Indian Defence Review

I now realised that the surprise of our infiltration had been blown. The enemy would react to our presence with speed and vengeance. So I ordered my company to establish the roadblock in that general area. We dug down and blocked the road from both ends with a clear killing ground in the centre. I asked the FOO to carry out silent registration of targets on approaches to the roadblock. To my surprise neither the coordinates of our location, the target nor the location of the gun position were known to him. Therefore, silent registration was not possible and he asked my permission for active registration of at least one target. He conveyed to the gun position that he was approximately two to three kilometres from the river bank on the road to Bogra to indicate his approximate location and adopted the Bravo Tango – Oscar Tango procedure to direct fire. The target chosen was a bamboo grove about 500 yards from our location. Fortunately, the first round fell in the proximity of the target and we could see the flash of the impact on ground. He corrected the fire with two more rounds. We now knew our exact location.

I admired the FOO’s ingenuity in directing fire on a target in a totally unknown area at night. He carried out silent registration of remaining targets as we did not want to arouse the enemy before our roadblock was fully effective. At this juncture, Sub Dil Bahadur Tamang, No 2 Platoon Commander, an unassuming but bold Gurkha, came to me and reported that an enemy party of four men on foot, carrying RR ammunition from depth localities to forward companies, had been intercepted by his platoon. They had been overpowered and their necks slit with Khukris to maintain silence and surprise. He took me to his platoon that was a short distance away and showed me four enemy bodies neatly laid in a row. I was very pleased with his presence of mind and achievement. Then it dawned on me that I was not behind the enemy position but somewhere in the middle of his defenses. I took a quick round of the roadblock to ensure that we were ready for enemy reaction. I told the Platoon Commanders to send out perimeter patrols and place listening posts and sentries so that we were not taken by surprise.

Fully confident and satisfied with our achievement, I sat in my fox-hole wrapped in a rain cape to rest before the main action started. It was bitterly cold, and the sweat and grime all over my body due to exertion, fatigue and anxiety made me very uncomfortable. Just then, the perimeter patrol from No 1 Platoon located a telephone line, leading off the road. 2/Lt Teja Bedi along with about section strength proceeded to investigate the line. After walking about 300 yards, Teja Bedi found himself facing a group of bunkers, trenches, antennas and telephone exchange in what looked like Headquarters. Men were sleeping on the ground and the sentries were facing away from him perhaps also sleeping. There was no sign of life except flickering of dim light in one of the bunkers. He alerted me of the situation in a hushed voice on the radio. I immediately ordered his remaining platoon to reinforce him and asked him to demonstrate that he was commanding a large force and assault the position if challenged. I followed him with some more men that I could muster immediately. After deploying his men, he along with Nk Bal Bahadur stealthily entered the closest bunker where light was flickering. Inside, they found a Pakistani Officer who turned around quickly towards them. But before he could react Nk Bal Bahadur pulled out his khukri and placed it at his neck.

Displaying exceptional presence of mind and courage, 2/ Lt Teja Bedi told the officer that his position had been surrounded. To his great surprise, the Pakistani Officer told Teja Bedi, that he was Major Muhammad Ajmal, Officiating Commanding Officer of 32 Baluch. The Commanding Officer Lt Col Sultan Mahmud had been killed during a counter-attack on 2/5 GR on night of December 7/8 at Pirganj. Teja Bedi who was in complete command of the situation, confidently and firmly reiterated to the Major that his position had been surrounded by 5/11 GR and he had no choice but to surrender or everyone would be killed in the ensuing firefight. Taken aback, completely confused and bewildered, Major Muhammad Ajmal disclosed that this was the Battalion Headquarters of 32 Baluch and offered to surrender if he did not kill him and his men. Teja asked him to come out of the bunker, order his men not to offer any resistance and to surrender peacefully. By now, the Headquarters of 32 Baluch had come alive and there was commotion. Like their Commanding Officer, they were also bewildered, confused and surprised to see the Gurkhas pointing their weapons at them ready to fire. Some of them attempted to man their weapons and positions. But Major Muhammad emerging out of the bunker, ordered his men not to offer resistance and remain peaceful, otherwise all of them would be killed as they had been surrounded. Just then, the reinforcements for Teja Bedi arrived. The Pakistanis were now convinced that they had been indeed surrounded. The enemy was lined up, searched and disarmed. A total of 25 personnel surrendered. Teja Bedi quickly collected the Officiating Commanding Officer, Adjutant, Capt Muhammad Salim, RMO, Capt Sherzaman, AMC, and the Commanding Officer’s two Radio Operators with their sets and marched them towards the Company Headquarters. Since it was not possible to control all the surrendered personnel with about 20 men that he had, lest our bluff was called off; he turned them around and fired randomly. They fled helter-skelter in the darkness of night to save their lives.

It was almost 0430h when the POWS were bundled up in the trenches of the Company Headquarters with their hands tied. A quick interrogation of the Officiating Commanding Officer revealed that his defenses were based on Ichamati River with two companies holding the river bank and one company in the depth. It was now confirmed that my company was in the guts of the enemy battalion. I spoke to Lt Col FT Dias, my Commanding Officer for the first time since the commencement of the infiltration and updated him on the events that had taken place so far. I requested him to affect a link-up with me as soon as possible. It would otherwise become untenable to hold onto the POWs and the roadblock.

No sooner had I finished speaking to the Commanding Officer than the enemy reacted violently to remove the roadblock and to rescue their Commanding Officer. Some of the enemy personnel who had escaped from the Battalion Headquarters may have informed their depth Company/ Brigade of the disaster that had befallen them. The eviction of the roadblock was necessary for their survival and it had to be done quickly at any cost. Anyhow, we had anticipated such a situation. Approximately one enemy Company, most probably from the depth, managed to close in on us, taking advantage of the darkness and thick bamboo groves. We were in a dangerous situation. If the enemy attacked us with determination and made even a small dent in our position, the balance would tilt in his favour. The hunter would become the hunted. Instead of the enemy, we would be the prisoners. I told my men not to yield even an inch of ground under any circumstances; we would fight it out till the last.

At this stage when we were under grave threat, I had no choice but to call for DF RED, RED, RED as the enemy was barely 200 yards away and closing in. The FOO gave executive fire order to the Gun Position. The artillery reacted immediately and very heavy effective fire rained on the enemy that had formed up for assault on my position as well. The crunch, flash and dust that accompanied were awe-inspiring. My company also brought down effective fire on the enemy pinning him down to ground. It was a fight for victory or death. When the salvos landed on us, we ducked in our trenches and piled on each other.

The Pakistani Commanding Officer was bewildered and ashen-faced as if in shock when the ground around us was shaking. He wondered if he would survive the bombardment and intermittently cursed his luck and prayed with eyes closed. He looked miserable and pathetic. I asked Major Muhhamad Ajmal to speak on his radio and ask his men not to press the attack otherwise he would be the first one to be shot by me. He immediately obeyed. Whether it had any effect is doubtful as his authority had ceased to exist. The shelling continued for about 15 minutes and great damage was caused to the enemy who was in the open. We received a few shrapnel and lots of dust and mud flying in our faces. After a feeble attempt to assault, the enemy faltered, broke line and withdrew in disorder, leaving behind a number of dead. He could not withstand the devastating arty and small arms fire.

This was perhaps one rare occasion when DF RED RED RED had been fired successfully. It was a great experience for all of us and it is a miracle that we survived such a savage and devastating fire. Meanwhile 5/11 GR attacked Saulakhandi and Malahar, the two forward companies at first light. The tanks of both 63 CAV and 69 Armoured Regiments also provided fire support. The enemy at Saulakhandi put up a stubborn resistance, but was eventually defeated by the determined “D” Company under Major AS Mamik. Many acts of bravery on the part of our men were recorded in this battle. After the Battle of Saulakhandi, the enemy realised the hopeless situation that he was in. With the capture of their Commanding Officer and destruction of their Headquarters, there was no central authority to command and control the operations. The defenders were demoralised and survival instinct over took them.

“B” Company under Major TB Rai made light of the enemy resistance at Malahar. Those who could not escape surrendered in large numbers. “C” Company under Capt MS Pathania mopped up the remaining opposition. As the depth Company had been used up in evicting my roadblock, there was token resistance from isolated pockets hiding in groves. He managed to rush the RCC Bridge on Ichamati Nala at Mahasthan before the enemy demolition party could fire the charges.

I sent PA-5511 Major Muhammad Ajmal the Officiating Commanding Officer along with his Adjutant Capt Muhammad Salim, RMO, Capt Sherzaman, AMC and Radio Operators to the Headquarters when the link-up took place. By 1100h on December 13, 32 Baluch had ceased to exist. It was a great humiliation for the Battalion. This was 5/11 Gorkha Rifles’ finest hour when a Battalion was not only routed, but completely annihilated an adversary Battalion by bold infiltration and attack. For this operation, Lt Col FT Dias, Major AS Mamik, Major JBS Yadava, and Capt Surjit Parmar, Arty, were awarded VrC; 2/Lt TS Bedi and Nk Bir Bahadur Magar, were awarded SM; Nk Nandlal Limbu and Rfn Lal Bahadur Rai were awarded M-in-D.

Valuable and costly lessons were learnt out of the Battle of Hilli and such like battles fought in other sectors from November 22, onwards till the outbreak of war on December 04, 1971. All of us were impressed by the tenacity and ingenuity of the Pakistan Army in stalling our set-piece attacks on Hilli. No doubt we fought bravely and eventually overcame stubborn resistance, but set-piece attacks on fortified defended localities were foolhardy on the part of our Commanders. We shook our heads in dismay and disappointment when huge casualties started arriving out of these attacks. This was quite demoralising. When the war commenced on December 04, it was clear that conventional attacks were out and we had to penetrate through the gaps in enemy defenses, isolate and attack him from the flank/ rear.

Fortunately for us, the Pakistan Army had taken forward posture to defend every inch of ground with no or very little reserves and depth. Their presumption was that the Indian Army will fight conventional battles along developed axes of advance as we had done in the 1965 War. By following these tactics, we would at best be able to wrest a few pockets of land to rehabilitate the refugees, before, either we were worn out or a ceasefire was imposed. The Battles of Hilli, Thakurgaon and Pachagarh Bulge from November 22 till the outbreak of war further reinforced their perception. Whatever reserves were available also got sucked in while fighting these battles.

When the war commenced on December 04, 66 Mountain Brigade of 20 Mountain Division had moved through the gap between Thakur Gaon and Hilli and reached Nawabganj by December 06 without encountering serious opposition. They were however very cautious, deliberate and not willing to venture deep inside enemy area, even though patrols had reported no enemy presence. Bad going conditions and lack of logistical build up was their prime excuse, but lack of enterprise was the main reason At this stage 20 Mountain Division decided to launch 340 (I) Infantry Brigade, an additional formation allotted to them, to give momentum to the operations and exploit success gained through the gap. 2/5 GR and a Squadron of 69 Armoured Regiment cut off Rangpur – Bogra highway at Pirganj by 1630 hrs on December 07. The enemy was surprised and the tide of operations turned in our favour then on. After securing their North flank at Pirganj and East flank at Gaibanda on the Brahmahputra, 20 Mountain Division decided to swing south towards Bogra, its prime objective. 5/11 GR relieved 2/5 GR and took over the advance to Bogra on December 09 (See Map). Goraghat on River Karotaya was invested from the East by the evening. However, before the battle could be developed fully, we were asked to disengage and hand over to 2/5 GR.

The advance to Bogra had to be resumed as speedily as possible before a ceasefire was forced on India by the international community. On December 11, the Battalion fought the Battle of Govindganj on the South bank of River Karotaya on its way to Bogra. The defenses were held by two companies of 32 Baluch who had fallen back from Gaibanda, one Company of 23 Punjab and assorted units. The battle was won by a wide left hook, by passing the enemy main defenses and then attacking him from the rear and flank. PT 76 Tanks of 69 Armoured Regiment carried the Battalion on this 56-kiometre hook across the country through marsh and wet lands.

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The defenses were well prepared and coordinated. The battle commenced at last light. The enemy was completely surprised by the maneuver and lost his nerve and will to fight when he found us in his rear and flank. The defenses crumpled within a few hours of fighting. The withdrawing enemy was annihilated by a block established by my Company and “C” Squadron 69 Armoured Regiment under Major SC Mehra, two kilometres behind the defenses at Kamar. 80 enemy soldiers were killed, 40 captured as POWs along with two Chaffee tanks, two 105 mm guns, 15 vehicle load of ammunition and 60 other vehicles. By 2100 hrs that day, Govindganj had fallen. We lost one officer and three ORs in the battle and one officer, one JCO and seven ORs were wounded. I was also wounded in this battle but joined my Company after treatment at the ADS. It was a big victory for us. But Bogra, the main objective of 20 Mountain Division was still out of sight and out of our grasp.