Military & Aerospace

1971: The blitzkrieg in East Pakistan - II
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The Indian casualties were 31 killed and 87 wounded against 26 Pakistanis captured and quite a few killed and wounded.

81 Mountain Brigade secured the Shamshernager complex by about midday on 2 December against stiff resistance by one company each of 22 Baluch and Tochi Scouts. The Indian casualties were 31 killed and 87 wounded against 26 Pakistanis captured and quite a few killed and wounded. On the other axis, 59 Mountain Brigade contacted Kulaura the same day but was not able to capture it till 6 December, and that too only after flushing out the opposition with a heavy dose of napalm bombing. The commencement of hostilities with the pre-emptive Pakistani strike in the western sector on 3 December brought a greater sense of urgency, and Sagat Singh ordered Krishna Rao to speed up the operation.

81 Mountain Brigade resumed its advance and secured Munshi Bazaar by 5 December. A company of 30 FF defending the town put up a brave fight, suffering about 22 killed, including the company commander, and 31 taken prisoner. Maulvi Bazaar was contacted by 7 December. Meanwhile, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles from 59 Mountain Brigade was lifted by helicopter across to southeast of Sylhet town and was soon in touch with its defences. The garrison commander had got the town vacated and converted it into a fortress which was held by Pakistani ad hoc 202 Infantry Brigade consisting of remnants of units falling back from the border defences. Fearful of being cut off by the Indian heliborne force and also being saturated daily with napalm, the commander of Pakistan 313 Infantry Brigade pulled his troops back to Sylhet without any interruption.

The battle of Sylhet, like that of Khulna, was lost by Pakistan elsewhere. It was remarkable that, despite battle fatigue and the prospect of an unequal fight, a company each at Shamshernagar and Kulaura, with a few paramilitary troops and very little artillery and air support, held Krishna Raos brigades for days.

This brought the number of the garrison to some six battalions, one artillery regiment and a mortar battery, but all these units were on reduced strength. Apte walked int. Maulvi Bazaar on 9 December without meeting any opposition, and he was able the next day to secure Saidpur and Sherpur ferries, which were found unoccupied. Having secured all its assigned objectives, the brigade was pulled out to Agartala airfield as corps reserve, as planned for a possible fly into Dacca.

Meanwhile, 59 Mountain Brigade advanced towards Sylhet and was able to capture Fenchugunj on 11 December and link up with its battalion 4/5 Gorkha Rifles on 13 December. 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, advancing south from Dauki in Khasi and Jaintia Hills along the Jaintiapur-Darbasth-Sylhet road, captured Chandghat and was able to invest Sylhet from the northeast, and then came under the command of 8 Mountain Division. Working its way cross-country from Kanairighat, Bangladesh Battalion also joined 5/5 Gorkha Rifles by 9 December.

From 13 December onwards, after 59 Mountain Brigade had built up on 4/5 Gorkha Rifles, Krishna Rao besieged the Sylhet fortress from all directions, but for some air strikes he awaited the garrison’s surrender on its own. This took place on 17 December and involved 109 officers, including three brigadiers, 191 JCOs and 6,124 other ranks, almost double the strength of Krishna Rao’s forces. The battle of Sylhet, like that of Khulna, was lost by Pakistan elsewhere. It was remarkable that, despite battle fatigue and the prospect of an unequal fight, a company each at Shamshernagar and Kulaura, with a few paramilitary troops and very little artillery and air support, held Krishna Rao’s brigades for days. And in spite of the great odds against them they managed to slip away to Sylhet.

Advance to Chittagong

An ad hoc force named Kilo and comprising two I battalions, two Bangladesh battalions, one battalion each from BSF and CRP, an artillery mountain regiment, a Mujib battery and a BSF post group, was created and placed under Brig Anand Sarup. In view of the change of corps thrust lines from Belonia to the Laksham area, the Pakistanis had vacated Feni, and this town was secured by the Kilo force on 6 December. Extending their operations, the force also occupied Kaberhat and Zorarganj by 8 December.

To everybodys horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force.

The force was then ordered to advance on Chittagong, and this began on 8 December. Opposition encountered at Sitakund was overcome by 12 December. Meanwhile, 83 Mountain Brigade, from 23 Mountain Division assigned to capture Chittagong, had also fetched up at Sitakund. Mukiraghat, held by a Pakistani force of about two mixed companies, was cleared on the night of 13 December. The combined force reached Faujdarhat on the outskirts of Chittagong by 15 December, when operations were suspended, against negligible opposition. The Chittagong garrison,comprising 161 officers, 305 JCOs, naval petty officers, and airforce warrant officers and 8,618 other ranks from all three services, surrendered after the ceasefire.

Amphibious Operation

Despite all advice to the contrary, the Chief had not given up his pet idea of an amphibious operation as part of his overall plan for liberating East Pakistan. Watching the rapid collapse of organised resistance in the province, he ordered a battalion group to be sent by sea to Cox’s Bazaar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping through that point to Burma. A group comprising 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two companies of 11 Bihar and some mortars was hastily collected, named Rome Force, placed under Commander Artillery, 8 Mountain Division, and put on a merchant ship to sail to a rendezvous off Cox’s Bazaar. MV Vishva Vijay set off with the force in the early hours of 12 December. A naval contingent of 50 which was to accompany the force did not arrive before the ship sailed.

Reaching the rendezvous on 14 December, the force was transferred to two LSTs, INS Guldar and Gharial. As the operation had been planned on the basis of maps, the actual survey of the landing coast was carried out on nearing the beach. To everybody’s horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force. There was no option to beaching somehow, and one of the LSTs beached on a runnel. Only 12 men could disembark, and two of them drowned.

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With another effort, some 30  more were put ashore. The commander of the force was in an awkward predicament when the men already ashore flashed back the news that there were no Pakistani troops in the area. Instead, they had contacted a group of Freedom Fighters. With their help the remainder of the force was transferred to shore in local fishing boats between 16 and 18 December. These country craft could carry very little heavy equipment, vehicles, guns and ammunition. This was one instance where the Chief overruled his advisery and pushed through a pet operation. It was undertaken without suitable craft and equipment and combined operations training. But for the coast being devoid of the Pakistanis and aid from the Mukti Bahini, this adventure would have ended in a fiasco.

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One thought on “1971: The blitzkrieg in East Pakistan – II

  1. Its time the highlights of Maj Gen SS. Ubban and the I.A.F pilots ( helicopter) deputed to him ( S.F.F) thru A.R.C and the role they played in October -November 1971 should be brought put and studied, otherwise they will fade away with time.

    The study of the same would help realise the integration and working of 3 agencies that too of covert ops. i.e , S.F.F ( thus army) IAF ( thru mainly heli operations) and the Intelligence thru A.R.C . Also some of the comments of the pilots after the kargil war hints at them not knowing their own force’s earlier operation and thus a learning curve could be missed

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