Indian Defence Review

To this end, both powers have been striving to acquire such facilities by extending their influence among other nations with similar interests. So long as India remains strictly neutral and does not extend these facilities in one garb or another to either of these powers we have nothing to fear. If there is a naval conflagration in the area, only those littoral countries would invite retaliatory action, which have the adversaries’ bases on their territory. A neutral country is not likely to be directly embroiled: in the conflict unless it becomes absolutely necessary for a warring nation to acquire the denied facilities by force to further its war potential. In view of the fierce nationalism surging in the region such an eventuality is remote, especially so in the case of India, which has emerged as a regional power of consequence.

The next consideration is safeguarding Indian merchant shipping on the trade routes passing through the area, especially along the approaches to seaports. The vulnerability of our ships will be confined to the period of war. The degree of vulnerability would depend upon the strategic value of the cargoes carried, and also on whether they are carried under the Indian flag or in foreign vessels on charter. In this regard, the oil traffic from the Persian Gulf will be very vulnerable. Otherwise, in the context of short wars, sustaining the war effort would not depend upon material from abroad. Instead, it would be sustained by the stockpile of war material created for the purpose in the preparatory stage of planning.Despite the ambitious expansion of Indian merchant shipping tonnage, the number of our ships on international trade routes will be so marginal, at least in the foreseeable future, that it would not be worthwhile to arrange naval escorts for them. In fact, the best protection at such a time would lie in Indian vessels intermingling with those flying other flags to the extent that it should become difficult to single out Indian craft on the high seas. On the other hand, as traffic enters home waters, the congestion of Indian vessels would be such as to warrant protective measures at seaports till they join the international traffic.

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The security of India’s coastal waters assumes greater importance in view of its growing fishing fleet and coastal trade and passenger traffic. Numerous vessels of all sorts, from country boats to coastal steamers to fishing trawlers, throng India coastal waters, and this activity is likely to grow. Besides, the economic development of the country has resulted in various installations and industries springing up along the coast, and these are vulnerable both to surface and submarine attacks. In this regard, offshore oil platforms, refineries and oil storage tanks close to ports become extremely vulnerable. The close defence of the coast and of coastal waters and of craft plying in them therefore has greater significance and should invite higher priority than loose talk of protecting trade routes on the high seas.

The security of Indias coastal waters assumes greater importance in view of its growing fishing fleet and coastal trade and passenger traffic.

The threat from China in our coastal waters is marginal unless it manages to secure bases closer to sensitive Indian areas. Chinese naval strength is based mainly on submarine and patrol boats and lacks the inherent capability to sustain operations so far distant from the mainland and its sea base. There is a possibility of its securing such facilities in some East African countries and possibly in Pakistan, but the mere fact that its intervention against India would invite Soviet retaliation under the treaty of friendship between the two countries keeps the Chinese threat rather diffused. Although all precautions should be taken to meet such a threat, this should not tilt our defence development plans in that direction. At the best, China can be considered only a long-range threat.

The most potent and immediate threat is from Pakistan. The present weakness of the Pakistani Navy lies in its lack of air cover for naval operations away from the airfields at Malir and Badin close to Karachi. Thus the freedom of action of its flotilla is confined to the radius of action of its medium-range Mirage Ills, which covers that portion of the Arabian Sea extending downward north of Bombay. By neutralizing these airfields by air and ground action this radius can be further reduced. The vulnerability of the Indian coastline, as well as its coastal waters, to attack by larger Pakistani warships is greater north of Bombay than south of it.

As deployment of the Pakistani fleet south of Bombay without air cover would invite disaster, especially when Pakistan has no carrier-borne air capability, it is likely that its naval operations in this area would be mainly confined to undersurface activities by Daphne submarines, which have the range and speed to undertake such distant missions. At present, submarine tenders are not in Pakistan’s list of shopping priorities, but once they become available it would be able to extend these operations a great deal.

As deployment of the Pakistani fleet south of Bombay without air cover would invite disaster, especially when Pakistan has no carrier-borne air capability, it is likely that its naval operations in this area would be mainly confined to undersurface activities by Daphne submarines, which have the range and speed to undertake such distant missions.

Although as a result of losing the eastern wing Pakistan has little strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal, the nuisance value of disrupting port facilities at Vishakhapatnam and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be considerable. It therefore becomes imperative that the bias of our defence planning should be to deal with a major Pakistani naval offensive along the Kathiawar coast to the north of Bombay, including submarine activity.

The best antidote for submarine attacks is early detection and engagement with lethal weaponry, whether the attacking vessel is submerged or on the surface, Much controversy has gone on in India with regard to the choice of maritime reconnaissance aircraft to replace the aging Constellations. There has been brisk advocacy of the British Nimrod, the American Lockheed P-3C Orion and the Russian Ilyushin-38 by different vested interests. Some have even advocated the purchase of the Japanese Shim-Melwa flying boat.

All these are long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft with both detection and strike capability. Except the Japanese craft, all operate from land bases. The flying boats need calm, protected waters for operation.

There was a hot debate, in Parliament and outside, on whether the Air Force or the Navy should man these aircraft. It was argued that since. the Navy was primarily concerned with surface and subsurface craft at sea the task should be handled by naval aviation, which would know what to look for and would have a sense of urgency for engagement both from air and sea. The participation of naval agencies from detection to target destruction should help better coordination at every stage of the process.

On the other hand, the Air Force felt that if the Navy handled these aircraft this would entail the creation of a separate infrastructure for maintenance and repair, resulting in unnecessary duplication of effort. Moreover, the naval air arm was accustomed to handling only small aircraft. Naval pilots would have to be trained afresh at considerable cost while IAF had a ready pool of pilots suited to fly bigger, more sophisticated aircraft. Both sides missed the basic assessment of the requirement: Does India really need these long-range aircraft? As I said earlier, our immediate task is defending coastal waters, while that of patrolling the high seas lies in the distant future. There is no great urgency to spend money on long-range reconnaissance requirements at the cost of developing other more pressing capabilities. It is just as well that economic constraints impelled the Government to suspend a decision, for otherwise the purchase of these aircraft would have led to lopsided priorities in the Indian Navy’s growth. Lately, the Government opted for the Ilyushin-38 to be manned by the Navy as a long term measure.

Overdependence for supply of shipping requirements on a single source, however pressing the need, should be avoided for obvious reasons.

At the moment Pakistan has considerable offensive capability. If it launches an all-out surprise attack anywhere along the Kathiawar coast it has a high probability of success, provided the Pakistan Air Force plays its part in full accord with naval plans. Midget submarines could create havoc in the offshore drilling establishments in the Bombay High area. As brought out earlier, this capability progressively diminishes in relation to objectives farther south.

Since the threat south of Bombay in the Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Bengal is mostly from submarines, it is essential that airfields should be located all along the coast and that the infrastructure should be created to enable older types of aircraft belonging to the Navy and the Air Force to operate in reconnaissance and strike roles against submarine and surface craft. Since there is no likelihood of interference by either the Chinese and the Pakistan Air Force in this region, Seahawks, Alizes, Toofanis, Vampires and similar craft could be suitably modified for this role. The infrastructure should provide flexibility to transfer aircraft to the threatened sector at will. This can be supplemented by surface and underwater counter-measures possible with the resources at hand, especially in sensitive areas.

The threat to the coastal waters and the trade routes through the Arabian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and to Europe through the Suez Canal, is very potent, and will increase progressively, with the pace of Pakistan’s high speed naval buildup. In matching responses, as well as to achieve an edge in strike power at sea, it is imperative that our air and naval punch in the threatened sector should be greatly increased. Most ships of the Indian fleet are old, and about a third of them need immediate replacement.

It is also necessary to increase its submarine power and its antisubmarine measures too. Our antisubmarine frigates are mostly old. Leander class frigates are useful, but the rate of production is far behind the envisaged wastage. It is learnt that India plans to build the A-69 Aviso in collaboration with France. This is a small craft of about 1,200 tons displacement which carries four fixed launchers for homing torpedoes. It is primarily an antisubmarine frigate and should be handy in coastal waters against Daphnes. Since the pace of indigenous production lags behind the aging process of the Indian fleet, it is necessary to fill the gap with warships acquired abroad.

Also read: Evolution of Indian Submarine Arm

The Government has from time to time announced a program of replenishing and adding to the present fleet. The cost of modern warships with sophisticated surveillance and firing systems and weaponry is prohibitive. It is therefore essential for an expert committee to carry out a systems analysis and work out a practical naval growth plan to match the potential threats. The plan should consider the rate of waste and match it with indigenous production and then work out an acquisition plan consistent with the availability of fiscal resources.

The effort should be to have not only a defensive capability in the region north of Bombay but also to create a formidable offensive capability both in naval guns and missile power and a sizable amphibious landing capability on Pakistan’s open coast. The potential of this threat would tie up a good portion of the Pakistan Army on the west coast, thus helping Indian operations farther north. Growth should be by stages, in such a manner that the balance between defensive and offensive is not upset at any time. Overdependence for supply of shipping requirements on a single source, however pressing the need, should be avoided for obvious reasons. Diversity, although irksome from the logistical angle, always pays in acquiring weapons.

The overall naval picture envisages a large inventory of ant. submarine vessels, missile and patrol boats working with the naval air arm and the Air Force as an integrated team as a defensive measure. On the offensive side, it visualizes a combination of gun and missile power in terms of surface and under-surface warships, with adequate escort and supply ships, hard-hitting enough to take on Pakistan’s navy both at sea and in harbor. Matching enhancement of the supporting Air Force strike and maritime reconnaissance capability needs to be ensured. There is no room for pessimism till the desirable is achieved. Admiral Nanda has more than amply proved that an offensive outlook and human ingenuity can make up for material and technological shortcomings with telling effect. The Indian Navy needs to imbibe this spirit as part of its glorious tradition.