Detailed analysis revealed that the composition of about 18 infantry battalions was all West Pakistanis and six all East Pakistanis while the supporting arms, comprising one armoured and seven artillery regiments, were mixed, with about 70 percent of West Pakistani and 30 percent of East Pakistani elements, the former predominating, at least in the higher ranks.
Guerilla-type action against law and order agencies, both in the urban and rural areas, had led to a shutdown of schools and colleges, and law-abiding citizens feared to tread the streets. The Naxalites denounced the elections as “treachery” and vowed to block them by eliminating candidates who opposed their ideology. Threats were uttered that political scores would be settled by bullets. To ensure orderly elections in the state in this atmosphere, about a division plus of the Indian Army was moved into it to supplement the state and central police agencies. All eyes were focused on the West Bengal elections, and the little news that filtered across the border from East Pakistan was only of academic interest, at least for the time being.
Our military intelligence was well served with information from East Pakistan. It was known with a degree of exactitude that traditionally the region had only one infantry division comprising four brigades with adequate supporting arms, a squadron or two of fighter and transport aircraft, and some naval presence in Pakistan’s territorial waters as well as in riverine waterways. Detailed analysis revealed that the composition of about 18 infantry battalions was all West Pakistanis and six all East Pakistanis while the supporting arms, comprising one armoured and seven artillery regiments, were mixed, with about 70 percent of West Pakistani and 30 percent of East Pakistani elements, the former predominating, at least in the higher ranks.
In addition, there was a paramilitary organisation called the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), comprising about 16 wings with an approximate strength of 13,000. With the exception of the majority of officers and junior commissioned officers, these wings were manned by East Pakistanis. This formation was responsible for manning the border in times of peace to ensure its integrity as well as to keep a check on the movement of civilians across it. It was estimated that reinforcements by air could have augmented the East Pakistan garrison with three or four infantry battalions with light arms. It was also known that this airlift had slowed down somewhat after Mujib’s protest and the threatened strike action by members of the staff of Pakistan International Airlines stationed in Dacca, but exact figures relating to this operation were not available.
Mujib was gradually paving the way for a total confrontation which would engulf the armed forces in its sweep.
The impact of the happenings in East Pakistan on the loyalty of rank and file of military personnel belonging to the province and their leadership was a foregone conclusion, but to what extent this would erode the battle efficiency of Pakistani units drawn from both wings could not be accurately forecast. It was felt that on the whole the West Pakistan units would remain unaffected, as the small proportion of junior Bengali officers on their establishment could easily be relegated to positions of lesser responsibility or be neutralised by house arrest and other action. On the other hand, the East Pakistan units, whose higher ranks were mostly officered by West Pakistanis, upset the calculations of observers.
The degree of cohesion and loyalty of a unit depends on a given situation, the pressures brought to bear upon the group, and its leadership. Since all these factors were of an indeterminate nature, the assessment could be only in broad terms, especially when the extent of penetration of Awami League influence in the army was not known. The possible effect of defections, desertions or outright mutiny and revolt by East Pakistani elements could not thus be accurately gauged. But considering the predominance of West Pakistanis in positions of responsibility, and their control of the channels of communication and other facilities for exercising command and control, their monopoly of heavier weapons in the way of artillery and armour, their numerical strength and their traditional martial background indicated that in an open trial of strength Bengali military personnel would come out only second best.
“¦ the East Pakistan units, whose higher ranks were mostly officered by West Pakistanis, upset the calculations of observers.
On the whole, it was felt that the situation would not deteriorate militarily to the extent that Tikka Khan’s professional, “business-like” hand would not be able to control developments, ruthlessly if necessary. And it would still remain Pakistan’s internal problem, albeit with some irritation to India, and nothing more. Politically, India looked forward hopefully to a fruitful conclusion of the political parleys in Dacca.
The negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujib dragged on, but from cryptic press communiques and radio quotes they appeared to be leading nowhere. Rumours were afloat that these were stalling tactics on the part of Yahya Khan to build up the requisite military strength for the final crackdown. Now it is known, through Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem’s book Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, that Tikka Khan had been preparing for quite a while to update the plan titled ‘Operation Blitz’ and gear up the necessary machinery to put it into operation at short notice.
Although the press communique issued on 3 March looked hopeful, Pakistan Republic Day was celebrated in Dacca as Resistance Day. Bangladesh flags appeared on rooftops and rejoicing crowds paraded the streets while the army was confined to barracks.7 On the night of 25 March, Yahya Khan left Dacca unannounced, and the same night Tikka Khan struck throughout East Pakistan with a heavy hand.8 This led Bhutto to say “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved,” but news of this action was blacked out in the rest of the world for some time.
About midday on 26 March, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff was interviewing me as a routine on my posting, his telephone rang to convey the news that an East Pakistani non-commissioned officer and about 30 other ranks had walked over to one of our border observation posts on the periphery of the Belonia salient in Tripura and had reported that the Bengali elements in the Pakistani armed forces in the eastern wing had revolted and fierce clashes were raging, especially in the Chittagong area.
Notes:
- Ibid., Vol XVII, No 18, “General Yahya Khan in Dacca. Negotiations with S. M. Rahman,” p. 10130.
- Ibid., p 10130.
- After the split in the Congress in November 1969, it had lost its status as a majority party. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 3, “Lok Sabha Dissolved, Fresh Election Ordered,” pp. 9957-58.
- The Congress Party won more than a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha/
- President’s rule was revoked on 2 April and Bangla Congress president Ajoy Mukherjee was invited to form a ministry.
- Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No1, “Total Naxalite-CPM Murders in W. Bengal,” p. 9940.
- Op. cit., Vol XVII, No 18, “Pakistan Day Observed as Resistance Day;” p. 10132.
- Ibid., under chronology or events since 1969, p. 10150.
This was the first news India got of Tikka Khan’s crackdown. All contacts with East Pakistan had been severed and Radio Dacca was silent. Terrified civilians started pouring into India across the entire India-East Pakistan border, an exodus which finally resulted in about 10 million refugees becoming India’s responsibility. The thunder of artillery, the crackle of machine guns and other noises of war began to be heard from the peripheral border areas, and blazing fires and spiralling smoke told a tale of destruction.
The refugees spoke of the devastation, ruthless killing, rape, loot and plunder they had fled from. Then came about 40 foreign news correspondents, photographers and television cameramen, hurriedly deported from Dacca. They vividly described the tank battles which had raged in the streets of the city on the night of 25/26 March. From the Intercontinental Hotel, they had witnessed the razing of the university.
Terrified civilians started pouring into India across the entire India-East Pakistan border, an exodus which finally resulted in about 10 million refugees becoming Indias responsibility.
They had heard heavy mortar fire and the crack of rocket launchers. According to them, the military were employed against unarmed Bengalis with brutal ruthlessness. They feared that Mujib and his associates had either been murdered or imprisoned. They felt that the genocide perpetrated in Dacca was of the worst type, even more cruel than that in the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. Although the Pakistan Army had confiscated their films, cameras and tape recorders, some of them managed to smuggle out horrifying pictures of devastated towns and villages and streets littered with the dead and the maimed.
Meanwhile, Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj Ziaur Rahman, a Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of Bangladesh on 26 March.1 This was welcome news indeed to supporters of the liberation struggle, but the fate of Mujib and other top leaders of the Awami League still remained unknown.
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