Military & Aerospace

The Revolt in East Pakistan
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Yahya Khan also resiled from the hard line he had adopted by announcing a new date, 25 March, for summoning the National Assembly9 and comparative calm ensued for a while. Speaking at a mammoth gathering at Ramna racecourse on the afternoon of 7 March, Mujib announced his willingness to participate in the session of the National Assembly provided his four demands—withdrawal of martial law, return of troops to their barracks, inquiry into army killings, and transfer of power to duly elected representatives of the people—were met before the start of the session. He also outlined a weeklong programme of non-cooperation starting 8 March to cripple the army regime.10 So overwhelming was the response to Mujib’s call that he and his associates had virtually become the rulers of East Pakistan. It seemed as if Bangladesh had in fact come into existence.

This was amply evident when Lt Gen Tikka Khan, newly nominated Governor and Martial Law Administrator, arrived in Dacca on 7 March to take over from Yakub Khan. The Chief Justice of the High Court of East Pakistan refused to administer the oath of office to the new Governor,11 duly appointed by the President of Pakistan as notified in the official gazette. Other judges of the court are also said to have declined to perform the ceremony. In the event, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan had to be rushed to Dacca to do so.

After the imposition of curfew in Dacca on 2 March,6 units of the Pakistan Army moved into the city and resorted to firing on the demonstrators.

This incident was a clear defiance of the military regime’s authority. Perhaps the dictatorship’s ever-weakening hold on East Pakistan had impelled Yahya Khan to appoint Tikka Khan for the task of bringing Mujib to heel. Tikka Khan was known as a tough, no-nonsense soldier who would not hesitate to use military force, even to the degree of brutality, to restore the military regime’s authority. He was known to have employed such methods against a tribal rebellion in Baluchistan with considerable success. After the swearing in, Tikka Khan is said to have summoned Mujib to his presence, but Mujib agreed to see the Governor only if he came to his house.

This was the parting of the ways between Tikka Khan and Mujib, and perhaps between East and West Pakistan. Unable to stomach this personal insult, Tikka was bound to react violently against ostensible defiance on the part of Mujib and his Awami League. To Pakistan watchers, as well as to the General Staff of the Indian Army, a strong military action appeared imminent.

Meanwhile, Mujib’s civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement was visibly affecting the governmental machinery and people of Bangladesh. It encompassed the provincial law and order agencies such as the police and paramilitary forces.12 The tirade against the Pakistan Army in the newspapers of Dacca, denouncing it as “alien and barbarous,” continued unabated and must have had some effect in subverting the loyalties of the Bengali rank and file, in the East Bengal Regiment in particular and the Pakistani armed forces in general, especially those stationed in East Pakistan and sensitive to the mood of the people.

Book_India_wars_sinceMujib was gradually paving the way for a total confrontation which would engulf the armed forces in its sweep. Tikka Khan, professional that he was, was hound to be preparing to combat such an eventuality. The news had trickled into Dacca from Sri Lanka that Pakistan Army personnel were flying over the island from the western to the eastern wing in civilian clothes.13 New Delhi had earlier banned overflights of Indian territory by Pakistani aircraft after the Pakistan-inspired hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane in January 1971. This made it necessary for Pakistani craft to take the circuitous route through Sri Lanka, and this was both expensive in terms of money and time-consuming.

Notes:

  1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 15, “National Assembly Postponed Indefinitely,” p. 10092.
  2. Ibid., “Hartal Continues,” p. 10093.
  3. On 13 November 1970, cyclone havoc in East Pakistan claimed 2 million lives, as reported by The Times, London.
  4. The six-point programme was spelt out on 24 February 1971 by Sheikh Mujib in addressing a news conference in Dacca.
  5. In his broadcast to the nation on 26 March 1971, President Yahya Khan charged Sheikh Mujib with treason.
  6. Asian Recorder, “Violent Demonstrations, Curfew Imposed,” p. 10092.
  7. On 6, March it was announced that the troops called out in Dacca would return to barracks following an improvement in the situation as a sequel to Sheikh Mujib’s appeal to remain peaceful.
  8. Radio Pakistan announced on 1 March the appointment of Lt Gen Shahbjada Mohammad Yakub Khan as the province’s Martial Law Administrator in place of the Governor, Admiral S. K. Khan.
  9. Asian Recorder, “President Yahya Khan’s broadcast,” p. 10093.
  10. Ibid., “Mujib’s Conditions for Attending Assembly,” p. 10094.
  11. Ibid., Vol XV11, No 20, “March 9.”
  12. Ibid., “SM Rahman Asks Defence Workers to Defy Martial Law,” p. 10096.
  13. A Deutsche Presse Agentur report said that despite Ceylon’s restrictions Pakistani military aircraft had been passing from the west to the east wing through the island. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 18, “Ceylon’s Restrictions onPakistani Aircraft,” p. 10132.

Intelligence reports indicated that a part of Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division, stationed at Quetta, was being inducted into East Pakistan to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. Reliance on air transportation at first restricted immediate reinforcements to lightly armed manpower, but in due course heavier weapons could be expected to fetch up by sea. Mujib, according to the Dacca press, openly objected to this surreptitious buildup of armed strength and questioned its motive. But the airlift of troops continued throughout Yahya Khan’s parleys with Mujib and Bhutto in Dacca in the second half of March.1

Perhaps the dictatorships ever-weakening hold on East Pakistan had impelled Yahya Khan to appoint Tikka Khan for the task of bringing Mujib to heel.

As the political negotiations between the President and the elected representatives of the majorities in the two wings were extended,2 there was a general feeling that an acceptable solution would be found. It was believed that Yahya Khan would not throw away the only chance of keeping the two wings of Pakistan together, especially so when both the Soviet Union and the United States gave the impression that they were helping to narrow the differences between the opposing stands. And if the problem still defied a political settlement, it was thought that it would be handled by Tikka Khan by means of military action, with partial success at least, to tide over this period of inflamed passions.

It was not beyond the realm of possibility for Tikka Khan to suppress the rebellion by imprisoning the Awami League leaders, suspending political activities, and generally forcing the people to acquiesce by the well-recognised method of carrot and stick commonly used by rulers. In either eventuality, the problem would remain within the confines of Pakistan’s internal affairs and would not concern India directly. But a crackdown on the democratic processes would arouse Indian sympathy for Mujib and his followers, perhaps also a few tears and some loud protests in international forums, but no more. India very much wished at that time to be left alone.

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India had its own problems. The Indian leaders had been busy in the preceding winter in parliamentary elections to consolidate their own position after the split3 in the ruling Congress Party. The elections brought a dazzling victory to Indira Gandhi,4 and this spurred her to establish a stable government in anarchy-ridden West Bengal.5 From the collapse of the coalition government in March 1970 and the imposition of presidential rule, some political murders were reported to have been committed in clashes between the Naxalites led by Charu Mazumdar and other political groups.6

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