Indian Defence Review

Could the performance of the ADA been better? Like everything else, there is always a room for improvement but it is also important to understand the constraints under which the ADA was operating. Firstly, the allotment of ADA was biased towards defence of IAF bases and installations with the only six AD regiments, of the total twenty, allotted to field army in the Western Sector. The situation in the East was similar with only six of the total eighteen ADA batteries allotted to field army. With PAF focussing more on support to Pak Army, it meant that there were not enough ADA Troops to counter the PAF while the ADA deployed on most of the air bases just waited endlessly for the PAF. Secondly, some of the ADA Troops with the field formations were sub-allotted in sections and detachments which further reduced their efficacy.

As regards the performance of ADA at the air bases, the undue restrictions imposed on the ADA while deployed at the air bases and other IAF installations adversely affected their efficacy. The ADA, as a standard practice, was given ‘Guns Tight’ orders. It is understandable, and necessary, to have restrictions on own AD guns when friendlies are in the air but these restrictions were imposed even during ongoing air raid(s) and when there were no friendlies in the air. This was partly done to hide the location and alignment of the runway from the raiding PAF aircraft but is also meant that the AD guns were not allowed to carry out a timely engagement of the raiding aircraft. The following example, the personal account of the raid at Halwara on 3 December is illustrative:¹⁹

At 2338 Barnala declared Halwara as threatened and I sounded the air raid siren. I ordered ‘Guns Tight’ for the AD Arty units( emphasis added).

I was now under a threat.  No friendly aircraft were airborne within my airspace.  It should have been logical therefore to place the guns free.I had no inclination of disclosing the location of the airfield.  The airfield was well camouflaged and concealed.  Night visibility was not very high.  Hence, ‘Guns Tight’ was a better option.

At times, the delay in clearing ADA to engage the PAF aircraft was due to the confusion that prevailed at the air bases:²⁰

I spotted the outline of an aircraft at quite a distance. Fixing my gaze I reconfirmed within myself that what I saw was right. Sure enough the aircraft kept closing in and instinctively I said that it had to be an enemy aircraft approaching from the ‘West’ as no other known traffic was expected from that direction.

I promptly informed the Base Commander on the Hotline. In utter disbelief he uttered “Impossible! (as no Radar had informed about any intruder)”. Keeping my gaze fixed at the aircraft I kept reporting to the Base Cdr about the approaching aircraft urging him to act.

Lo and behold at 2033- 34 hrs the intruder arrived overhead and very cunningly dropped delay fuse bombs during this in-bound run, one of which fell a few yards away from my tower. Soon afterwards the first bomb-explosion was heard and a few seconds later I saw the same aircraft going back in the same direction from where it had approached dropping many more live bombs.

As the first bomb exploded, the Hotline buzzed and the voice in excitement asked, “what is it”, I said “the same aircraft on its way back after completing his mission” and he exclaimed “On Sh….”. 

Air Chief Marshal PC Lal also notes in his memoirs “My Years with the IAF’ that during a PAF raid, ADA guns were ordered ‘Guns Tight’ even though it was known that B-57 was ‘not ours’.²¹ There are other examples also but the aforementioned would suffice to emphasise the point that undue restrictions imposed on ADA only resulted in reducing their efficacy.

Notwithstanding the constraints and restrictions imposed, ADA performed well and complemented the interceptors well in taking on the intruders. It was also the only effective deterrence during the PAF raids in the night. Another point to note is the failures of the SA-2s of the IAF which did not manage to shoot down any PAF aircraft even as they were given priority over the ADA in engaging the enemy aircraft.In the TBA, the ADA did well to keep the PAF at bay and helped the IAF maintain a favourable air situation. A measure of their contribution during the war is the award of three honour titles to ADA for their performance in the TBA and one for the defence of Amritsar Airfield.

The award of four honour titles and thirteen Vir Chakras notwithstanding, the role of ADA has largely been overlooked during the 1971 as it happened during the 1965 war. One reason for this is the general absence of a comprehensive history of ADA during the war. Also, there are no personal narratives and accounts of the war veterans in the public domain. Hopefully this void will be corrected in the future and the contributions of ADA during the war will be more widely known and understood.

13. Prasad, SN, India-Pakistan War of 1971 A History, Natraj Publishers, New Delhi 2014, pp 236-37
14. ibid.
15. Tiwary, Air Vice Marshal Ak, Indian Air Force in the Wars, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2013, pp 214-16 (Kindle Edition)
16. The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry Into the 1971 War, University of Michigan Press, 2000, p 237
17. ibid
18. Ghosh, Wing Commander Anil, The Night Intruder: A Personal Tribute to the Canberras, Bharat Rakshak, 13 June 2017, accessed at https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1971war/1268-anil-ghosh.html#gsc.tab=0
19. Sen, Gp Captain TK, Hectic Days at Halwara-4 The Enemy Shows Up, TKS’ Tales, 4 April 2010 accessed at https://tkstales.wordpress.com/2010/04/04/hectic-days-in-halwara-4-the-enemy-shows-up/
20. Chaudhri, Wg Cdr Divakar, Sirsa’s War, Bharat Rakshak, 23 August 2011 accessed at http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1971War/1095-Sirsa-War.html#gsc.tab=0
21. Lal, Air Chief Marshal, My Years with the IAF,Lancer Publications, New Delhi, 1986 p 270