Indian Defence Review

Selection of the Optimum & Cost-Effective System

This phase has two parts, namely the technical and the commercial. The technical part has generally been handled in a professional manner practically for most defence purchases. Witness the Bofors gun which served the country well in the Kargil conflict, though it is still mired in controversy for other reasons. It is the commercial part which needs the element of transparency as also a professional approach. Take the case of the Medium Range Air-to-Air missile, which was part of the inventory some twenty years ago. Since this missile was then contemporary, the DRDO would not have had much knowledge of its material and technological aspects and its cost. It was natural therefore to depend on the foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for information on capability and costs which naturally would benefit them. If the DRDO and the IAF had together formulated a long term plan with funds and accountability, the IAF would have been better placed during discussions on the cost, capability and support requirements for the missile. The next step on the road to indigenisation is for the individual service, the DRDO, the concerned industry, public or private, as well as the foreign vendor to agree upon a road map for transfer of core technologies to India.

A good example to follow would be that of the model adopted by Embraer company of Brazil, one of the leading designers of regional airliners and executive jets, and one in which the US has a stake. There is a need for a more flexible approach towards foreign participation. Perhaps, there is also a need to enhance Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in defence industry from the current level of 26 per cent to around 50 per cent to allow excess capacity to be exported and other such incentives, so that the combination of the latest technologies with India’s low labour costs and technological capability, can provide a winning formula for both the foreign partner and the Indian industry.

Acquisition, Induction & Support for the Selected Weapon System

The Indian Armed Forces have shown their ability to absorb high technology weapon systems. Witness the ease with which the Mirage-2000 and Su-30 MKI have been inducted into the IAF. The Indian Navy has inducted and operated the HDW and other submarines with similar ease. The Indian Army has also displayed a high level of competence in handling the Bofors gun and other high technology weapon systems. Acquisition and induction have not been a problem for the Indian Armed Forces, but provision of spares has been especially the lack of response by the Russians in relation to product support for aircraft and other weapon systems acquired from them. The Western vendors have been no better and hence it is important for the three services to be adequately knowledgeable.

This knowledge applies also to the quantity and cost of spares supplied by foreign vendors. With the road map for transfer of technologies serving as template, the DRDO would involve itself with the new induction, especially in relation to core technologies of engines and radar in the case of all the three services, stealth technology and night vision devices enabling them to be aware of all the problems associated with the core technology and methods of coping with them. This interaction can go both ways, where engineers and technicians from the services interact with the foreign vendors and the concerned PSUs are able to assess the reliability and cost of components as also that of production so that there is mutual confidence. Also, the charges for the entire weapon system as well as that of the spares would be reasonable. Apart from this, during its service life, such close monitoring will allow the services to arrange for buyback of extra spares that have been sold. Both the foreign vendor and the public or private player will be more open and transparent in their dealings with the three services. Cases of overcharging will reduce as the services gain more knowledge and as they monitor more closely all aspects of induction, operation and maintenance of these systems.

The joint development of the Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) could serve as an example wherein along with the induction of the C-130J Hercules, where HAL designers and engineers working on the MTA, could visit the C-130 Squadron to understand the modifications on this aircraft and incorporate relevant changes in the MTA. Conversely, IAF engineers and technicians posted to the Hercules unit and with earlier experience on An-32 and IL-76 aircraft of Russian origin, as also on the British HS-748 Avro, could suggest relevant changes in the design of the MTA, to make it a more efficient and effective platform. Also an understanding could be obtained of the way the Americans address the operational and maintenance challenges encountered.

Such an approach will ensure that both knowledge and cost effectiveness are addressed, which in turn will build up mutual understanding and respect of each other’s knowledge and capabilities. Other important considerations can be resolved in the following manner. We need a rolling modernisation and acquisition board consisting of representatives from the services, the DRDO, the industry, finance and other agencies and operate as a cohesive body and where around one-third retire every five years. This will ensure continuity in policy and its execution. The parliamentary committee on defence needs to question the delays in acquisition of critical weapon systems and make their reports available in the public domain. Perhaps it is time for the concerned Chiefs of Staff to take a firm stand whenever there are inordinate delays. Defence deals call for more transparency and oversight.

Finally, it needs to be ensured that the parking of funds from each service to a particular PSU, if they are taking place, be stopped, for it is not the sensible and correct way to handle vast amounts of funds.

Conclusion

Delays and higher costs have been the bane of defence procurement. Through interaction with foreign vendors, the DRDO and Public or Private sector vendors, the services can gain knowledge on operational, maintenance as well as cost aspects of a weapon system. Such regular and continuous interaction will also provide the necessary impetus to the drive towards indigenisation.