Mighty Athens had set out to quash the puny but independent-minded island of Melos during the Peloponnesian War. Overcome by the urge of self-preservation, the Melians begged to the canons of fair play and honour. The Athenians sneered, “The strong do as they will and the weak suffer as they must.” And suffer they did — all alone.

The Pune German Bakery blast on February 13th rent the air of uneasy calm prevailing post-26/11. The Kabul guesthouse attacks on February 26th were another reminder, for those Indians wearing blinkers that India is at war with radicalised militants. With more terror attacks on the horizon, the Union government must be riffling through the options on the table to counter Pakistan-bred terrorism.

Since Pakistan is going to be the darling of the international community till the US-led coalition forces decamp Afghanistan, India’s diplomatic leverage is bound to be severely circumscribed.

Since Pakistan is going to be the darling of the international community till the US-led coalition forces decamp Afghanistan, India’s diplomatic leverage is bound to be severely circumscribed. The consequent inflamed passions will trigger discussions on the military options to teach Pakistan a lesson, and one phrase that’s going to rebound unceasingly is ‘Cold Start’.

Deterrence Versus Pre-emptive Action

Few months after the November 26th seaborne invasion of Mumbai, I had an absorbing colloquy with Adity Sharma, a student doing her MA in international relations in the USA. Here I paraphrase her point: It’s but natural for an aspirant India, dreaming big about global stardom, to endeavour for greater influence in Asia first before spreading its soft power elsewhere. Forget Asia, first India needs to pull her weight to exert reasonable influence in her backyard — a hostile neighbourhood. For that, India needs to evolve an effective strategy of deterrence or wield the pre-emptive sword to thwart terror attacks with Pakistani imprimatur.

But! though they will almost definitely face elimination in the long run, terrorists are not rational creatures, and therefore incapable of seeing reason. Thus, deterrence will most likely fail to prevent them from acting against the state. And the efficacy of deterrence is further frustrated when the opponent does not deem the threat credible.

...terrorists are not rational creatures, and therefore incapable of seeing reason. Thus, deterrence will most likely fail...

Now, will it be more practicable for India to employ pre-emptive action that she can justify as self-defence to the world? Here the Pakistan Army will threaten to unsheathe nuclear weapons to stave off any Indian pre-emptive move.

International Law

Article 51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for the right of countries to engage in military action in self-defence, including collective self-defence (under a coalition). The law however does not specify about the type of attack that would give the state the justification to retaliate in self-defence. What is implicit is the victim of an armed attack has the right to employ military force against the aggressor after informing the Security Council. The use of force obviously has to be in tune with the principle of proportionality, and employed within a reasonable time frame.

In India’s case, Pakistan is the host state where from the terrorists operate unhindered. The terrorist groups have been at it, with the connivance of the state (Pak Army), for ages. That the Pakistani Government is clearly disinclined to trammel them only bolsters India’s argument to attack these venomous groups.

Article 51 was famously cited by the US in support of the Vietnam War.

In India’s case, Pakistan is the host state where from the terrorists operate unhindered. The terrorist groups have been at it, with the connivance of the state (Pak Army), for ages. That the Pakistani Government is clearly disinclined to trammel them only bolsters India’s argument to attack these venomous groups.

In December 2007, Turkey attacked the strongholds of the militant ethnic separatist group PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party; PKK, a terrorist organisation blacklisted by the UN and others, founded in the late-1970s to create an independent Kurdish state, has since been engaged in an armed struggle against Turkey). Turkey claimed to the world that the Iraqi government had proven incapable of shackling the rebels, which amply justified its counterstrike on PKK.

You do not get better evidence of Pakistani complicity than Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani national caught alive during the 26/11 terrorist attack. If India had chosen to launch surgical strikes ensuing 26/11, it could have done so under international law. And it would have been deemed proportional, timely.

Cold Start, A Primer

If one were to go by the recent commentaries of stalwarts across the border, Cold Start seems to have produced some cold sweat over there. So what is Cold Start?

Following the terrorist attack on our Parliament on December 13, 2001, the Union government ordered the armed forces to mobilise for action along the Indo–Pak border. Known as Operation Parakram, the mobilisation was so tardy that it took almost three weeks for even Indian Army’s elite strike corps to move to its op locations after ‘action stations’ was sounded.

Cold Start, an offensive exercise, reverses India’s historic defensive military posture.

What is informally known as the Sundarji doctrine had become the keystone of Indian Army’s war plan since the early-1980s. The three offensive ‘strike corps’ — I, II and later XXI Corps — based at Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal respectively, each with an orbat of an armoured division as spearhead, two mechanised infantry divisions in echelon, an artillery brigade, an air defence artillery brigade, engineer brigade and services, formed the heavy-duty sword-arm. Seven defensive ‘holding corps’ each comprising infantry and mechanised divisions, an armoured brigade, an artillery brigade and services, were deployed near the Indo–Pak border to foil Pakistani forays.

The Sundarji doctrine hinged on whopping conventional retaliation through the knockout blows executed by the three strike corps, which, under IAF’s air cover, would engage and destroy the Pakistan Army’s two strike corps (Mangla-based Army Reserve North and Multan-based Army Reserve South) in a ‘high-intensity battle of attrition’. Thereafter, the Army would press on to cleave Pakistan’s midriff into two.

Down the line, the doctrine underwent a policy nudge: instead of deep thrusts and high manoeuvres with mechanised forces, the focus shifted to inflicting maximum damage to the enemy forces, especially high-value targets.

For the fear of alienating the Muslim population of J&K, the use of nuclear weapons there by Pakistan can more or less be ruled out.

The Op Parakram experience exposed five major flaws in the Sundarji doctrine:

• Lack of strategic surprise as the strike corps took too long to deploy, and gave the Pakistan Army enough time to counter-mobilise;
• The firepower was concentrated with the strike corps, the holding corps lacked it;
• The gargantuan size of the strike corps hindered its agility and its mobilisation turned out to be a logistical nightmare;
• The doctrine was found wanting to script a quicksilver riposte to terrorist attacks;
• It did not factor in the ever-ready-to-use nuclear arsenal of Pakistan.

What is the solution? Even as full mobilisation of the armed forces is set in motion, a chunk of the Army, with the aid of IAF, must have the capacity and capability to launch prompt incursions at rattling pace to deliver deathblows on enemy targets, but the onslaught should not be deadly enough to compel Pakistan to punch the nuclear button. Cold Start essentially embodies this war-fighting strategy. Cold Start, an offensive exercise, reverses India’s historic defensive military posture. By entrenching the tenet of broad front offensive-shallow penetration, it overthrows the narrow front-deep penetration credo of the Sundarji doctrine.

The vast majority of the military, bureaucratic and political plutocrats of Pakistan belong to heartland Punjab, and therefore it is highly unlikely that the Pakistan Army would use nukes for tactical gains

Unveiled in April 2004, Cold Start is a limited-war doctrine, a terrestrial-cum-aerial blitzkrieg that confines the conflict within the nuclear ‘red lines’. It envisages the creation of eight Division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) — carved out of the existing holding corps on the western front (less XIV, XV and XVI Corps based in Jammu and Kashmir) and also the strike corps — each IBG made up of independent/rapid armoured brigade, mechanised infantry, self-propelled artillery, missile-defence battery and backed by close air support, capable of executing multiple strikes using overwhelming firepower, to take the Pakistan Army by surprise and to inflict considerable damage on it within, say, four days. The Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor, to a query from the press corps, confirmed this: “The plan now is to launch self-contained and highly mobile battle groups adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.”

The holding corps, re-designated as pivot corps, would be reinforced with extra brawn so as to undertake limited offensive operations and strike few crippling blows of its own.

The pivot corps and IBGs would be stationed closer to the border to minimise logistical requirements and to enhance their ability to surprise. Besides, these division-sized units can be alerted and mobilised quicker than corps. Simultaneous attack from eight different directions should leave the Pakistan military leadership at sixes and sevens, and there through degrade their decision-making ability. Having eight formations to monitor instead of three should put the recce at intelligence resources of Pakistan at full strain, which should further the chances of achieving surprise. Moreover, heavens forbid, if Pakistan scrambles to nuke, division-sized formations would be smaller targets than corps-sized ones.

Given Pakistan’s proclaimed itch to nuke India, the Indian Army expects the US-led international community to intercede to halt the hostilities. During the post-ceasefire negotiations, India expects to extract iron clad undertaking from Pakistan to quell its homegrown terrorists in exchange for the territorial gains it made.

Pakistan, of course, can be expected to claim that India’s Cold Start warfare would have a destabilising effect on the subcontinent. Apart from formulating an ‘antidote’ to Cold Start, Pakistan would begin to rely even more on its nuclear arms to clip India’s conventional upper hand. Pakistan can also be expected to redraw and lower the nuclear red lines besides essaying to miniaturise nuclear warhead and putting its nuclear forces under a higher state of alert.

To-do Items

The first instances of fielding irregulars as force-multipliers perhaps took place during Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808 and Russia in 1812. Of late, the Israel Defence Forces had to bear the brunt of the militiamen — Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The Pakistan Army has diligently fathered and nurtured irregular fighters as frontline ‘assets’ to confront the Indian forces. The Indian military planners have to factor the menace posed by these wildcard warriors.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are primarily meant to blunt India’s conventional edge. Since Pakistan, unlike India, has no ‘no-first-use’ policy, and since it has not ruled out employing nukes in response to a conventional assault...

With time, the distinction between strike corps and pivot corps must diminish and disappear, to enable the remodelled corps to carry out both offensive and defensive operations. This way, the combat potential of the Indian Army could be harnessed fully.

The armed forces have to stockpile NBC equipment and enhance training to familiarise troops to operate in an NBC contaminated area.

The Nuclear Battleground

Nuclear weapons are not meant to fight wars, but Pakistan does not seem to believe so and its army thinks they are playthings to be pulled out at the first swoosh of gunshot. So let us analyse whether India can undertake limited conventional operations against Pakistan without triggering a nuclear response.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are primarily meant to blunt India’s conventional edge. Since Pakistan, unlike India, has no ‘no-first-use’ policy, and since it has not ruled out employing nukes in response to a conventional assault, the only unequivocal policy outline hitherto comes from retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, boss of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division. He enunciated, “If, India overruns large swathes of Pakistan territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilisation or creates large-scale internal subversion in the country.”

Cold Start essentially embodies this war-fighting strategy. Cold Start, an offensive exercise, reverses India’s historic defensive military posture.

The Indo–Pak border can be demarcated into four geographically and demographically distinct sectors or theatres:

• The Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir;
• South J&K and Punjab plains;
• North and Central Rajasthan; and
• South Rajasthan and Gujarat.

Right from south Jammu to central Rajasthan, the terrain either side of the Indo–Pak border is marked by natural and manmade obstacles like canals and dhussi called ditch-cum-bund (DCB) — the subcontinent’s own Maginot Line. These DCBs are dotted with well-concealed concrete bunkers with ample defensive firepower. The DCBs thus render large-scale mechanised operations well-nigh impossible.

For the fear of alienating the Muslim population of J&K, the use of nuclear weapons there by Pakistan can more or less be ruled out.

The vast majority of the military, bureaucratic and political plutocrats of Pakistan belong to heartland Punjab, and therefore it is highly unlikely that the Pakistan Army would use nukes for tactical gains as an Indian nuclear reprisal would devastate their home province. Moreover, much of the DCBs and bulwark of concrete bunkers should survive a nuclear attack, and therefore counterproductive from military perspective, and only a gormless Fuehrer would bang the nuclear button. Furthermore, the RAPIDs — Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (attached to the holding corps in Punjab and Rajasthan) — are equipped with very dependable C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) system, kitted with NBC gear and stocked with decontamination vehicles/aids, and therefore capable of functioning in an environment dirtied by NBC attack.