The pattern of the Pakistan Army’s repressive operations between 25 and 31 March remained confused as the information available from the refugees and defecting troops was mostly confined to the peripheral areas. Except for the stories of correspondents coming from Dacca, and for those of affluent refugees who had bought their way out, nothing was known of events in areas deep in the interior. From all accounts, Tikka Khan was rather thin on the ground.
“¦Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj Ziaur Rahman, a Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of Bangladesh on 26 March.
Of the 12 to 15 fully West Pakistani battalions at his disposal, he was committed to having a brigade’s worth in and around Dacca, the seat of the rebellion, one brigade in Comilla looking after the region east of the Meghna river, including the major port of Chittagong and the tea-growing area of Sylhet, another in the general area of Jessore and Khulna, south of the Ganga, and a fourth deployed in the northerly area bounded by the Yamuna and the Ganga.
The troops were deployed in battalion and company group strength to hold important towns and communication centres, and columns were sent to relieve beleaguered garrisons. One column was reportedly making its way from Feni to Chittagong. The discernible pattern of operations seemed to be to secure Dacca, to break the Awami League hold on the local administration, to ensure the use of Chittagong naval base as the major port of entry for shipping from West Pakistan, to safeguard the functional airfields, to facilitate an aerial buildup in troublesome regions, to guard cantonments and arsenals, to clear the road, rail and inland waterway systems, to ensure the security of main towns, and in the process to disarm the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles and police.
News trickled out from Chittagong that Operation Blitz was kept an absolute secret from Bengali officers although all ranks could sense the impending clashes the day before. Chittagong housed the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC), estimated to hold about 2,500 rank and file, including the newly raised 9 Battalion. 20 Baluch, the West Pakistan battalion in the cantonment, struck at EBRC personnel, who although mostly raw recruits gave a stiff fight, which resulted in heavy casualties. But most of the trained personnel, consisting of the permanent staff, managed to get away.
The troops were deployed in battalion and company group strength to hold important towns and communication centres, and columns were sent to relieve beleaguered garrisons.
8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in command Ziaur Rahman. He took over Radio Chittagong2 and raised the first cry of armed revolt against the military dictatorship.3 Zia was joined by elements of EPR and EBRC,4 and together they attacked 20 Baluch, which was firmly entrenched in the EBRC lines, with much success. Later, they occupied the whole of Chittagong town, causing damage in its non-Bengali colonies. They destroyed textile mills set up by some of West Pakistan’s 22 ruling families to exploit the protected markets of East Pakistan.
But in their enthusiasm they lost their sense of priorities. The naval base was untouched. With the help of newly arrived reinforcements, the naval establishment managed to secure Tiger Pass, connecting the town with the port, and that kept the base out of reach of the rebels. Later, a relief column from Comilla, as well as the efforts of the beleaguered 20 Baluch, cleared the town by 31 March and took control of the Chittagong radio station two days later. Ziaur Rahman made his way along with his comrades towards India. On his way, he occupied the Belonia bulge till ousted by a heavy Pakistani punitive attack mounted on the arrival of reinforcements.
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Almost simultaneously, five other EBR battalions stationed in East Pakistan, the whole of EPR and the armed police revolted. On the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at Joydevpur, north of Dacca, with its companies dispersed at Tongi, Ghazipur, Tangail and Mymensingh, revolted around 28 March, killing the few West Pakistani officers and their families. They stiffly resisted efforts to disarm them and gradually made their way to Tura in the Indian state of Meghalaya.
8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in command Ziaur Rahman.
1 EBR Battalion, located at Jessore, was disarmed about the same time after a heroic but unequal struggle. 10 EBR, a national service battalion consisting of students under training, was sent on forced leave and later disbanded after seizing their arms. But 3 EBR, located in the Saidpur area, and 4 EBR, in the Comilla sector, escaped being disarmed humiliatingly. Along with their officers and arms, they moved first towards Hilli and Sylhet respectively, and later came to India under heavy military pressure from Pakistani troops.
Bengali elements in mixed units were easily subdued, but some of them managed to get away to join their comrades in open revolt. The revolting EBR battalions organised EPR, the Mujahids, the Ansars, the police and ex-servicemen as well as civilians to resist alien army rule in the name of the newly emerging Bangladesh. In addition to their own arms, the rebels looted Pakistani armouries and police stations, gathering considerable quantities of arms in the process. The EBR battalions organised resistance sectorwise, and wherever they entered India they coordinated the activities of EPR and other rebellious elements in their respective areas. But overall coordination of the revolt and its connected activities was however lacking.
They stiffly resisted efforts to disarm them and gradually made their way to Tura in the Indian state of Meghalaya.
EPR detachments concentrated on attacking Pakistani border outposts and surrounding isolated garrisons. Exploiting the minimum Pakistan presence in inaccessible areas, and the undue time Pakistani troops took to react in others, the sector commanders organised some bold forays deep inside Pakistani-held territory. Some enterprising local commanders of the Border Security Force who had learnt of Pakistani atrocities from the refugees and revolting Bengali elements, often joined in the raids, especially in the Jessore and Sylhet regions. Finding a vacuum in these areas and full of enthusiasm, some of them told visiting news correspondents covering the refugee exodus that the occupation of East Pakistan would be easy. Such talk created a powerful lobby in India which urged the Prime Minister to take immediate action to liberate Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, Tikka Khan asked for and got more troops to deal with the troublesome province. Pakistan 9 Infantry Division and 16 Infantry Division were flown from the western wing to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. This was achieved at the considerable risk of denuding the striking forces north and south in that wing. It is said that 9 Infantry Division was ordered to move from Kharian in the west on 30 March. Its flight in PIA Boeings started from Lahore on 1 April and the whole divisionless heavier arms, had concentrated in East Pakistan by 5 April. This speaks well for Pakistani military efficiency.
Bengali elements in mixed units were easily subdued, but some of them managed to get away to join their comrades in open revolt.
9 Infantry Division quickly reinforced the thinly held region east of Meghna from Sylhet to Chittagong. One of its brigades was airlifted to Sylhet, where the besieged garrison was in great difficulty. The second brigade was flown to Comilla to take over from the old 14 Infantry Division Brigade, which in turn moved to Chittagong. The third brigade moved to Mymensingh, thus achieving adequate strength closer to the border to push the rebels out of the peripheral areas.
The mode of operations was to send strong battalion columns into the outlying areas to crush the general revolt, clear the rebel-held areas and generally pacify the affected civil population. The Dacca brigade, having accomplished its task, was rushed north to relieve Rajshahi. The columns are claimed to have moved at great speed, covering about 300 miles in seven days in an assortment of transport from cycle rickshaws to river boats with ad hoc logistic support.
The rapidity of these operations seemed to have a salutary effect on the rebel strongholds, especially in the interior. These columns devastated villages and towns in their path, slaughtered resisters, and generally created havoc of the Chengez Khan type. The heroic resistance of politically inspired freedom fighters in Chandpur and Akhaura was overcome at great cost to the Pakistanis.
Exploiting the minimum Pakistan presence in inaccessible areas, and the undue time Pakistani troops took to react in others, the sector commanders organised some bold forays deep inside Pakistani-held territory.
Meantime, Pakistan 16 Infantry Division enabled Tikka Khan to rationalise the formation’s operational boundaries so as to dominate the rebelaffected areas with greater, and perhaps crushing, strength. 9 Infantry Division was assigned the area east of the Meghna, including the Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong sectors, 14 Infantry Division Mymensingh, Dacca and Jessore, and 16 Infantry Division the whole northern region. With this added strength and more stabilised logistic support, the columns fanned out over the entire countryside, especially near the border with India. They pushed the rebels towards India and sought the pacification of these areas with an iron hand.
These operations mainly involved fighting small company and battalion actions, with tank, gun and air support. Tikka Khan’s mode of operation seemed to be to hit hard and crush rather than pacify. To secure two vital crossings at Bhairab Bazaar on the Meghna and Golando Ghat on the Padma, he attacked with brigade groups and a preponderance of air and gun support. In the former action, 4 EBR Battalion, holding the bridge, was badly mauled and lost a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. It was militarily imprudent for the revolting troops to engage in set-piece battles in such circumstances, but then the habits of regular soldiers die hard.
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