Indian Defence Review

Having failed in his manoeuvre, Sagat Singh switched back his thrust lines westward so as to catch Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade on the move and off balance.

It was known that Pakistan 117 Infantry Brigade was holding the Comilla-Maynamati-Lalmai Hills complex while 53 Infantry Brigade was to occupy the Laksham defences. Both these complexes were held in strength, leaving very little in depth. Sagat Singh therefore decided to isolate Laksham, bypass the Lalmai defences and make a dash for Chandpur and Daudkhandi. 61 Mountain Brigade under Brig Tom Pande, functioning under direct command of Headquarters IV Crops, was directed to cross the Gomti and cut off the Maynamati-Companyganj and Maynamati-Daud-khandi roads and close in on the Maynamati complex from the west and help in its reduction by 23 Mountain Division.

On receiving information that the enemy had withdrawn from Burichang on 7 December, in a characteristic dash Pande crossed the Gomti speedily and established roadblocks at Chandina and Jafarganj. In relentless pursuit, he pushed 15 Kumaon and a troop of armour forward to secure Daudkhandi. No organised opposition was encountered en route except for minor resistance of about a platoon strength at Elliotganj. This position was overcome in no time and Daudkhandi secured on 9 December.

With the fall of Daudkhandi, the Pakistani commanders were in utter confusion. Comilla was vacated and fell on 9 December. The Pakistani troops holding border defences fell back rapidly on the Maynamati defences. About 1,500 of them were trapped and surrendered to Pande. This was the first major Pakistani surrender in the war. With the remainder of his brigade, Pande closed in on the Maynamati defences from the north and west, and on 12 December he was placed under the command of Headquarters 23 Mountain Division for reduction of the fortress.

The town was captured on 8 December after a fierce battle in which Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties. Chandpur was secured the next day without opposition.

Meanwhile, 301 Mountain Brigade infiltrated between the Lalmai Hills and Laksham on the night of 3 December and secured Madaffarganj by 6 December. They overran a battalion defences on the way and were able to capture the major portion of 25 FF, including its commanding officer. About this time, Rahim Khan was proceeding towards Laksham to visit his forward troops with his tactical headquarters when he and his party were involved in a f i re fight on the outskirts of Madaffarganj. It was then he learnt of the presence of Indian troops behind his Laksham brigade. He beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind his commando escort of about a company in the general area of Hajiganj as a covering position.

At the same time, Brig Niazi, commander of Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade, made a desperate effort to break through the Indian roadblocks to join his divisional headquarters at Chandpur. In its advance to Chandpur, Indian 301 Mountain Brigade hit its leading elements, consisting of two companies of 2 “Azad Kashmir” Battalion and the commandos, at Hajiganj. The town was captured on 8 December after a fierce battle in which Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties. Chandpur was secured the next day without opposition.

As the brigade reached the east banks of the Meghna, a steamer and two launches were seen moving in midstream. These were promptly engaged and damaged heavily. The day before Gen Rahim Khan had managed to get away, only to be intercepted by IAF planes and was badly wounded. He managed to fly later to Burma before the general surrender. Failing in his attempt to break through towards Chandpur, Niazi fell back on Laksham, but not for long.

The day before Gen Rahim Khan had managed to get away, only to be intercepted by IAF planes and was badly wounded.

On the night of 8 December he made another bid and, breaking through the Indian cordon, made his way to the Maynamati fortress. Most of his party under Col Naim, numbering about 1,500 including some 40 officers, were captured by Pande in the north, while the Brigadier got through to the fortress with the rest. This brigade had earlier infiltrated on 3 December night and established roadblocks between Changram and Laksham. In the same way, 181 Mountain Brigade, following on the heels of 301 Mountain Brigade, had established roadblocks west and north of Laksharn on the Laksham-Hajiganj railway and astride the Lalmai-Madaffarganj road.

Combined with 181 Mountain Brigade roadblocks, the Indian cordon was complete. But the Laksham garrison managed to get away through the roadblocks with some casualties and at the cost of abandoning its heavier weapons and equipment. After the withdrawal of the garrison, Laksham was occupied on 9 December. Hira’s 23 Division had reached the key river ports of Chandpur and Daudkhandi. Leaving two brigades, 61and 181 Mountain, to reduce the Maynamati defences, he focused his attention on Narayanganj, across the Meghna, and Chittagong.

Hira employed 181 Mountain Brigade from the south and 61 Mountain Brigade from the north. Successive attacks by both brigades, supported by a preponderance of artillery fire and air strikes, could not make a significant dent on the Maynamati defences. Brig Atif, in command of the fortress, had repeatedly refused the Indian demand to surrender. The stalemate continued till hostilities ended on 16 December, when 86 officers, including two brigadiers, 175 JCOs, 3,918 other ranks and 102 civilians surrendered.

It was later discovered that the Maynamati defences had been systematically organised into three-tiered field fortifications to meet threats from all directions with an elaborate obstacle system. After withdrawal of 53 Infantry Brigade from Laksham, the garrison swelled to about 4,000, with four tanks and a battery of artillery. In retrospect, Sagat Singh felt that the reduction of such strong defences would have been expensive both in terms of life and material, and very time-consuming. Bypassing the Maynamati fortress was therefore wise.

Originally, 57 Mountain Division under Gen Gonsalves was to capture Akhaura and thereafter build up north of Maynamati and capture Daudkhandi. Having demonstrated in the northeast, he encircled Akhaura and captured it by 5 December. Its defences were manned by Pakistan 27 Infantry Brigade under Brig Saadullah with a mixed force of regulars and a paramilitary force of about battalion strength. The defences had been sited along the Tista, with an anti-tank ditch to take a frontal assault. The position had considerable defence potential, but Gonsalves tricked the garrison commander, simulating tank noises in the northeast using five-ton trucks without silencers at night and outmanoeuvering the defences from the rear.

By 8 December, the Indians had reached all three river ports and key points of communications along the Meghna at Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Ashuganj and had secured the vital Meghna bulge. All roads to Dacca from the east now lay open.

On the fall of the Tista bridge, Saadullah started withdrawing to the main defences in the general Ashuganj-Bhairab Bazaar area on the Meghna, where Headquarters 14 Infantry Division had already fallen back and were busy improving the defences. 30 Baluch covered 24 Infantry Brigade’s withdrawal to Ashuganj. In the battle for Akhaura, one of the battalions of 301 Mountain Brigade established a roadblock in the Kodda area and found that the railway line between Brahmanbaria and Akhaura had been dismantled and the track used by motor transport. The bridge over the Tista fell into its hands intact. A further probe towards Brahmanbaria indicated that it was lightly held as only a delaying position.

Advance along this axis to Dacca was not initially considered as it was calculated that the Brahmanbaria bottleneck would be strongly held, and its capture would become all the more difficult when the troops deployed in the Maulvi Bazaar-Shamshernagar area would fall back on it. Moreover, according to Indian intelligence, no road linked Brahmanbaria with Ashuganj. On learning that Pakistan III Infantry Brigade had moved north from Maulvi Bazaar to Sylhet and that there was a perfectly good road between Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj, Sagat Singh quickly decided to change the thrust line of 57 Mountain Division to Brahmanbaria-Ashuganj instead of Maynamati-Daudkhandi. Gonsalves organised a three-pronged advance on Brahmanbaria over waterlogged paddy fields.

One of these prongs worked along the Meghna from the south towards Ashuganj. But by the time the pincers closed, Saadullah had crossed the river, leaving behind small pockets of resistance at Sahuganj. According to Fazal Muqeem, Saadullah had to fight his way through the southern pincer with 39 Baluch, capturing seven Indian PT-76 tanks of 63 Cavalry in the process, and this had heartened the Pakistani troops a great deal. The division reached Ashuganj on 9 December and found the bridge had been demolished. By 8 December, the Indians had reached all three river ports and key points of communications along the Meghna at Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Ashuganj and had secured the vital Meghna bulge. All roads to Dacca from the east now lay open.

Investment of Sylhet

It had been decided by the end of November to carry out transborder operations in support of the Mukti Bahini to improve the Indian defensive posture. Accordingly, 8 Mountain Division under Gen Krishna Rao was ordered to capture Shamshernagar and Kulaura with a brigade each. 81 Mountain Brigade under Brig Apte was to advance along the Kailashabar-Shamshernagar-Maulvi Bazaar axis, and 59 Mountain Brigade under Brig Quinn was to do likewise along the Dharamnagar-Kulaura-Brahmanbaria-Maulvi Bazaar axis.