Military & Aerospace

The Revolt in East Pakistan
Star Rating Loader Please wait...

By about 10 April, Tikka Khan was able to restore a semblance of normalcy in that after having pushed the rebellious troops, the Hindu and other minorities and non-cooperators across the Indian border, and also having crushed the Awami League, he contrived to carry out his mandate of reestablishing Yahya Khan’s writ in Bangladesh. Having accomplished this, he relinquished the soldier’s role in favour of Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, who took over as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Pakistan Eastern Command. Tikka Khan reverted to the role of Governor and Martial Law Administrator. For the time being, there was nothing much for Niazi to do except stabilise what he had achieved and further strengthen the army’s hold on the land and people.

The mode of operations was to send strong battalion columns into the outlying areas to crush the general revolt, clear the rebel-held areas and generally pacify the affected civil population.

The tempo of the operations continued unabated. By the end of April, the army had reoccupied most BOPs, recaptured the rebel stronghold of the Belonia bulge, covering approximately 57.9 sqaure kilometres, cleared the rivers and sea routes to the ports of Chalna, Khulna and Chittagong, and restored rail communications in most areas. Except for a few small pockets in outlying and inaccessible peripheral areas, the rebellion had outwardly been suppressed by the end of May.

In its early stages, news poured into India of the barbarities perpetrated by Tikka Khan and his West Pakistanis, and the Indian press glorified the heroic defiance of the rebels. So overexuberant were the Indian publicity media over the rebel activities that they headlined Tikka Khan’s supposed killing by a daring assailant. Sympathisers of Bangladesh were jubilant, but their jubilation soon died down when Tikka Khan appeared in person in a live television show which was beamed from Dacca all over the world. This was an immature propagandist gimmick which for quite a while destroyed the credibility of its perpetrators.

Sources of information which had dried up in the period of repression were reactivated and a clearer picture of the situation in East Pakistan became available. The press in Dacca painted Tikka Khan as a benevolent ruler who had promised that nobody under his protection would be “allowed to die of hunger” and had honoured his promise in deed. India was painted as the inspirer of the revolt which had resulted in wanton destruction of life and property.

By about 10 April, Tikka Khan was able to restore a semblance of normalcy in that after having pushed the rebellious troops, the Hindu and other minorities and non-cooperators across the Indian border, and also having crushed the Awami League, he contrived to carry out his mandate of reestablishing Yahya Khans writ in Bangladesh.

The beaming Niazi was depicted as a soldier’s general, constantly visiting forward troops and having a crack or two with a lonely soldier. The soldier was praised for his forbearance, professional efficiency and deep concern for the coreligionist population. Normalcy was shown through reopened schools and colleges, functioning of secretatriats and the administration at the district level, reopening of mills, rehabilitation of the tea industry, and general shopping activity in the streets of Dacca. Giving credence to this news as only half the truth, it was estimated that at least normalcy was on its way back and would return fully unless something was done to disrupt it soon.

To relieve the regular army from border-holding duties, Tikka Khan raised a paramilitary force, known as the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF), to replace the old EPR by enlisting about 6,000 officers and men—but this time with a difference in that about 90 per cent of the rank and file was from West Pakistan. A start was also made to raise Mujahids from among the loyalists Biharis, as also Razakars. This force was to protect railway and road bridges, industrial and electrical installations and communication centres and other vulnerable targets from terrorist attack as well as create confidence amongst the local population. Maj Gen Jamshed, a former director of EPR, was flown posthaste from West Pakistan to command this force. These measures were designed to strengthen Tikka Khan’s grip on the administration of the province and win back the confidence of the Bengalis.

But the exodus of bewildered refugees continued unabted, and by the end of May India had about 10 million of them as its responsibility.5 The financial burden of refugee relief was estimated by the World Bank, as quoted in the New York Times, at about $700 million in a full year.6 This was roughly half of India’s defence budget in 1970, and the nation groaned under this additional economic pressure.

Book_India_wars_sinceIt may be said to the credit of the Pakistani military machine—and Tikka Khan that, defying the logistic nigntmares of a distant overseas base, long and circuitous air routes, lack of an administrative infrastructure and stockpiling for a force not more than a division plus, and utter disruption of road, rail and sea communications, it crushed a movement, at least temporarily, launched by 75 million people acting unitedly. Internationally, Pakistan’s military image soared for the time being, and India’s credibility sank correspondingly low. The Indian people watched the entire drama helplessly. But then they had their own problems.

Notes:

  1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 20, “Provisional Government formed,” p.10153.
  2. Op cit., Vol XVII, No 20, “The Fighting,” p. 10150.
  3. Op. cit., “Directives to Civilians,” p.10153.
  4. Free Bangla Radio claimed that the Bengali elements of the East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles had raised the strength of the liberation forces to 50, 000 armed men. Op. cit., p. 10153.
  5. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 38, “Total of Refugees,” p. 10370.
  6. Op. cit., Vol XVII, No 41, “Effect of Refugee Influx on Economy, World Bank Report,” p. 10400.
1 2 3 4 5
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left