Military & Aerospace

1971: India's Military Plan - II
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A comparison of the relative strength of India and Pakistan worked out at a ratio of 7:4, and this did not appear to the planners as such a preponderant superiority in numbers as to go for the stereo-typed British-style step-by-step operations relying more on attrition rather than superior generalship.

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To achieve quick success, as dictated by political compulsions, the planners had to search for an audacious plan which brought into play superiority of manoeuvre and psychological methods.

Also read: 1971: India’s Military Plan – I

Accordingly, the following strategy for liberating Bangladesh was projected to the Chief, and he accepted it as a framework for detailed working :

To achieve quick success, as dictated by political compulsions, the planners had to search for an audacious plan which brought into play superiority of manoeuvre and psychological methods.

  • The capture or effective blockading of the two major ports of entry to stop further buildup in the region after the outbreak of war as well as to create a psychology of isolation among the Pakistani troops and the fear of being cut off from West Pakistan. The blockade was expected to prevent a third party from evacuating the retreating Pakistani forces by sea, although such intervention seemed farfetched.
  • Securing such objectives forbade inter-sector movement. In the eastern sector, the bridge at Feni connected the Chittagong area with the rest of the sector. Certain ferry sites along the rivers which facilitated transsector movement along the inland waterways were to be rendered unserviceable. Airfields were to be secured and rendered unfit for use to prevent lifting of troops and equipment.

This aimed at separating the Pakistani formations in snch a manner that they would not be able to put up a united stand at any stage of the battle. It would also ensure that the formations deployed forward would be unable to withdraw to depth positions, especially those prepared for the defence of Dacca. The utmost speed was visualised in reaching these vital objectives, and in this context bypassing the opposition encountered en route was to be accepted.

It would also ensure that the formations deployed forward would be unable to withdraw to depth positions, especially those prepared for the defence of Dacca.

  • To further split and disorganise the Pakistani formations into penny packets, such communication centres were to be secured within the sectors which, if in Indian hands, would further incapacitate the Pakistani Army’s capability to fight in strength. Thus widely dispersed units and sub-units and detachments would be an easy target for piecemeal destruction.
  • Once the enemy was defeated in detail by this manoeuvre, the race for Dacca would be started by any formation in a position to do so. It was fully appreciated that without the capture of Dacca the campaign could not be concluded successfully.

On the basis of this broad strategy, the planners proceeded to examine the objectives sectorwise in depth. In the northwestern sector, Bogra was the main communication centre, and its occupation would completely unbalance the Pakistani forces operating in this sector. The best way to reach Bogra was to advance along the Hilli-Gaibanda axis as this would ensure that the forces in the north would be cut off from the rest of East Pakistan, for a thrust along this axis would pinch the waist as it were. The Pakistani forces in the Dinajpur-Panch Garh-Rangpur area were to be pinned down by subsidiary actions while the main thrust in this sector would be aimed at Bogra via Ghoraghat-Gobind Ganj. The thrust to Ghoraghat would be two-pronged, one via Milli and the other via Pirganj.

In the northwestern sector, Bogra was the main communication centre, and its occupation would completely unbalance the Pakistani forces operating in this sector.

The main objective in the southwestern sector was Khulna, and the direct route towards it lay along the Barisal -Satkhira-Khulna axis. This axis however ran against the grain of the country and involved crossing numerous river obstacles. It was therefore preferred to tackle Jessore first. The main communication centre, it was connected to Dacca through Jhenida-Magura-Faridpur. The communication centres of Jhenida and Magura were therefore of vital importance as their capture would split and disorganise the Pakistani forces operating in this sector.

Once Jessore, Jhenida and Magura were captured, Kushtia, Hardinge Bridge and Khulna could be reached. This visualised two sizable thrusts developing from Jessore or near it, one to the north and the other to the south, reaching towards Hardinge Bridge and Khulna respectively. Although this mode of advance reached the priority objectives last, the size of the initial entry and then its splitting north and south offered better opportunities of disorganising the Pakistani forces and thereby achieving the overall objectives quicker.

The Pakistani forces in the Dinajpur-Panch Garh-Rangpur area were to be pinned down by subsidiary actions while the main thrust in this sector would be aimed at Bogra via Ghoraghat-Gobind Ganj.

In the eastern sector, control of Meghna Bridge, between Chandpur and Ashuganj, was of prime importance as its capture would isolate Dacca from Chittagong, Comilla and Sylhet. It would further facilitate the operations to capture Dacca. The three key points along the river line were Ashuganj, Daud Kandi and Chandpur. The main objectives in the northern part of this sector were the airfield at Shamsher Nagar, the communication centre of Maulvi Bazaar and the town of Sylhet.

Since this part could be easily cut off by blocking the Agartala Ashuganj waistline, the objectives in the Sylhet complex were of lower priority than those of the Meghna bulge and could be dealt with at a later stage. The capture of Chittagong seaport was of vital importance, but its overall effect would be considerably lessened if the port could be cut off from the rest of East Pakistan by securing the Meghna bulge objectives.

In view of the strategic importance of Chittagong, its capture by developing a thrust along the Feni-Chittagong axis was considered in depth, but because of being costlier in resources and time this approach was abandoned in favour of a sea assault involving combined operations. Having taken part in combined operations in Southeast Asia Command in the Second World War, Manekshaw was sold on the idea. A feasibility study revealed that although the Indian Navy could, with the aid of the merchant marine, carry a brigade group worth on the high seas its capability to maintain the requisite rate of buildup on a beachhead by landing craft was a constraining factor, especially in unloading facilities from cargo carriers to such craft at sea.

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While the planners were toying with the idea of combined operations and were finding it hard to make any headway, the Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral S.M. Nanda, offered to blockade both Chittagong and Khulna. He gave an assurance that access to these ports from the sea would be denied to the Pakistanis, and this was gratefully accepted. As a result the capture of these ports by land forces was relegated to a lower priority.

Dacca, the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan, was the prime objective of the campaign. A thrust from the north had to be aimed at capturing Jamalpur and Tangail and then working its way to Dacca. Mymensingh, though a communication centre of some importance, could by virtue of its distance from the main thrust line be bypassed and dealt with at a later stage.

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