projection through ASEAN nations to form a robust architecture and help against piracy and longstanding threats to the region’s socioeconomic security and future prosperity.

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