The challenges that the Army is expected to face in the next decade are not likely to be any less formidable. An appraisal of the emerging threats in fact indicates an increasing complexity of the missions that the army may be expected to execute.
The basic character of the Army’s responsibilities is unlikely to witness significant changes. Till the boundary disputes with China and Pakistan remain unresolved, Army’s most important role of ensuring the nation’s territorial integrity will retain primacy. Concurrently, as in the past, the Army will continue to remain embroiled in combating militancy, insurgency and terrorism. With the prevailing instability in the immediate and near neighborhood, and the growing regional and global role of our country, the Army must also be prepared to undertake missions beyond our borders. It may be added that however much the Army may want to resist, it will continue to be drawn to tackle internal law and order situations and national manmade or natural calamities.
Over the last few years China too has begun to demonstrate bellicosity, tinged with arrogance, against us.
How has the Army fared in the last two decades in the discharge of its responsibilities? At considerable cost to itself it has barely managed to keep the lid on. Given the serious shortage of junior officers, and the indifferent and insufficient weaponry at its disposal, the Army it can be contended, has done exceedingly well. Regrettably the problems of the Army, and the stresses it is subjected to, are understood only by those who are in it. The MOD and the political leadership, or for that matter also the strategic community have a vague awareness, nowhere close to the ground realities. This explains the decades of inertia.
Exploiting the progressive decline of our conventional military capability all through the decade of the eighties, Pakistan launched a well orchestrated offensive through irregulars in Kashmir from about the beginning of 1990. When the momentum of this offensive seemed to be petering out Pakistan did not hesitate to gamble for higher stakes by resorting to Kargil. The Kargil fiasco and the growing domestic instability, however, did not dampen Pakistan’s appetite for fomenting trouble for us. The terror attack on our Parliament in 2001 and 26 Nov 2008 – Mumbai is still fresh in our memory.
Over the last few years China too has begun to demonstrate bellicosity, tinged with arrogance, against us. Border intrusions with the purpose of intimidation coupled with force accretions in Tibet and along the LAC, portend problems for us. Its aggressive posturing on other fronts compounds the basket of our concerns.
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Viewed from the national security perspective it emerges that our concept of military deterrence has failed or is failing. Clearly then, the Army’s conventional war fighting capabilities must be brought to levels that promise if not absolute, sufficient deterrence.
The Army could do with a totally fresh appraisal to cover its overall strength, its structure and equipment profile, the quality of its man power, its leadership and its training. Such a review could perhaps be relevant and necessary for the Navy and the Air Force as well.
So how do we go about building a credible dissuasive conventional military deterrence? For the past two to three decades the three services have been unsuccessfully trying to drive the process. It would be mindless to persist with the same approach. The responsibility must shift to the PM and his Cabinet Committee on Security. This is not going to happen without some precipitate action. How this is to be brought about is a matter that the services must address?
The Army could do with a totally fresh appraisal to cover its overall strength, its structure and equipment profile, the quality of its man power, its leadership and its training. Such a review could perhaps be relevant and necessary for the Navy and the Air Force as well.
In this article I propose to dwell on the subject of equipment and weaponry for the Army. Technological advancements are taking place rapidly. Correspondingly the rate of obsolescence is also increasing. It is therefore imperative that we manage change with much greater sophistication so as to ensure available funds are utilized optimally. It follows that individuals charged with formulating qualitative requirements, induction plans and evaluation of systems must be competent and have the requisite grooming and experience. Even though this issue has been debated before no concrete remedial steps have yet been taken.
As regards weapons and equipment, the focus will essentially be on the combat arms i.e. infantry, artillery and armor (listed in what I believe should be the order of priority). Force multipliers and a few other support systems will also be discussed.
Infantry
The Infantry is the largest arm of our Army and the only arm which has perhaps never had a respite from combat from the time the Naga insurgency began in the fifties. Matters worsened when we sent the expeditionary force to Sri Lanka for Operation Pawan. Ever since, the Infantry has continued, without break, to climb the stress ladder.
The resolve to modernize the infantry soldier has been there for long, but the process has been painfully slow. Ways have to be found to accelerate the process and do it comprehensively.
Considering the Infantry’s constant engagement in battle I am aware that all Army Chiefs from the early nineties have sought to give the Infantry the highest priority in terms of equipping and modernizing it. But if we were to carry out a critical appraisal of the Infantry in 2010 the report card of twenty years effort would be quite dismal. How ironical, especially when costs are lower and the systems involved are relatively not so complex? The story is eloquent testimony to the manner in which the country’s higher defense management works.
Almost everything that a soldier needs, from the clothes and boots to the weapon he carries, is at present well below par.
Consider the 5.56 family of weapons that the Army is currently equipped. The Army was virtually bulldozed into accepting these weapons. It was told that indigenous R&D must be encouraged. Promises were made that in the production models the user will get a much improved and more reliable version and that a superior Mark 2 will follow. The DRDO also hinted that high volume orders from many foreign customers would be placed soon after the Indian Army accepted the induction and placed orders for delivery. The Army had no choice but to accept though none of the commitments materialized. It has lived with these weapons for more than a decade and paid an incalculable price. A good and reliable personal weapon we know does wonders to a soldier’s confidence and morale. But we have failed in giving him such a weapon. Shouldn’t there be review and people held accountable?
Conceptually the start point of capability–building and modernization has to be the individual soldier. So we must begin by giving him the best we can. Essentially what the soldier needs is a good and reliable personal weapon, comfortable clothing with stealth and concealment features designed to ergonomically accommodate everything he has to carry, the best protection (body armor) that portable weight permits, stabilized helmet mounted computer screens, sensors and night vision devices for observation and using his weapons, effective communications and position locating/ situational awareness systems. In addition he requires a host of sundry items like eye protection goggles, contemporary light bag pack equipment etc. The approach should be to look at the tactical vest and the helmet (protective gear) as a platform on which the future soldier systems are embedded so that weight reduction and mobility improvements issues are optimally addressed.
The resolve to modernize the infantry soldier has been there for long, but the process has been painfully slow. Ways have to be found to accelerate the process and do it comprehensively. We must therefore begin as of yesterday.When considering assault rifles we have quite a few options available; each having its unique features. Let us briefly look at the 21st century trends in assault rifles. Essentially they are refinements to the systems developed in the previous decades. Some exciting options that could be considered are:-
- Heckler & Koch HK 416 firing the 5.56x 45 or the HK 417 firing the 7.62×51 NATO rounds. Both these weapons have updated features with Picatinny rails, a drop free magazine release, and some other smart features.
- Israel’s IMI Tavor TAR-21. It has a compact bull pup design and uses the NATO 5.56x 45 cartridges. It can easily be set up for right or left handed shooters and has several modular variants that come with a standard reflex sight.
- XM 8 from the US. This has quite a few modular variants with inbuilt electronics such as a laser sight, round counter and integral infra red and visible sights.
- South Korea’s XK11. This is an interesting new rifle that has a ballistic computer, a laser range finder and a digital scope that provides the soldier with combat data and enables night firing through thermal imaging sights. The product is still at a prototype stage but has considerable promise.
- The AK Series. The Kalashnikovs family of assault rifles is much too well known.
An important trend in small arms in the 21st century is that sophisticated electronics is now being built into the design of these weapons. Whereas I believe we are currently looking at the weapons and the allied electronics as two separate systems to be procured independent of each other and then integrated. There could be some justification for the approach we have now adopted. A few years ago we had considered integration of night sights in our tender for assault rifles. At that time there weren’t many who were offering such embedded systems. To my mind the idea was right though the timing was wrong. But now, with most weapon manufacturers developing weapons with built in electronics, I am not too sure whether we should be jettisoning a sound concept.
“¦blinded by the labels of “˜support and “˜supported, the Army has not yet grasped the full import of the modern artillery on tomorrows battlefield.
Given the current employment of the Army and looking at the two vital needs of the infantry soldier i.e. his personal weapon and his body armor, it is difficult to decide which merits greater priority. What is but evident that on both counts the establishment has been found wanting.
Today we have all of the Rashtriya Rifles and a significant proportion of the Army deployed in combating militancy, terrorism and insurgencies. Of these how many of their personnel, are equipped with suitable body armor? And what are the constraints to procuring body armor? On both counts we will get answers that are far from convincing, particularly when today we have a host of companies in India manufacturing body armor and combat helmets. With a dynamic and inclusive approach we can harness the capabilities of these companies to give us quality protection suits and helmets at competitive prices. As a matter of fact with some support in terms of investment in R&D and inducements of assured orders, our companies can well become global leaders in protective solutions.
Assessments suggest that in the development of ‘small arms protective inserts’ (SAPI), technology today is at only the 40 percent level. Both in the case of X SAPI – silicon carbide and ceramic and E SAPI, and high molecular weight polyethylene (HMW- PE) and aramid fibers, there are possibilities that by improving the quality of resins and making the weave more unidirectional, weight to protection ratios can be substantially improved.
The infantry also needs to acquire better surveillance and target acquisition capabilities as well as more potent fire power at the section level and above. A mission, terrain and adversary based analysis may suggest the induction of special weapons and surveillance systems on a regional basis. It can be assumed that such an exercise would have been undertaken.
Artillery
In my reckoning Artillery modernization has not made any headway because of two reasons. The first is that- blinded by the labels of ‘support’ and ‘supported’, the Army has not yet grasped the full import of the modern artillery on tomorrow’s battlefield. The second can best be described by just one word: jinxed.
However like the Infantry, modernization of the artillery has also been a matter of concern in the last decade or so. In these years much has apparently been done but unfortunately without any headway. Actually the process began in the early eighties. But other than 400 Bofors guns procured in the mid eighties we have nothing else to show.The exercise to procure new towed and mounted self propelled tracked and wheeled 155 mm 52 caliber guns are on. We are also planning to induct a specified number of light weight 155 mm guns for certain areas and missions. It is important at this juncture to focus on ensuring that the process of evaluation and induction moves without any hiccups and delays.
As we induct these guns the space of the contact battle at the tactical level will increase to a 30 km envelop thus enhancing our ability to destroy, maneuver, and defeat. Similarly we need to pay more attention to the requirements of the Artillery at the operational and strategic level. In this context even though we have been inducting the Prithvi, the BrahMos and the Agni series, the process has been based on the developmental projects of the DRDO and not on the basis of a well thought through conceptual framework. The subject of rocket and missile artillery thus merits deeper examination. We require more systems that can provide coverage between the 30 to 100 Km ranges. Besides, the liquid propellant based Prithvi imposes certain operational limitations. Admittedly the Smerch rocket system has filled this gap to some extent but much more needs to be done.
The Armor is the only arm of the Indian Army whose upgradation and modernization has by and large been on track.
Firing platforms like the guns and rocket and missile launchers are just one of the four pillars upon which comprehensive artillery capability is structured. The other pillars are communications to include artillery command and control systems, surveillance systems and the ammunition systems. In the Kargil war our communications and surveillance systems were not adequate. Thus the guns could be exploited to only 30 percent of their potential.
In principle surveillance and target acquisition capabilities must exceed our delivery systems ranges by at least 30 percent. The ideal would be 50 percent. We have been working on this for a while but more needs to be done. We should be able to establish a comprehensive surveillance and target acquisition grid by using a mix of ground and air/ space based sensors to include satellites, aircraft, drones, helicopters and tethered balloons. On the ground besides, electro optical devices and thermal cameras we will also require a sufficient number of weapon locating radars some of which should be employable in the mountains. The surveillance grid must allow for transmission and exchange of data to all shooters and decision makers in real time. The problems of surveillance in the mountains merit special attention.
Advancements in ammunition technology have led to a dramatic enhancement in the lethality and destructiveness of the artillery. With improved conventional munitions (ICM) the kill capacity of the ordinary shell has gone up in multiples. Smart and intelligent munitions now permit pinpoint accuracy enabling the artillery to engage and destroy fortifications and tanks from long ranges. We must induct such sophisticated ammunition speedily. However while doing so the challenge lies in getting the mix right since sensor/seeker based munitions are relatively very expensive.
Armor and Mechanized Infantry
The Armor is the only arm of the Indian Army whose upgradation and modernization has by and large been on track. With the induction of the T 90 tanks our armor is as good as any in the world even though some upgrade programs on the T 72 are a bit behind schedule. With the planned induction of TI based fire control systems and active protection systems our armor is likely to remain contemporary for the foreseeable future.
The BMP 2 inventory merits attention. It is understood that comprehensive plans have been drawn up to improve its fire power mobility and night fighting capabilities. Once implemented the BMP units will have the requisite level of compatibility with our tank fleet.
Supporting Arms
AD Artillery. Traditionally the Army’s approach to air defense has been to look at a family of guns and missiles to provide a tiered air defense umbrella to the tactical battle area (TBA). With the advancements in missile technology there is a case to review this approach. Contemporary medium and short range surface-to-air missiles have hit probabilities that are close to 0.9 and 1 (90 to 100 percent). If backed by sound surveillance, acquisition and tracking systems, the air defense umbrella provided can be reasonably effective. It is for this reason that not many countries/ weapon manufacturers are today in the business of making air defense guns. To my mind the focus should be on procuring adequate numbers of both the short range and the medium range missiles and have them backed up by effective surveillance coverage of the air space impacting the TBA. In this, field coordination with the air force has been lacking in the past. Hopefully the problem has now been addressed.
An executive of a company engaged in the development of robots asked me recently as to why the Indian defense forces were not interested in this subject.
Engineers. With battle field transparency progressively improving there is a case to review our concepts of laying defensive and tactical minefields. We should instead graduate to the concept of laying reactive/impromptu minefields using mechanical systems to lay mines or have them remotely delivered. Based on the conclusions arrived appropriate capabilities would have to be built up.
Signals. Communications are getting cheaper and better by the day. Advancements are extremely rapid. We must radically change our approach to remain in step. Gone are the days of plans like the AREN and the ASCON. The attitude required is that of the average mobile phone user who changes his phone without much ado. Rapidity of decision making and implementation will now be vital.
Other than the requirements of the arms there are two areas that deserve much greater attention in the future. The first is a subject that we have been grappling with for a while, made some progress, but not enough, and that is simulators. Virtual reality and graphics can today bring enormous realism to training. Most of our section and platoon/troop training should be based on contemporary simulation systems. Again at the unit and formation level we should depend much more on war gaming and simulation to train our officers and commanders.
The second is robots. These are futuristic platforms that will be performing a variety of missions in the battlefields of tomorrow. Some have already been deployed, many more will follow. An executive of a company engaged in the development of robots asked me recently as to why the Indian defense forces were not interested in this subject. My cryptic response was that we have not yet learnt to value human lives sufficiently. However the topic goes beyond lives. It is about doing certain missions more effectively. Besides other things a robot can perform quite a few human tasks without experiencing stress and fear.
The preceding analysis of the possible requirements of the Army is by no means exhaustive. It is just a cursory survey from a given perspective. There could be other differing views on some of the suggestions made. But what perhaps is beyond debate is the imperative of substantive capability accretion if the Army is expected to successfully face the challenges of the coming decades. More importantly, is that the plans for induction of new weapons and equipment and force multipliers must not follow the pattern that we have witnessed in the past two or three decades. Acquisitions have to be urgently undertaken.
Following the rigid rigor of the DPP is a prescription for inaction or interminable delays. Important acquisitions must therefore be brought under some fast track procedures. Surely, we have the genius to conceive a policy and a structure that can ensure that within the framework of fiscal and procedural prudence, sound procurement decisions are taken within the desired time frames.
We do not need astrologers to tell us that the security climate for us over the next decade or so is unlikely to be benign. If we do not then prepare to face the potential threats it is possible that we may face humiliation similar to what happened to us in 1962.
Please wait...
The Indian army needs a total Re-appraisal in many spheres esp. in the Selection board policies & promotions to see that that the right type of people make it to the level of Commanding officers & further up to the army high command..One more aspect needs to be looked at urgently.I remember my classmates in army public school giving first choice to Arms[Armoured & Infantry ] when they joined NDA & IMA & the toppers got Armoured & infantry.Nowdays, the toppers in NDA are choosing the Services like the Army Supply corps, Ordnance etc where they can make money-The result is poor type of COs of battalions & regiments.