Little is known of India’s nuclear command and control (C2) systems. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that these only exist in a rudimentary form. However, from what is in the open domain, it is equally clear that there is considerable scope for improvement in C2 systems. This is not so much in technical terms as in terms of ensconcing the deterrent into India’s strategic doctrine and culture. This paper brings to bear a social science perspective on the issue. The finding is that democratic political control requires being exercised over the deterrent, in terms of both its development and employment. The original system of the prime minister being in control of a secretive nuclear complex is now obsolescent. The nuclear complex is no longer nascent, requiring protection from nonproliferation pressures. Greater control needs to be exercised over it lest the internal democratic balance tilt away from parliamentary accountability in favour of the proverbial “military-industrial complex,” of which the nuclear “strategic enclave” is a major component. Such accountability needs begin with reassertion of India’s approach to nuclear weapons as “political weapons” in India’s nuclear doctrine. This would undercut any tendencies in expansion of the nuclear complex beyond the “minimum” in favour of a “credible” nuclear deterrent. The C2 systems would then remain “relaxed” as against any compulsion to move towards “ready.”

The nuclear complex is no longer nascent, requiring protection from nonproliferation pressures.

The aim of the paper is to discuss India’s nuclear C2 system. There is a gap in literature on this score. The work on this was when the deterrent was being forged over the turn of the century and restricted itself to how the deterrent should shape up and what this implied for nuclear C2. The discussion has been limited since on the manner the deterrent has grown, with only a few scholars, such as Rajesh Basrur and Manpreet Sethi, continuing to look at the issue.1 The paper attempts to fill this gap. It is divided into three parts. In the first part, theory is disposed of. In the next, C2 theory is situated in the Indian context and in the last part, issues emerging in terms of departure of practice from theory are highlighted.

The problem with any such effort is paucity of information. This is true in the Indian case for security issues, since declassification is not resorted to and official reticence is all pervasive. In light of this, that the C2 arrangements of a nuclear complex would be classified is understandable. The transparency that needs to attend deterrence applies to doctrine and a sense of resolve, not to specific aspects of institutions, technology and procedures that constitute C2 systems. For credibility of deterrence, a putative enemy at best needs to know that the doctrine can be executed—a function of C2. In any case, the enemy cannot risk assuming that these would not work.

This is true in the Indian case for security issues, since declassification is not resorted to and official reticence is all pervasive. In light of this, that the C2 arrangements of a nuclear complex would be classified is understandable.

Simply put, doctrine comprises how a nation views nuclear weapons and what it intends to do with them. C2 is how it is able to use these as desired. Two points need be raised at the outset: one, that writings on C2 have been mostly prescriptive, and, two, that insights from foreign C2 systems need to be adapted to the Indian context and conditions, particularly since the manner the U.S. (a major source of nuclear theory), for instance, approaches nuclear weapons being vastly different from that of India.

The Theory

A definition of C2 states as follows: “An arrangement of facilities, personnel, procedures and means of information acquisition, processing, dissemination and decision making used by national command authorities and military commanders in planning, directing and controlling military (nuclear) operations.”2 The array of C2 functions is considerable, ranging from intelligence, early warning and its assessment and communication to decision makers, IT-enabled deliberations, decision making, and communication to units executing the decisions, supervision, damage assessment and a rerun of the cycle. To Robert Osgood, nuclear C2 systems comprise facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, personnel and the structure essential for planning, directing, and controlling nuclear weapon operations and support activities; manufacture, ownership, custody, manning and operation, and military command of weapons; planning the strategy for using nuclear weapons (their number, type, deployment and the contingencies, methods and targets of their employment); the political decision to use or not to use nuclear weapons and the political decisions to govern the use of nuclear weapons in combat.3

In a democratic system, that translates into parliamentary oversight in addition to cabinet responsibility. This helps avert technological determinism and avoidable arms races.

These functions are to be performed under pressures of crisis or of unfolding conflict and in peace, in a zero-error environment. It does not need Clausewitz to remind theorists and practitioners that the medium comprises friction, fog of war, emotions, fears, uncertainty and risk. Since technology is a vital component of all this, Murphy’s Law would be in operation. Multiple agencies and hierarchies being involved, which at the best of times work at cross-purposes, C2 is indeed critical. Its key feature is that it needs to be survivable, i.e., has the ability to operate in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) environments through hardening, mobility, redundancy or concealment. This is to prevent a successful decapitation strike, either by elimination of the national leadership or military command networks or their being rendered ineffective due to communication problems between sensors, decision makers and nuclear units. Nuclear C2 needs to cover the entire nuclear trajectory, from development through deterrence to employment. Usually, the focus is on deterrence and employment that are crisis- and conflict-related. Instead nuclear developments must also be placed under political control in peacetime. In a democratic system, that translates into parliamentary oversight in addition to cabinet responsibility. This helps avert technological determinism and avoidable arms races. C2 helps ensconce the nuclear instrument in the state’s strategic doctrine and wield these as necessary for both deterrence and on its breakdown.

C2 comprises an alphabet soup encompassing the entire nuclear complex.4 For instance, the complexity of C2 is reflected in the new acronym C4I2SR.5 The extraordinary power that nuclear weapons confer, it is only right that extraordinary measures are taken to keep these under control. The key concept is “Always/Never,” implying nuclear weapons “always” work as intended and “never” when not intended. This entails “positive control,” meaning that the orders are transmitted down the chain. “Negative controls” are measures that prevent unauthorised use. These can be technical (permissive action links) and procedural (SOPs, two-man rule, etc.). “Assertive control” is centralised control, while “delegative control” means decentralisation. Assertive measures are when nonuse is privileged, while delegation is preferred where use is countenanced in some circumstances. The paradox is that the measures taken to prevent unauthorised use could result in a “fail impotent” situation, while those to ensure that weapons work when required may result in “fail deadly.”6 The preference of the state for assertive or delegative depends on two factors, its doctrine and its apprehension over safety and security. Safety is in relation to accident prevention, while security is concerned with unauthorised use.

These can amount to pathologies in a nuclear complex if political control is inadequately exercised. Political control in literature has hitherto confined itself to control over the military.

In respect of doctrine, a significant conceptual dyad is “certainty/ambiguity.” These are the diverse views on the question: What deters? Is certainty required, or is the very risk of nuclear use enough to deter? The declaratory doctrine is used for communication of intent to serve deterrence. This may not always reflect the operational, or employment, doctrine. Ambiguity could also serve deterrence by building uncertainty. It relies on risk assessment and influences risk perception of the enemy. The point is that certainty of retaliation is not necessarily essential for deterrence such as in doctrines like mutually assured destruction (MAD) and countervailing doctrine. The very possibility of retaliation serves to deter and undergrids deterrence based on existential and minimum deterrence. This doctrinal distinction is important from the view of controlling the development of the deterrent. While the capability of causing unacceptable damage is desirable from a second-strike point of view, such damage must be “sensibly” defined. This precludes MAD and the levels of megatonnage this entails. It helps keep the deterrent finite, affordable, simple, secure and safe.

Nuclear C2 is predicated on doctrine. For instance, the C2 implications for the U.S. of massive retaliation of the fifties, flexible response of the sixties and the countervailing doctrine of the seventies were different. This required constant upgrades in C2 structures, procedures, technology and investment.7 The C2 configuration of a nuclear force that is integrated with its conventional counterpart to deter conventional war is different from that of one under No First Use (NFU) stipulations. Even under NFU, the C2 system could be a ready one or a relaxed one, depending on what nuclear posture is adopted, a “launch on warning,” “launch under attack” or one that determines the nature of the strike prior to response.

Essentially, a nation has to answer for itself the questions “What is to be deterred?” and “What deters?” The doctrine is a product of the strategic culture and security circumstance. However, organisational theory informs that bureaucratic politics and institutional interests have a major role. These can amount to pathologies in a nuclear complex if political control is inadequately exercised. Political control in literature has hitherto confined itself to control over the military. This needs to expand to include the nuclear complex since the complex is now a major component of military power and is not entirely a military domain, given the pervasive presence and power of civilian technologists.

As with any organisation, there is a tendency for mimesis,8 to copy those perceived as advanced. This importing of best practices increases resemblances through a process called isomorphism.9 This is not necessarily good in case the unsuitable assumptions are also imported uncritically. For instance, following the American way of a large and variegated arsenal, a state may end up in a “creeping growth” model, moving it from “minimum” to “limited deterrence,”10 While C2 organisations need to be learning organisations, there is a need to ensure that the technological and organisational momentum is controlled. This is a function of C2 in peacetime. Learning has advantage particularly to ward off accidents. The risk of these grows in crisis and in face of conflict. In such circumstance, alert measures are upgraded and nuclear signalling resorted to. The C2 system requires being responsive to these demands, even while not precipitating the crisis into conflict.