Indian Defence Review

Fostering Military Professionalism

Our narrative of the 1962 border conflict is but a list of self-deprecating ‘never dos’. A force of just three weak Brigades in the Eastern and two in the Western Sectors out of forty odd in the Indian Army at that time, were hastily inducted to occupy disjointed defensive positions with little in terms of depth, fire support, obstacles and manoeuvre elements to offer what bloody resistance the valiant officers and men could. Deserted by fundamental tactical sense in face of political pressure, top Indian commanders had thus left the entire combat zone for as many as five divisions equivalent of the battle-hardened PLA to manoeuvre at will and unhinge their defensive positions before overrunning these. In short, there was just one episode replayed over and over again all along the front line: sections, platoons and companies from different units, hurriedly formed and deployed in static positions for administrative expediency, fighting out through sheer grit and little else in terms of weapons, ammunition and equipment, till overwhelmed by the text-book manoeuvre of a vastly superior force7. It was a series of hopeless battles fought for military honour by small groups of soldiers under the leadership of spirited young officers who had been left to their devises.

In contrast, the Chinese had foreseen the offensive at least five years earlier, planned in meticulous details at the highest level leaving nothing to chance, and led by the most astute Chinese Generals of that time8. Preparations – intelligence, logistics, induction and acclimatisation – were deliberate and thorough and the war was fought as one must be. Hardened by continuous warfare for over three decades, the PLA attacked resolutely even if the expected resistance did not materialise. Truly, our self-righteous disapproval of China’s ‘betrayal’ of our political solidarity, surreptitious military build up, tactics of infiltration, ‘cutting off’ and ‘human wave’ assault was nothing but a lament of a loser over what are fundamental to astute military practices of deception, manoeuvre and concentration of force. Similarly, our soldiers having no winter clothing or modern rifles did not cause us to lose the war – Indian soldiers had fought under worse conditions and yet emerged victorious.

We lost because we pawned our military acumen and with it, the nerve to keep the struggle alive. We deployed amateurishly, fought mechanically, did not bring to bear the better part of what forces we had including our air power, broke up when ‘cut off’ and accepted defeat in what was actually just a few battles lost in an early stage of what should have been a protracted war. Unlike our officers and men, higher commanders and their political mentors lost the stomach for a fight even before gearing up. The panic apparent among the Chinese leadership when faced with approach of winter, triggered by some delay in India’s response to their offer of ‘unilateral ceasefire’, makes interesting reading in this context.9 The prospect of being trapped across closed passes while the formidable Indian Army girdled up to fight, was anything but enticing to them. No doubt, India’s acceptance of the ceasefire came as a great relief to Chinese leaders – it helped secure the political gains that they had sought to achieve.

The fourth lesson had led to the armed forces rededicating to the fundamentals of military professionalism – contingency planning, resolute leadership, adherence to battle procedures, repudiation of short-cuts and steadfast struggle against all odds. After 1990, however, there seems to have crept-in some dilutions in the commitment to the exactions of hard soldierly ‘calling’. Military fundamentals – preference for difficult options in training, planning, execution and character building, and Chetwodian leadership, never easy to follow, seem to be giving way to cosier, ad hoc ‘solutions’. That such affliction is a sure recipe for dilating the military structure, is a disturbing thought.

Arguably, within the polity there is a connection between thrust on economic liberalisation, rise in socio-political aspirations and acquiescence with ‘hollowness’ in military resources. May be, this causes adulteration in military professionalism. This is a virus which the military leaders have to be vary of.

Emergence of New Maladies

The lessons of 1962 and the government’s alacrity in acting fast allowed India to rise quickly from the damage done to her internal as well as international standing. Thus during the following two decades or so, India’s internal and external policies reflected a new found strength. However, effects of stale economic policies finally blew up in 1991, to the extent that the nation had to pawn its gold bullion to keep afloat. In the salvage act, defence spending had to be cut to balance the budget, and stalling operational preparedness became a ready solution. The regression was exacerbated by collapse of the Soviet Union, the dependable source of military hardware, failure of the DRDO to deliver and procurement scandals perpetuated by greed in the system which put the procurement process in deep freeze.

Fundamentally sensitive to swift degeneration, the armed forces were soon afflicted by depilating deficiencies in their inventory of war-material. Finally in 1996, as the Army Chief ruefully put it to the government, “The (Army’s) spirit is strong but body is weak.” Soon enough came the territorial intrusion into Kargil when supreme valour and sacrifice from young officers and men saved the day. This time the sorry state of the Army was reflected in the Army Chief’s pronouncement that, “We will fight with what we have.” Then, like a weak body playing host to viruses, immorality, favouritism, recalcitrance and misappropriation started festering upon the body military. The government, by its nonchalant indifference to the soldier’s sense of entitlements, has done what it could to hasten the decline. That is the state today, worse than 1962, as it appears.

To this situation may be added some new maladies that seem to emerge to the further detriment of the nation’s military institution:-

• Image of a ‘soft state’, adapting to reconciliation with intransigence abounds. Hard realities of power-play are overlooked in the comfort of an ostrich-like approach to military planning. Inimical forces are thus encouraged to play mischief.
• The political directive to the armed forces remains ambiguous. The ‘Raksha Mantri’s Directive’ to the armed forces, besides being cursory, is literally a ‘poor’ document because the government is unable to provision her forces to be able to fulfil that mandate.
• Nuclear weaponisation with the military assigned to superficial role is seen as panacea of all voids in basic military hardware. Consequently, a credible deterrence and comprehensive schemes for war-fighting remains elusive to the third largest armed force in the world!
• As if hardware deficiencies are not enough, quality soldiery is in short supply, as indeed is the absence of cutting-edge battle leadership.
• The average standard of training is gradually tapering short of what must be achieved to fight a modern war in all its hues – selected few gladiators do not win wars.
• Defence industry has failed to manage proper turnover of equipment and ammunition, causing latent weakness in fighting formations.
• Most crucially, modernisation schemes remain disjointed in scope, inadequate in range and depth, and trapped in political as well as procedural quagmire. Logistic upgrades remain excruciatingly slow in coming, while ‘jointness’ in military endeavours has not proceeded beyond lip service.

From the above, it appears that the Indian state seems to be intent on pushing its military institution towards the nadir!

Renewal of Past Resolve

1962 is a case study in contrasting strategies. One lightly equipped force, unprepared for combat, was hastily moved to unknown terrain and ordered by the government to engage in combat with a deliberately composed military adversary, that was acclimatised and logistically well supported, was experienced in combat in difficult terrain, and nurtured by a civilian leadership that understood the complexities of combat.

Lessons assimilated of the 1962 debacle have paid us good dividends. It saved India in 1965, brought glory in 1971, preserved Indian interests in the region and prevented inimical forces from dismembering India. However, the post-1990 period gives indications that all may not be well any more. Thus we had the armed forces crying out their ‘hollowness’ in war wherewithal, the failure in forestalling the ‘Kargil War’, and the recent uproar of consternation on neglect of the servicemen’s sensitivities that went to the sad extent of appeal to the Supreme Court and the President of India. Meanwhile, larger issues of military strategy – potent policy on ‘security vs budget vs strength vs preparedness’, an achievable political directive and result-oriented scope and schedule of modernisation – remain unaddressed. The state falters even in attracting the best candidates to shoulder the excruciating burden of soldiering, even when it earns the dubious distinction of becoming the largest importer of arms in the world!

The Kargil Committee Report states, “An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such an ad hoc functioning”. It goes on to add, “The public discourse on military modernisation currently revolves around procurement delays, purchase scandals and issues of pay and status”. A dozen years later, as the successive annual reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence repeat, the situation has not changed!

Larger and smaller nations, developed and developing, have maintained their armed forces in good fettle. Celebrating the 1962 debacle may rekindle a resolve among the Indian polity to rescue itself from another blunder.