Indian Defence Review

Eastern Sector :The eastern sector comprised the area east of the Meghna in the destricts of Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla and Chittagong, and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The approach to Dacca lay across the Meghna, a river of great width ranging from 4,000 to 4,500 yards. It was spanned only by the railway bridge at Ashuganj, which was about 2,950 feet long. The terrain, except the hill tracts, is generally low-lying and waterlogged by paddy fields. Like the rest of Bangladesh, it is interspersed with numerous rivers and drainage channels. Cross-country movement is generally difficult till the first week of December. Since the rivers frequently change course and cause bridging problems, ferries are the only reliable means of crossing.

Also read: 1971: The blitzkrieg in East Pakistan – I

Sylhet district is pocked with numerous haors bheels, perennial lakes with several feeder streams, and extensive marshes surrounded them. The landscape is broken by high mounds called tillas, ranging from 100 to 200 feet. These tillas are surrounded by lowlying langai land which remains waterlogged for nine months a year.

In Comilla district, the Lalmai Hills extend north to southwest of Comilla town. These low hills are about 16 kilometres long and four wide and have numerous elevations covered with low vegetation. The average height of the range is about 225 kilometres.

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As for road and rail communications on the Indian side, a single-track, metre-gauge railway took off from the trans-Assam artery at Lumding and terminated at Dharampur after running a considerable distance close to the Indo-Pakistani border. The stretch between Karimganj and Dharampur was prone to disruption by Pakistani saboteurs. Several attempts were made to blow up the track at various points, but vigorous security measures, including regular trolley patrols, searchlight specials and tracker dogs, kept trains running throughout the period of preparation for and conduct of the war.

Laksham was the hub of the road and rail communications to Chittagong. The capture of Brahmanbaria could cut off all the Pakistani forces in the eastern sector…

On the East Pakistan side, a similar single metre gauge track ran north to south connecting Sylhet with Chittagong. For most of its distance it ran close and parallel to the international border. Besides being connnected across the Meghna with Dacca and Mymensingh, it fed the river ferries of Chandpur and Noakhali. The strategic bottleneck along these communication arteries was the Brahmanbaria area, as the Ashuganj bridge connected the Dacca and Mymensingh sectors with the eastern sector. Laksham was the hub of the road and rail communications to Chittagong. The capture of Brahmanbaria could cut off all the Pakistani forces in the eastern sector, especially the Sylhet and Maulvi Bazaar garrison, and the capture of Laksham would cut off the Comilla garrison.

Similarly, on the Indian side, an arterial road connecting Assam with Tripura ran north and south from Silchar to Belonia via Teliamura, a communication centre which fed Kamalpur, Khowai, Agartala, Sonamura and other border towns. In addition, a road running parallel to the international border, particularly south of Agartala to Chanddegram, had been newly constructed and improved to enable the quicker deployment of troops. Agartala was also connected with Sabrum, a border town overlooking Chittagong Hill Tracts. Various laterals connected the Silchar-Belonia artery with the Agartala-Sabrum road for flexibility in diverting traffic.

Most of the Indian fields were too close to the border, Agartala airfield being within the range of small arms in Pakistani posts overlooking the runway.

On the East Pakistan side, the main road artery ran parallel to the railway from Sylhet to Chittagong. Various feeder roads linked the border towns and the river ferries. It was easy to link the two road systems at a chosen point of entry. On the other hand, the railway system could be linked only at Latu, opposite Karimganj. The road and rail tracks on the Pakistan side ran over an embankment four to eight feet high. A large number of bridges and culverts were destroyed by Freedom Fighters or the retreating Pakistanis. Road construction was difficult because materials were not available locally. Decking of railway bridges did not help as the width of the track did not allow passage of heavier vehicles.

The operational airfields available to Pakistan were at Dacca, Sylhet, Shamshernagar, Comilla, Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. Most of them had been built by the Allies in the Second World War to serve the Burma theatre and the Pakistani Government had kept them in good condition. They could handle Sabrejets. On the Indian side, Silchar airfield was available to jets while Kamalpur, Khowai and Kailashabar were fit only for transport planes. Most of the Indian fields were too close to the border, Agartala airfield being within the range of small arms in Pakistani posts overlooking the runway.

This was a clever ruse indeed as it confused Indian intelligence for quite a while with the same units appearing in their Orbat in the eastern and western wings at the same time.

The Pakistani forces in the sector were built up gradually as the insurgency mounted. Originally, 53 Infantry Brigade Group, of 14 Infantry Division located at Comilla, controlled the whole eastern sector with a battalion each at Sylhet and Chittagong. When Pakistan 9 Infantry Division was inducted into the east wing on the outbreak of hostilities, it was made operationally responsible for the area east of the Meghna and 53 Infantry Brigade Group came under its command. The broad deployment of the division before the monsoon was 313 Infantry Brigade in the area of Sylhet, 117 Infantry Brigade at Comilla, and 53 Infantry Brigade in the Chittagong area. 27 Infantry Brigade of 9 Infantry Division was deployed in Mymensingh and placed under the command of 14 Infantry Division, then operationally responsible for the area, including Dacca and Jessore.

With the growing intensity of the insurgency and Niazi’s concept of holding the border in strength, the troop requirements increased. Niazi accordingly raised 202 Infantry Brigade at Sylhet, pulling 313 Infantry Brigade southward to the general area of Maulvi Bazaar. 27 Infantry Brigade reverted to the eastern sector and was deployed in the general area of Brahmanbaria and Akhaura. These three brigades in the northern half of the sector were grouped under Headquarters 14 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen Abdul Majid. With 117 Infantry Brigade at Comilla in the southern half of the sector, 53 Infantry Brigade was pulled back to the general area of Laksham and Feni, and the newly raised 97 Infantry Brigade at Chittagong was placed under the command of Headquarters 39 Infantry Division, raised on an ad hoc basis, under Gen Rahim Khan.

None of these brigades had full combat power because they consisted of one or two regular battalions, one “Azad Kashmir” unit and a battalion strength of paramilitary forces. The supporting fire units were ad hoc collections of guns and mortars, but even those were deployed in penny packets. To conceal this weakness, non-regular Ranger and Scout units were given the designations of regular infantry battalions located in the western wing.

This was a clever ruse indeed as it confused Indian intelligence for quite a while with the same units appearing in their Orbat in the eastern and western wings at the same time. The puzzle could not be solved till the very end of the conflict. It is difficult to understand why, in undertaking this reorganisation, Niazi moved Headquarters 9 Infantry Division from its original formation to the Jessore sector and kept Headquarters 14 Infantry Division in this region commanding brigades belonging to another division. Gen Sagat Singh, General Officer Commanding IV Corps, was operationally responsible for the eastern sector. His task was initially to ensure the security of rail and road communications in the sector during the administrative and troop buildup in the region, as also to provide protection to administrative installations, airfields and Air Force establishments under development in the corps zone of responsibility. This was to be achieved by denying the enemy ingress into Tripura and Silchar district, with particular emphasis on the security of Agartala town and its airfield.

Gen Sagat Singh, General Officer Commanding IV Corps, was operationally responsible for the eastern sector. His task was initially to ensure the security of rail and road communications in the sector during the administrative and troop buildup in the region

Later, on the outbreak of hostilities, Sagat Singh was to launch an offensive to destroy the Pakistani forces deployed east of the Meghna and the Bulai. The directions issued to him by his army commander indicated the interception of surface communications, including road, rail and waterways, between Chittagong and the main hinterland and to the north. Thereafter, he was to capture Comilla within seven days and, depending upon the situation, he was required to secure Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Feni within another ten days. Simultaneously, Sagat Singh was to secure Shamshernagar airfield and Maulvi Bazaar in the north and, if circumstances permitted, capture Sylhet. On completing these tasks he was to develop operations for the capture of Chittagong, which was to be achieved by the 21st day. It is significant that the capture of Dacca was not even mentioned in the commander’s directive at this stage.

The resources allotted to Sagat Singh to carry out this task were, as mentioned earlier, three mountain divisions. Subsequently, as plans were finalised, a contingent of eight Bangladesh battalions with a couple of artillery batteries also came under his command. On the army commander’s directive, the initial plans of the corps were made sometime in September and wargamed in October. It was about this time that I met Sagat Singh at Teliamura to discuss these plans as a representative of the Military Operations Directorate. I had known him earlier, when he was Brigadier General Staff of XI Corps and I was General Staff Officer Grade 1 of 4 Mountain Division in the April deployment of the Indian Army against Pakistan after the Kutch incident in 1965. He had a fine reputation as a frontline soldier and was known to have an unrthodox and aggressive attitude to military matters, especially in war. He had proved his mettle by spearheading the Indian advance in the liberation of Goa in 1960.

As discussed earlier, Sagat Singh’s plan broadly envisaged 8 Mountain Division’s securing Shamshernagar airfield and Maulvi Bazaar and thereafter investing Sylhet town. After ensuring the security of Agartala, 57 Mountain Division was to help 23 Mountain Division in capturing the Comilla and Maynamati complex and then developing operations to secure Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Feni. On completing this action and depending upon the prevailing circumstances, operations were to be developed to capture Chittagong.

I did not agree with the limited aims of this offensive but had not been able to convince my superiors of the need to aim at the vital objective of Dacca. I suggested this to Sagat Singh indirectly. I said: “General, why are you wasting your energies in knocking your head against Lalmai height defences? Why don’t you secure the Brahmanbaria-Ashuganj area, and then the road to Dacca will open itself for you to stage a triumphant march in the heart of Bangladesh polities?” “But that is not my task,” he snapped back. “I’m only suggesting,” I said with a smile.

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A glint came into his eyes, and he took me away from his operation room in the darkness of evening, beyond the hearing of eavesdroppers. “Tell me, does India mean business this time or are they wasting our time?” he asked. “It appears almost a certainty,” I replied. He said: “Then leave it to me. I will get there.” We left it at that. I knew he would, orders or no orders.

The Pakistani troops had been engaged in sustained counterinsurgency operations in a hostile environment and were hardpressed and suffering from battle fatigue.

Sagat Singh sized up the Pakistani deployments and their capability by the end of October, and with his characteristic flexibility of approach changed the original concept of his plans. He realised that Niazi had overstretched himself and put far too much faith in fixed defences. The Pakistani troops had been engaged in sustained counterinsurgency operations in a hostile environment and were hardpressed and suffering from battle fatigue. The casualties they had sustained in the process both in terms of personnel and equipment could not be recouped. Shortage of artillery and air support and further dispersal of these resources had considerably reduced the fighting potential of Niazi’s force.

Sagat Singh felt greater dividends would be obtained if the Pakistani forces were unbalanced by a swift and vigorous offensive to secure Chandpur and Daudkhandi, isolating all the troops deployed east of the Meghna and south of the Brahmanbaria Akhaura complex through bypassing the strongly held ComillaMaynamati fortress. At that time Pakistani 117 Infantry Brigade, under the Olympic hockey player Brig Atif, was manning the Comilla-Maynamati defences while 53 Infantry Brigade was deployed in the general area of Laksham covering the approaches to Chandpur. Sagat Singh had quite a few of his troops tied up to secure his lines of communication and Agartala town and its airfield, and he did not have enough resources to carry out the type of swift and vigorous offensive he had in mind if 53 Infantry Brigade continued to hold Laksham. He therefore devised an elaborate deception to lure the brigade away from its location.

Sagat Singh estimated the new induction to consist of two to three battalions and a battery of field guns and some mortars. He was tempted to trap the Pakistani troops in the bulge to avoid fighting them at the Laksham defences later.

Roads and bridges on the road from Shatir Bazaar to Sabrum were improved to indicate an Indian interest in the general area of Feni. Administrative dumping for a division was created north of Shatir Bazaar, giving the impression that the impending offensive could develop thrust lines along the Shatir Bazaar-Belonia and Shatir Bazaar-Sabrum axes. In addition, a phantom radio network simulating brigade traffic became active. Niazi’s suspicions were confirmed by Sagat Singh’s preliminary operations, using 23 Mountain Division in the Belonia bulge to pose a direction threat to Feni. After the withdrawal of East Bengal Regiment units in March through the bulge, the Mukti Fauj managed to maintain a presence in its northern tip.

Sagat Singh decided to extend the area of operations farther south. Containing the Pakistani defences frontally, he established roadblocks behind them southward and, developing attacks from that direction, he was able to capture Parshuram and Belonia. Sensing a sizable threat to Feni town and the only road and rail link from Chittagong to the hinterland, Niazi moved his 53 Infantry Brigade or a major portion of it forward to meet this threat. Sagat Singh estimated the new induction to consist of two to three battalions and a battery of field guns and some mortars. He was tempted to trap the Pakistani troops in the bulge to avoid fighting them at the Laksham defences later.

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He repeated the earlier manoeuvre by exerting frontal pressure from the north and west along the Fulgazi-Koteshwar-Muhamadpur line and then established strong roadblocks between the enemy forces at Fulgazi and Feni. Before the battle of attrition or the apprehension of the Pakistani troops thus trapped could begin, they withdrew the next night with their guns and equipment through a gap of no more than 2,000 yards between the two roadblocks. Having failed in his manoeuvre, Sagat Singh switched back his thrust lines westward so as to catch Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade on the move and off balance.

Having failed in his manoeuvre, Sagat Singh switched back his thrust lines westward so as to catch Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade on the move and off balance.

It was known that Pakistan 117 Infantry Brigade was holding the Comilla-Maynamati-Lalmai Hills complex while 53 Infantry Brigade was to occupy the Laksham defences. Both these complexes were held in strength, leaving very little in depth. Sagat Singh therefore decided to isolate Laksham, bypass the Lalmai defences and make a dash for Chandpur and Daudkhandi. 61 Mountain Brigade under Brig Tom Pande, functioning under direct command of Headquarters IV Crops, was directed to cross the Gomti and cut off the Maynamati-Companyganj and Maynamati-Daud-khandi roads and close in on the Maynamati complex from the west and help in its reduction by 23 Mountain Division.

On receiving information that the enemy had withdrawn from Burichang on 7 December, in a characteristic dash Pande crossed the Gomti speedily and established roadblocks at Chandina and Jafarganj. In relentless pursuit, he pushed 15 Kumaon and a troop of armour forward to secure Daudkhandi. No organised opposition was encountered en route except for minor resistance of about a platoon strength at Elliotganj. This position was overcome in no time and Daudkhandi secured on 9 December.

With the fall of Daudkhandi, the Pakistani commanders were in utter confusion. Comilla was vacated and fell on 9 December. The Pakistani troops holding border defences fell back rapidly on the Maynamati defences. About 1,500 of them were trapped and surrendered to Pande. This was the first major Pakistani surrender in the war. With the remainder of his brigade, Pande closed in on the Maynamati defences from the north and west, and on 12 December he was placed under the command of Headquarters 23 Mountain Division for reduction of the fortress.

The town was captured on 8 December after a fierce battle in which Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties. Chandpur was secured the next day without opposition.

Meanwhile, 301 Mountain Brigade infiltrated between the Lalmai Hills and Laksham on the night of 3 December and secured Madaffarganj by 6 December. They overran a battalion defences on the way and were able to capture the major portion of 25 FF, including its commanding officer. About this time, Rahim Khan was proceeding towards Laksham to visit his forward troops with his tactical headquarters when he and his party were involved in a f i re fight on the outskirts of Madaffarganj. It was then he learnt of the presence of Indian troops behind his Laksham brigade. He beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind his commando escort of about a company in the general area of Hajiganj as a covering position.

At the same time, Brig Niazi, commander of Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade, made a desperate effort to break through the Indian roadblocks to join his divisional headquarters at Chandpur. In its advance to Chandpur, Indian 301 Mountain Brigade hit its leading elements, consisting of two companies of 2 “Azad Kashmir” Battalion and the commandos, at Hajiganj. The town was captured on 8 December after a fierce battle in which Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties. Chandpur was secured the next day without opposition.

As the brigade reached the east banks of the Meghna, a steamer and two launches were seen moving in midstream. These were promptly engaged and damaged heavily. The day before Gen Rahim Khan had managed to get away, only to be intercepted by IAF planes and was badly wounded. He managed to fly later to Burma before the general surrender. Failing in his attempt to break through towards Chandpur, Niazi fell back on Laksham, but not for long.

The day before Gen Rahim Khan had managed to get away, only to be intercepted by IAF planes and was badly wounded.

On the night of 8 December he made another bid and, breaking through the Indian cordon, made his way to the Maynamati fortress. Most of his party under Col Naim, numbering about 1,500 including some 40 officers, were captured by Pande in the north, while the Brigadier got through to the fortress with the rest. This brigade had earlier infiltrated on 3 December night and established roadblocks between Changram and Laksham. In the same way, 181 Mountain Brigade, following on the heels of 301 Mountain Brigade, had established roadblocks west and north of Laksharn on the Laksham-Hajiganj railway and astride the Lalmai-Madaffarganj road.

Combined with 181 Mountain Brigade roadblocks, the Indian cordon was complete. But the Laksham garrison managed to get away through the roadblocks with some casualties and at the cost of abandoning its heavier weapons and equipment. After the withdrawal of the garrison, Laksham was occupied on 9 December. Hira’s 23 Division had reached the key river ports of Chandpur and Daudkhandi. Leaving two brigades, 61and 181 Mountain, to reduce the Maynamati defences, he focused his attention on Narayanganj, across the Meghna, and Chittagong.

Hira employed 181 Mountain Brigade from the south and 61 Mountain Brigade from the north. Successive attacks by both brigades, supported by a preponderance of artillery fire and air strikes, could not make a significant dent on the Maynamati defences. Brig Atif, in command of the fortress, had repeatedly refused the Indian demand to surrender. The stalemate continued till hostilities ended on 16 December, when 86 officers, including two brigadiers, 175 JCOs, 3,918 other ranks and 102 civilians surrendered.

It was later discovered that the Maynamati defences had been systematically organised into three-tiered field fortifications to meet threats from all directions with an elaborate obstacle system. After withdrawal of 53 Infantry Brigade from Laksham, the garrison swelled to about 4,000, with four tanks and a battery of artillery. In retrospect, Sagat Singh felt that the reduction of such strong defences would have been expensive both in terms of life and material, and very time-consuming. Bypassing the Maynamati fortress was therefore wise.

Originally, 57 Mountain Division under Gen Gonsalves was to capture Akhaura and thereafter build up north of Maynamati and capture Daudkhandi. Having demonstrated in the northeast, he encircled Akhaura and captured it by 5 December. Its defences were manned by Pakistan 27 Infantry Brigade under Brig Saadullah with a mixed force of regulars and a paramilitary force of about battalion strength. The defences had been sited along the Tista, with an anti-tank ditch to take a frontal assault. The position had considerable defence potential, but Gonsalves tricked the garrison commander, simulating tank noises in the northeast using five-ton trucks without silencers at night and outmanoeuvering the defences from the rear.

By 8 December, the Indians had reached all three river ports and key points of communications along the Meghna at Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Ashuganj and had secured the vital Meghna bulge. All roads to Dacca from the east now lay open.

On the fall of the Tista bridge, Saadullah started withdrawing to the main defences in the general Ashuganj-Bhairab Bazaar area on the Meghna, where Headquarters 14 Infantry Division had already fallen back and were busy improving the defences. 30 Baluch covered 24 Infantry Brigade’s withdrawal to Ashuganj. In the battle for Akhaura, one of the battalions of 301 Mountain Brigade established a roadblock in the Kodda area and found that the railway line between Brahmanbaria and Akhaura had been dismantled and the track used by motor transport. The bridge over the Tista fell into its hands intact. A further probe towards Brahmanbaria indicated that it was lightly held as only a delaying position.

Advance along this axis to Dacca was not initially considered as it was calculated that the Brahmanbaria bottleneck would be strongly held, and its capture would become all the more difficult when the troops deployed in the Maulvi Bazaar-Shamshernagar area would fall back on it. Moreover, according to Indian intelligence, no road linked Brahmanbaria with Ashuganj. On learning that Pakistan III Infantry Brigade had moved north from Maulvi Bazaar to Sylhet and that there was a perfectly good road between Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj, Sagat Singh quickly decided to change the thrust line of 57 Mountain Division to Brahmanbaria-Ashuganj instead of Maynamati-Daudkhandi. Gonsalves organised a three-pronged advance on Brahmanbaria over waterlogged paddy fields.

One of these prongs worked along the Meghna from the south towards Ashuganj. But by the time the pincers closed, Saadullah had crossed the river, leaving behind small pockets of resistance at Sahuganj. According to Fazal Muqeem, Saadullah had to fight his way through the southern pincer with 39 Baluch, capturing seven Indian PT-76 tanks of 63 Cavalry in the process, and this had heartened the Pakistani troops a great deal. The division reached Ashuganj on 9 December and found the bridge had been demolished. By 8 December, the Indians had reached all three river ports and key points of communications along the Meghna at Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Ashuganj and had secured the vital Meghna bulge. All roads to Dacca from the east now lay open.

Investment of Sylhet

It had been decided by the end of November to carry out transborder operations in support of the Mukti Bahini to improve the Indian defensive posture. Accordingly, 8 Mountain Division under Gen Krishna Rao was ordered to capture Shamshernagar and Kulaura with a brigade each. 81 Mountain Brigade under Brig Apte was to advance along the Kailashabar-Shamshernagar-Maulvi Bazaar axis, and 59 Mountain Brigade under Brig Quinn was to do likewise along the Dharamnagar-Kulaura-Brahmanbaria-Maulvi Bazaar axis.

The Indian casualties were 31 killed and 87 wounded against 26 Pakistanis captured and quite a few killed and wounded.

81 Mountain Brigade secured the Shamshernager complex by about midday on 2 December against stiff resistance by one company each of 22 Baluch and Tochi Scouts. The Indian casualties were 31 killed and 87 wounded against 26 Pakistanis captured and quite a few killed and wounded. On the other axis, 59 Mountain Brigade contacted Kulaura the same day but was not able to capture it till 6 December, and that too only after flushing out the opposition with a heavy dose of napalm bombing. The commencement of hostilities with the pre-emptive Pakistani strike in the western sector on 3 December brought a greater sense of urgency, and Sagat Singh ordered Krishna Rao to speed up the operation.

81 Mountain Brigade resumed its advance and secured Munshi Bazaar by 5 December. A company of 30 FF defending the town put up a brave fight, suffering about 22 killed, including the company commander, and 31 taken prisoner. Maulvi Bazaar was contacted by 7 December. Meanwhile, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles from 59 Mountain Brigade was lifted by helicopter across to southeast of Sylhet town and was soon in touch with its defences. The garrison commander had got the town vacated and converted it into a fortress which was held by Pakistani ad hoc 202 Infantry Brigade consisting of remnants of units falling back from the border defences. Fearful of being cut off by the Indian heliborne force and also being saturated daily with napalm, the commander of Pakistan 313 Infantry Brigade pulled his troops back to Sylhet without any interruption.

The battle of Sylhet, like that of Khulna, was lost by Pakistan elsewhere. It was remarkable that, despite battle fatigue and the prospect of an unequal fight, a company each at Shamshernagar and Kulaura, with a few paramilitary troops and very little artillery and air support, held Krishna Raos brigades for days.

This brought the number of the garrison to some six battalions, one artillery regiment and a mortar battery, but all these units were on reduced strength. Apte walked int. Maulvi Bazaar on 9 December without meeting any opposition, and he was able the next day to secure Saidpur and Sherpur ferries, which were found unoccupied. Having secured all its assigned objectives, the brigade was pulled out to Agartala airfield as corps reserve, as planned for a possible fly into Dacca.

Meanwhile, 59 Mountain Brigade advanced towards Sylhet and was able to capture Fenchugunj on 11 December and link up with its battalion 4/5 Gorkha Rifles on 13 December. 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, advancing south from Dauki in Khasi and Jaintia Hills along the Jaintiapur-Darbasth-Sylhet road, captured Chandghat and was able to invest Sylhet from the northeast, and then came under the command of 8 Mountain Division. Working its way cross-country from Kanairighat, Bangladesh Battalion also joined 5/5 Gorkha Rifles by 9 December.

From 13 December onwards, after 59 Mountain Brigade had built up on 4/5 Gorkha Rifles, Krishna Rao besieged the Sylhet fortress from all directions, but for some air strikes he awaited the garrison’s surrender on its own. This took place on 17 December and involved 109 officers, including three brigadiers, 191 JCOs and 6,124 other ranks, almost double the strength of Krishna Rao’s forces. The battle of Sylhet, like that of Khulna, was lost by Pakistan elsewhere. It was remarkable that, despite battle fatigue and the prospect of an unequal fight, a company each at Shamshernagar and Kulaura, with a few paramilitary troops and very little artillery and air support, held Krishna Rao’s brigades for days. And in spite of the great odds against them they managed to slip away to Sylhet.

Advance to Chittagong

An ad hoc force named Kilo and comprising two I battalions, two Bangladesh battalions, one battalion each from BSF and CRP, an artillery mountain regiment, a Mujib battery and a BSF post group, was created and placed under Brig Anand Sarup. In view of the change of corps thrust lines from Belonia to the Laksham area, the Pakistanis had vacated Feni, and this town was secured by the Kilo force on 6 December. Extending their operations, the force also occupied Kaberhat and Zorarganj by 8 December.

To everybodys horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force.

The force was then ordered to advance on Chittagong, and this began on 8 December. Opposition encountered at Sitakund was overcome by 12 December. Meanwhile, 83 Mountain Brigade, from 23 Mountain Division assigned to capture Chittagong, had also fetched up at Sitakund. Mukiraghat, held by a Pakistani force of about two mixed companies, was cleared on the night of 13 December. The combined force reached Faujdarhat on the outskirts of Chittagong by 15 December, when operations were suspended, against negligible opposition. The Chittagong garrison,comprising 161 officers, 305 JCOs, naval petty officers, and airforce warrant officers and 8,618 other ranks from all three services, surrendered after the ceasefire.

Amphibious Operation

Despite all advice to the contrary, the Chief had not given up his pet idea of an amphibious operation as part of his overall plan for liberating East Pakistan. Watching the rapid collapse of organised resistance in the province, he ordered a battalion group to be sent by sea to Cox’s Bazaar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping through that point to Burma. A group comprising 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two companies of 11 Bihar and some mortars was hastily collected, named Rome Force, placed under Commander Artillery, 8 Mountain Division, and put on a merchant ship to sail to a rendezvous off Cox’s Bazaar. MV Vishva Vijay set off with the force in the early hours of 12 December. A naval contingent of 50 which was to accompany the force did not arrive before the ship sailed.

Reaching the rendezvous on 14 December, the force was transferred to two LSTs, INS Guldar and Gharial. As the operation had been planned on the basis of maps, the actual survey of the landing coast was carried out on nearing the beach. To everybody’s horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force. There was no option to beaching somehow, and one of the LSTs beached on a runnel. Only 12 men could disembark, and two of them drowned.

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With another effort, some 30  more were put ashore. The commander of the force was in an awkward predicament when the men already ashore flashed back the news that there were no Pakistani troops in the area. Instead, they had contacted a group of Freedom Fighters. With their help the remainder of the force was transferred to shore in local fishing boats between 16 and 18 December. These country craft could carry very little heavy equipment, vehicles, guns and ammunition. This was one instance where the Chief overruled his advisery and pushed through a pet operation. It was undertaken without suitable craft and equipment and combined operations training. But for the coast being devoid of the Pakistanis and aid from the Mukti Bahini, this adventure would have ended in a fiasco.