Indian Defence Review

However like the Infantry, modernization of the artillery has also been a matter of concern in the last decade or so. In these years much has apparently been done but unfortunately without any headway. Actually the process began in the early eighties. But other than 400 Bofors guns procured in the mid eighties we have nothing else to show.The exercise to procure new towed and mounted self propelled tracked and wheeled 155 mm 52 caliber guns are on. We are also planning to induct a specified number of light weight 155 mm guns for certain areas and missions. It is important at this juncture to focus on ensuring that the process of evaluation and induction moves without any hiccups and delays.

As we induct these guns the space of the contact battle at the tactical level will increase to a 30 km envelop thus enhancing our ability to destroy, maneuver, and defeat. Similarly we need to pay more attention to the requirements of the Artillery at the operational and strategic level. In this context even though we have been inducting the Prithvi, the BrahMos and the Agni series, the process has been based on the developmental projects of the DRDO and not on the basis of a well thought through conceptual framework. The subject of rocket and missile artillery thus merits deeper examination. We require more systems that can provide coverage between the 30 to 100 Km ranges. Besides, the liquid propellant based Prithvi imposes certain operational limitations. Admittedly the Smerch rocket system has filled this gap to some extent but much more needs to be done.

The Armor is the only arm of the Indian Army whose upgradation and modernization has by and large been on track.

Firing platforms like the guns and rocket and missile launchers are just one of the four pillars upon which comprehensive artillery capability is structured. The other pillars are communications to include artillery command and control systems, surveillance systems and the ammunition systems. In the Kargil war our communications and surveillance systems were not adequate. Thus the guns could be exploited to only 30 percent of their potential.

In principle surveillance and target acquisition capabilities must exceed our delivery systems ranges by at least 30 percent. The ideal would be 50 percent. We have been working on this for a while but more needs to be done. We should be able to establish a comprehensive surveillance and target acquisition grid by using a mix of ground and air/ space based sensors to include satellites, aircraft, drones, helicopters and tethered balloons. On the ground besides, electro optical devices and thermal cameras we will also require a sufficient number of weapon locating radars some of which should be employable in the mountains. The surveillance grid must allow for transmission and exchange of data to all shooters and decision makers in real time. The problems of surveillance in the mountains merit special attention.

Advancements in ammunition technology have led to a dramatic enhancement in the lethality and destructiveness of the artillery. With improved conventional munitions (ICM) the kill capacity of the ordinary shell has gone up in multiples. Smart and intelligent munitions now permit pinpoint accuracy enabling the artillery to engage and destroy fortifications and tanks from long ranges. We must induct such sophisticated ammunition speedily. However while doing so the challenge lies in getting the mix right since sensor/seeker based munitions are relatively very expensive.

Armor and Mechanized Infantry

The Armor is the only arm of the Indian Army whose upgradation and modernization has by and large been on track. With the induction of the T 90 tanks our armor is as good as any in the world even though some upgrade programs on the T 72 are a bit behind schedule. With the planned induction of TI based fire control systems and active protection systems our armor is likely to remain contemporary for the foreseeable future.

The BMP 2 inventory merits attention. It is understood that comprehensive plans have been drawn up to improve its fire power mobility and night fighting capabilities. Once implemented the BMP units will have the requisite level of compatibility with our tank fleet.

Supporting Arms

AD Artillery. Traditionally the Army’s approach to air defense has been to look at a family of guns and missiles to provide a tiered air defense umbrella to the tactical battle area (TBA). With the advancements in missile technology there is a case to review this approach. Contemporary medium and short range surface-to-air missiles have hit probabilities that are close to 0.9 and 1 (90 to 100 percent). If backed by sound surveillance, acquisition and tracking systems, the air defense umbrella provided can be reasonably effective. It is for this reason that not many countries/ weapon manufacturers are today in the business of making air defense guns. To my mind the focus should be on procuring adequate numbers of both the short range and the medium range missiles and have them backed up by effective surveillance coverage of the air space impacting the TBA. In this, field coordination with the air force has been lacking in the past. Hopefully the problem has now been addressed.

An executive of a company engaged in the development of robots asked me recently as to why the Indian defense forces were not interested in this subject.

Engineers. With battle field transparency progressively improving there is a case to review our concepts of laying defensive and tactical minefields. We should instead graduate to the concept of laying reactive/impromptu minefields using mechanical systems to lay mines or have them remotely delivered. Based on the conclusions arrived appropriate capabilities would have to be built up.

Signals. Communications are getting cheaper and better by the day. Advancements are extremely rapid. We must radically change our approach to remain in step. Gone are the days of plans like the AREN and the ASCON. The attitude required is that of the average mobile phone user who changes his phone without much ado. Rapidity of decision making and implementation will now be vital.

Other than the requirements of the arms there are two areas that deserve much greater attention in the future. The first is a subject that we have been grappling with for a while, made some progress, but not enough, and that is simulators. Virtual reality and graphics can today bring enormous realism to training. Most of our section and platoon/troop training should be based on contemporary simulation systems. Again at the unit and formation level we should depend much more on war gaming and simulation to train our officers and commanders.

The second is robots. These are futuristic platforms that will be performing a variety of missions in the battlefields of tomorrow. Some have already been deployed, many more will follow. An executive of a company engaged in the development of robots asked me recently as to why the Indian defense forces were not interested in this subject. My cryptic response was that we have not yet learnt to value human lives sufficiently. However the topic goes beyond lives. It is about doing certain missions more effectively. Besides other things a robot can perform quite a few human tasks without experiencing stress and fear.

The preceding analysis of the possible requirements of the Army is by no means exhaustive. It is just a cursory survey from a given perspective. There could be other differing views on some of the suggestions made. But what perhaps is beyond debate is the imperative of substantive capability accretion if the Army is expected to successfully face the challenges of the coming decades. More importantly, is that the plans for induction of new weapons and equipment and force multipliers must not follow the pattern that we have witnessed in the past two or three decades. Acquisitions have to be urgently undertaken.

Also read: Defence of Srinagar 1947