Military & Aerospace

The Navy in War-II
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Issue Book Excerpt: India\'s War since Independence | Date : 02 Jun , 2011

After 1965 Pakistan tried to keep pace with the Indian naval program, but the stoppage of US military aid and lack of foreign exchange prevented matching progress. But three Daphne class submarines were purchased from France on annual installments. Budgetary allocations for the purpose forbade refitting, modernization and replacement of the aging fleet. One cruiser, seven destroyers and the Ghazi had long outlived their usefulness. Three destroyers had to be demilitarized just before the war because of structural defects, and this had led to a sense of insecurity among the remaining ships’ companies.

This was further compounded by disaffection among its 38 per cent of Bengali officers and men. The unending drain of trained naval manpower to man newly activated gunboats in the riverine warfare in East Pakistan further affected the war potential of the Pakistan Navy. Far more serious gaps in Pakistan’s preparations existed however in the spheres of higher command, lack of facilities for maritime reconnaissance, the integration of air effort with naval operational plans, and in the fundamental concept of meeting the potential Indian threat.

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The headquarters of the Pakistan Navy were located in Karachi to be close to its flotilla and the naval battle in the event of war. But it was so far removed from Islamabad, the seat of decision-making, that at times it was forgotten. Fazal Muqeem reveals that the aims of Pakistan’s naval plans were modest to suit the state of preparedness and the capability of equipment.

Fearful of these missile boats, as well as lack of trust in the battle-worthiness of its fleet, Pakistan opted to go on the defensive, with its naval units deployed in a semicircle around Karachi within the radius of action of shore based air force fighter cover.

The Pakistan Navy was expected to do no more than look after the seaward defence of Karachi harbor and escort merchant ships carrying strategic supplies. As a prerequisite, it was assumed that a warning of seven days would be given to enable the navy to redeploy and alert its units at sea. Since the Pakistani Navy lacked its own long-range strike element, it was presumed that air support would be forthcoming from land based strike aircraft, at least within a radius of 100 miles from Karachi.

The Pakistani assessment had also overestimated the potential of the missile boats India had acquired from the Soviet Union. The missile boat is a small, low freeboard vessel housing the launcher. It presents a low silhouette and is difficult to detect at long ranges, while its Styx-type missile has a lethal range of about 40 kilometres. The accuracy cf !::e missile is considerably improved by combined guidance and radar homing devices. The Russians had designed these boats primarily for seaward defence in a rather semi-static role. Their inherent motive power provided only a limited range of mobility for defence. It goes to the credit of Indian ingenuity that they were used offensively with telling effect.

Also read: The Navy in War-I

Fearful of these missile boats, as well as lack of trust in the battle-worthiness of its fleet, Pakistan opted to go on the defensive, with its naval units deployed in a semicircle around Karachi within the radius of action of shore based air force fighter cover. The submarines were however deployed on offensive patrolling off the Bombay and Kathiawar seaports and other focal areas, ready to attack Indian shipping when ordered. This posture was adopted from the third week of November 1971 and was known to Indian intelligence. Admiral Nanda, as stated earlier, had insisted from the very beginning that, unlike 1965, the Navy should be brought into full play. Accordingly, he had been allotted three principal roles:

In India, an organization to coordinate merchant shipping in wartime did not exist and had to be built from scratch.

to protect Indian shipping and keep the sea lanes open for essential strategic traffic; to deny the use of the seas to Pakistan for naval and trade purposes by blockading both wings; and to undertake offensive forays on the coast of both wings for the maximum destruction of Pakistan’s naval strength and harbor facilities. Nanda started preparing for these roles with zealousness and characteristic drive.

In India, an organization to coordinate merchant shipping in wartime did not exist and had to be built from scratch. The pattern of shipping movement in and around Indian waters was studied over a period and analysed to ascertain schedules and routing. Problem areas of congestion were localized, and a concept evolved for naval deployment to provide direct and indirect protection to Indian shipping both in harbor and in approach lanes, and farther out on the high seas if possible.

Although protection was sought in maximum dispersal and diffusion on the high seas, congestion was inevitable on approach routes and in harbor areas, and these needed special protective measures. Pakistan was expected to attempt to deter foreign shipping from entering Indian waters, even by sinking a ship or two, and therefore Indian protective measures had to be so visibly assuring as to instill confidence in foreign shipping to go in and out of Indian ports with impunity.

The main problem was posed by heavy Indian shipping traffic to and from the Persian Gulf with its sea lanes running uncomfortably close to the Pakistan coast, thus giving favorable strategic environments to Pakistan.

The main problem was posed by heavy Indian shipping traffic to and from the Persian Gulf with its sea lanes running uncomfortably close to the Pakistan coast, thus giving favorable strategic environments to Pakistan. Towards the end of November, when hostilities appeared imminent, traffic to and from the Persian Gulf was spaced out to achieve maximum diffusion by mingling with ships of other nations. And as part of operational planning, the manoeuvring of the flotilla in the region was such that its action automatically provided indirect protection to the Gulf sea lanes.

An extensive publicity campaign was organized along the west coast to educate fishermen, sailors on coasters and air crew flying over the vulnerable area in recognizing Pakistani submarines in various profiles. They were asked to report immediately any suspicious movement in their waters to the ground organization established in the area for the purpose. It was likely that Pakistan intelligence got wind of these Indian preparations, and this might have deterred the Pakistani Navy from exploiting its submarine fleet as fully as technically and tactically feasible.

In the event, these measures provided effective to the extent that the daily docking average at Indian ports remained unaffected throughout the conflict. Control became effective much earlier, although an ordinance empowering the Indian Navy to control shipping in Indian waters came into force only in the last week of November. A premature enactment would have caused an unnecessary war scare.

At the outbreak of hostilities, India declared a blockade of Pakistani ports, but later changed this to contraband control. A blockade might have induced some powers friendly to Pakistan to try to run it just to humble India’s naval power. India could ill afford to get embroiled in such awkward skirmishes at that time. Contraband control, which allowed the freedom to search a particular ship, was more flexible in application and, under the circumstances, fitted the bill better.

An extensive publicity campaign was organized along the west coast to educate fishermen, sailors on coasters and air crew flying over the vulnerable area in recognizing Pakistani submarines in various profiles.

Nanda’s offensive plan was indeed simple. Leaving aside antisubmarine craft to protect the west coast from the Pakistani submarine menace of the Midget and Chariot type in its armoury, the Indian fleet was to be divided into two task forces. One, comprising the bigger, and comparatively slower, ships was to demonstrate off the Makran coast to guard the Gulf sea lanes. The aim was to draw the Pakistan fleet employed in protecting the harbor away from Karachi westward, inviting an engagement and the full attention of the Pakistani naval authorities. Then, exploiting the fact that the naval protection for the harbor had been denuded, the second task force of faster ships, towing missile boats collected in Kathiawar ports, was to rush from the south, get close to the Karachi dockyards and strike the harbor shipping and facilities, especially oil storage tanks, with all the force at its command.

There was considerable lethal power packed in each missile boat, and this was required to cause the maximum destruction in the area. The plan envisaged a very favorable air situation over the area of engagement, for otherwise the whole operation could be scuttled by interference in executing the naval manoeuvres. Towards this end, it was arranged that to cover the approach of the missile boats IAF would neutralize the airfields near Karachi, and after completion of the raid it was to support the withdrawal of the missile task force. This delicate synchronization and dovetailing of air effort was perfected with pains-taking care.

The idea of using the missile boats, essentially a defensive weapon, in this offensive role emanated from Nanda himself. To prove their effectiveness in this role several trials were carried out with the weaponry at Cochin for months till the desired standard of accuracy was achieved. There followed intensive training of crew and commanders. Mock battles to rehearse the task were carried out in early November off the coast of Bombay with complete success.

Book_India_wars_sinceVarious configurations and approaches were tested, and the most suitable accepted. Having fully satisfied himself regarding the soundness and efficacy of his operational plans, Nanda set about sharing his confidence with the officers and ratings participating in the venture. In an address before the expected war, he offered to remove without recrimination those who had no faith in the boldness and novelty of his concepts. None accepted the offer, and it was clear that the Navy was wholeheartedly behind the plan.As war clouds started gathering, both participating task forces put out to sea and were at their respective war stations about the end of November. The stage was now set for enactment of the drama, so painstakingly planned and rehearsed beforehand. A task force comprising five large ships was put on patrol duty in the northern sector of the Arabian Sea with the ostensible task of protecting Indian shipping in the Persian Gulf. They were to make their way slowly towards Karachi, keeping themselves about 150 kilometres south of the Makran coast and southwest of Karachi. The second task force, consisting of a similar number of smaller but faster warships, was formed off Kathiawar approximately 500 kilometres southwest of Karachi. The strike force of missile boats was towed to various hideouts along the Kathiawar coast and concealed from air detection.

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Commenting on the glaring gaps in Pakistan’s direction of war, Fazal Muqeem says the Pakistani naval chief was not even informed of Yahya Khan’s intention of starting hostilities in the western wing till as late as 29 November. The army chief, who was close to the President and presumably in his inner councils, sang up the naval chief and informed him of the President’s decision, saying that hostilities might start in a few days. He was not given the exact date and time, which he was told would be conveyed to him by the air chief in due course disguised in a codeword. The codeword was conveyed to him about 1515 hours on 3 December, a couple of hours before the pre-emptive.

Commenting on the glaring gaps in Pakistans direction of war, Fazal Muqeem says the Pakistani naval chief was not even informed of Yahya Khans intention of starting hostilities in the western wing till as late as 29 November.

At that time, the Pakistan flotilla warships were already deployed in their war stations. All commanders and ship companies were informed of the impending operations by about 1700 hours. The deployment, as appreciated by Indian intelligence, was in a semicircular arc, with Karachi harbor as the centre, within about 70 to 80 miles of the port. Brisk patrolling and watch was operative to monitor suspected craft on all the approaches to Karachi. Three Daphne class submarines were already operating off Kathiawar and Bombay to engage Indian warships when they came out of their hideouts.

Like India, Pakistan was not properly organized for long range maritime reconnaissance. The Government had called upon Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to perform this task. PIA employed its Fokker Friendship fleet for this purpose. The radars used were what the aircraft were equipped with for weather detection, which was meant to look upwards and ahead, with a downward decline of no more than seven degrees on a level flight. Despite these limitations, the reconnaissance flights started on 30 November. One such flight was sighted by the south-eastern task force off Okha base, on the Kathiawar coast, on the morning of 3 December.

According to Fazal Muqeem, this task force almost passed over the Pakistani submarines deployed in the area, but they were unable to engage them as the order for starting hostilities had not yet been released. The Pakistani naval chief had supposedly asked for an air strike in the late afternoon, but this was not carried out, and “by not giving sufficient notice of starting hostilities to the navy, a good opportunity of attacking the Indian task force was missed by the Pakistani submarines.”

Also read: The danger to India

The Indian air attacks started on the morning of 4 December and were kept up throughout the day. A mission of two aircraft flew very low over the harbor and hit an oil tank at Keamari, setting it ablaze. At the same time, the two supporting airfields at Malir and Badin were neutralized. Rocketing and strafing harbor facilities were kept up with increasing intensity. This air action diverted Pakistani attention from the two task forces which were approaching Karachi. The first contact was picked up by Karachi radars about 2100 hours at a distance of 40 miles.

The Pakistani naval chief had supposedly asked for an air strike in the late afternoon, but this was not carried out, and “by not giving sufficient notice of starting hostilities to the navy, a good opportunity of attacking the Indian task force was missed by the Pakistani submarines.”

As the Indian Navy had appreciated correctly, the Pakistani arc deployment led to a dispersal of resources to the extent that there was a distance of some 100 to 150 kilometres between ships. The formations Indian naval task forces had adopted were such that either of the two could converge on a selected hostile ship in isolation from others and silence it if it discovered the attacking force before the missile boats reached the harbor. The western task force off Makran made the first move to attract the Pakistani flotilla’s attention.

About 2330 hours, the Pakistani destroyer Khyber, on patrol about 70 miles off Karachi, signaled having detected the southeastern task force. Pakistan naval headquarters asked repeatedly whether Khyber had not mistakenly picked one of their own ships. This exchange of signals gave away the Khyber’s location and identity. Once given permission to engage, Khyber attacked a ship of the Pakistan Navy, and when an Indian ship attacked Khyber1 it broke in two. The minesweeper Muhafaz rushed to Khyber’s aid, but was also attacked and sunk.

This engagement was so sharp and swift that despite the exchange of fire, as events proved later, the element of surprise had not been dissipated. While sinking, Khyber signaled that it had been hit by an aircraft bomb. That evening, the IAF attack was so devastating that the Karachi harbor defences were in a state of utter confusion with fires blazing all over, their flames reaching the skies and illuminating the harbor area for miles. The Pakistani naval authorities did not believe the report, as it was inconceivable to them that an aircraft could hit a ship in darkness. Before more information could be exchanged, the ship went silent.

Also read: The way to Regional Power Status

A shore establishment however reported having seen the glow of “a big fire” on the horizon at sea. A fast patrol boat sent out to investigate reported having found the Muhafaz burning 40 miles off Karachi. The first person the patrol boat picked up was the captain of the minesweeper. He reported having been hit by what he thought was a missile. It appeared that both Khyber and Muhafaz had been hit simultaneously. In this engagement the Indian Navy claimed to have sunk another destroyer, Shahjehan, and the minesweepers Tughril and Tipu Sultan, although these losses are not confirmed by Pakistani sources. It is likely that these vessels were badly damaged but later retrieved by the Pakistan Navy. Boats were dispatched to pick up the Khyber’s survivors, but they returned empty with the excuse that the sea was choppy. About 70 survivors were picked up the next day after an extensive air and sea search following the Indian Navy’s withdrawal from the area.

The Pakistan Air Force in the area was equally benumbed. It is said that the Pakistani naval chief eventually woke up his air force counterpart in the early hours of the morning and pleaded for immediate air support.

In this confusion the Indian missile boats reached their targets, the oil storage tanks standing out on the radar screen from the surrounding clutter, and let their magazine of missiles dart out in fury, setting ablaze the remainder of the oil, which was by now flowing in bylanes adjoining the port. Surprisingly, all the shore guns and missiles of the defences were turned skywards in the belief that the attacking weapons were air-to-ground rockets. This shock action of the missile boats and the resultant devastation unnerved the Pakistan Navy. It was completely paralyzed, and this enabled the Indian task forces to make a getaway with ease.

The Pakistan Navy repeatedly asked for air support throughout the night of the raid, knowing fully well that no such aid could materialize in the hours of darkness. The Pakistan Air Force in the area was equally benumbed. It is said that the Pakistani naval chief eventually woke up his air force counterpart in the early hours of the morning and pleaded for immediate air support. Reportedly, the answer was: “Well, old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in future.” The missile boats created such a scare among the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy that all seagoing commanders pleaded absolute vulnerability of their craft against their attacks without the possibility of retaliation. For them, the fight was unequal, and drastic changes were needed in the concept of naval operations. For better protection of the fleet they suggested withdrawal of ships inside the harbor. This, they argued, would ensure protection against missile attack. The ships would of course become vulnerable to air attack if concentrated in this manner, but according to them such a concentration could provide deterrent antiaircraft cover with the ship guns.

Under pressure from his frightened officers, the Pakistani naval chief accepted the withdrawal of the flotilla inside the harbor. Accordingly, on 8 December, all warships except the fleet oil tanker Dacca, which was fully loaded, were brought in. Fear of fire, and the deep draught restricting the entry of the tanker, forced its anchorage along with merchant ships outside the harbor. This concentration of Pakistani warships gave the Indian Navy freedom to repeat their raid at will in Pakistani waters. The Indian Navy repeated the attack on the night of 8 December. According to the by then accepted concept, IAF attacked the harbor at 2200 hours and continued to press the attacked till our missile boats were within eight kilometres of their target. The missiles further damaged what was left of the oil installations.

Book_India_wars_sinceEnjoying the freedom of the seas, on the return journey the Indian fleet passed along the Makran coast and attacked the oil storages at Jiwani and Gwadar. Three merchant ships anchored along with the oil tanker outside the harbor were also hit and set ablaze. There were fires all along the coast as well as at sea, so much so that passing ships and airliners reported a glow in the skies over the city for miles around for some days. Reportedly, Pakistan lost about half its fuel reserves, and this would have certainly told on the battle front had the war been prolonged. The rout of the Pakistani Navy was complete and thereafter the Indian Navy’s mastery over Pakistan waters went unchallenged. After this conflict, the Indian Navy came of age.Note:

  1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 1, p. 10541.

The Navy performed its role with rare verve and energy, and despite the fact that most of the vessels on its muster were obsolescent it exploited its resources to the best effect. In fact, the Soviet naval chief, who visited India after the conflict, was surprised at the use of missile boats for a purpose for which they were not originally designed and was full of praise for our ingenuity. Fazal Muqeem’s accusation that we employed Russians to service these boats is absolutely baseless. The Indian crews were well trained to handle sophisticated weaponry from any source. In this case, it happened to be Russian.

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At the very beginning of the war, the Indian Navy had imposed a total blockade on traffic between the two wings of of Pakistan and effective control on traffic between them and the rest of the world. It captured the first Pakistani ship plying under an assumed name within 24 hours of the opening of hostilities, and thereafter no ship could ply in Pakistani waters unless the Indian Navy permitted.

The missile boats created such a scare among the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy that all seagoing commanders pleaded absolute vulnerability of their craft against their attacks without the possibility of retaliation.

While patrolling the Kathiawar coast, the Indian frigate Khukri was struck by a salvo of three torpedoes, from a Pakistani submarine and sank on the night of 9 December as a result of the damage caused. This was perhaps due to the efficiency gap between the Indian surveillance system fitted on our ships and the evasive tactics the submarine adopted. Eighteen officers and 176 crew went down with the ship while six officers and 61 crew were rescued. It was said that Capt Mulla, the ship’s commanding officer, was last seen on the bridge directing rescue operations and preferred to go down with his ship in the highest traditions of the Navy.

It is however felt that in the context of modern warfare this tradition is outmoded. So long as all the necessary steps have been taken to repair the damage and after having ascertained that no more can be done to retrieve a ship, and that all is done to save lives and retrievable equipment, all able bodied officers and ratings, including the captain, should try to get away to fight another day. For instance, if Lord Mountbatten had insisted in going down with the Kelly in World War II he would not have lived to be theatre commander in the Far East, including Burma, and to play such a significant part in negotiating India’s independence. Glory can be overdone.

The overall naval gains and losses in terms of attrition were: Pakistan lost one destroyer and one minesweeper in the west, three gunboats by naval action and one submarine because of an accident in the east against the loss of one Indian frigate and one shore based Alize aircraft of the fleet air arm. Overall, the count went in favor of the Indian Navy.’ The credit for this success rightfully goes to Admiral Nanda, who forged the Navy into a potent weapon and wielded it well. This should not however lull us into complacency, as in the context of modern warfare one can ill afford to rest on old laurels alone. A review of potential threats to maintain the Indian Navy’s battle-worthiness is constantly needed.

Also read: Kargil and decade since

As part of Bhutto’s drive to build Pakistan’s military strength after the humiliation suffered in 1971, the navy has received special attention. Its poor showing must have impelled a revision of priorities, and efforts have been made to provide it with the equipment necessary to redeem its honor in the event of another war with India. Pakistan has never concealed the fact that its arms buildup is primarily aimed at India, and in this regard there is a definite effort on its part to match our armed strength.

Under pressure from his frightened officers, the Pakistani naval chief accepted the withdrawal of the flotilla inside the harbor.

Intelligence reports reveal that by moving the naval headquarters from Karachi to Islamabad alongside the army and air force headquarters Pakistan has to a large extent overcome the difficulties of coordinating the efforts of the three services in planning as well as execution in the higher direction of war.

According to reports, Pakistan has more than made up the losses it suffered in 1971. Its present naval strength comprises 17 major surface warships and nine underwater craft besides a large number of support vessels like coastal patrol boats, minesweepers, tanks and tugs. There is no immediate proposal to have a separate fleet air arm to provide much-needed air cover, but it may be safely assumed that in the next conflict there will be better integration between its navy and air force. The Pakistan Air Force has long-range bombers like the Ilyushin28 and medium-range fighters like the Mirage Ill which will adequately fill the gap as and when required.

Pakistan’s underwater fleet has three Daphne-class modern patrol submarines which may have been augmented with fresh acquisitions. These craft, with a displacement of about 1,000 tons each, are equipped with 12 torpedo tubes and have a speed under water of about 15.5 knots. In addition, Pakistan has acquired eight midget submarines of the S x 404 class from Italy. They displace 40 tons, and can carry about 12 men for commando raids or frogmen for undersea sabotage in harbor areas. They are not very fast, having a submerged speed of only 6.5 knots. Because of their size and ability to operate in shallow water, they are suited for clandestine operations and attacks on offshore oil platforms. They have a limited range on their own, but their carriage on mother ships to achieve strategic range can increase their area of operation a great deal. They were used for such operations with advantage in the Second World War.

In fact, the Soviet naval chief, who visited India after the conflict, was surprised at the use of missile boats for a purpose for which they were not originally designed and was full of praise for our ingenuity.

The Pakistani surface fleet consists of one cruiser, four destroyers and two frigates, to be shortly augmented by two more of the Whitby class. Most of these vessels are aged. Although they possess quite formidable conventional firepower for shore bombardment and have also been equipped for antisubmarine roles, they can be neutralized by missile boats. Following the Indian line of acquisition, Pakistan recently went in for eight large patrol craft of the Shanghai II class from China. Although not armed with missiles at present, they are likely to be provided with the Chinese version of Styx surface-to-surface missiles.

These are very similar to those on the Russian missile boats in service with the Indian Navy. The Chinese are currently fitting their Hola and Hoku missile boats and Luta-class destroyers with them. It is probable that some might go to Pakistan. Once fitted with these missiles, Pakistan’s Shanghai II boats will be a match for the Indian boats and will beef up the offensive/defensive capability of the Pakistan Navy greatly. Much has been said lately in responsible quarters about the threat to India from the Indian Ocean in view of the great power rivalries in the region. The US decision to acquire Diego, Garcia and establish naval and communication facilities there triggered a controversy when India, along with some other littoral countries, appealed to the international community to keep the ocean free from these rivalries. This was a protest in. particular against the establishment of an American naval base in the region. Both US and the Soviet Union are geopolitically so distant from the Indian Ocean that it is difficult to sustain naval operations in the area, at least for long, without the backing of a suitable local infrastructure.

To this end, both powers have been striving to acquire such facilities by extending their influence among other nations with similar interests. So long as India remains strictly neutral and does not extend these facilities in one garb or another to either of these powers we have nothing to fear. If there is a naval conflagration in the area, only those littoral countries would invite retaliatory action, which have the adversaries’ bases on their territory. A neutral country is not likely to be directly embroiled: in the conflict unless it becomes absolutely necessary for a warring nation to acquire the denied facilities by force to further its war potential. In view of the fierce nationalism surging in the region such an eventuality is remote, especially so in the case of India, which has emerged as a regional power of consequence.

Book_India_wars_sinceThe next consideration is safeguarding Indian merchant shipping on the trade routes passing through the area, especially along the approaches to seaports. The vulnerability of our ships will be confined to the period of war. The degree of vulnerability would depend upon the strategic value of the cargoes carried, and also on whether they are carried under the Indian flag or in foreign vessels on charter. In this regard, the oil traffic from the Persian Gulf will be very vulnerable. Otherwise, in the context of short wars, sustaining the war effort would not depend upon material from abroad. Instead, it would be sustained by the stockpile of war material created for the purpose in the preparatory stage of planning.Despite the ambitious expansion of Indian merchant shipping tonnage, the number of our ships on international trade routes will be so marginal, at least in the foreseeable future, that it would not be worthwhile to arrange naval escorts for them. In fact, the best protection at such a time would lie in Indian vessels intermingling with those flying other flags to the extent that it should become difficult to single out Indian craft on the high seas. On the other hand, as traffic enters home waters, the congestion of Indian vessels would be such as to warrant protective measures at seaports till they join the international traffic.

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The security of India’s coastal waters assumes greater importance in view of its growing fishing fleet and coastal trade and passenger traffic. Numerous vessels of all sorts, from country boats to coastal steamers to fishing trawlers, throng India coastal waters, and this activity is likely to grow. Besides, the economic development of the country has resulted in various installations and industries springing up along the coast, and these are vulnerable both to surface and submarine attacks. In this regard, offshore oil platforms, refineries and oil storage tanks close to ports become extremely vulnerable. The close defence of the coast and of coastal waters and of craft plying in them therefore has greater significance and should invite higher priority than loose talk of protecting trade routes on the high seas.

The security of Indias coastal waters assumes greater importance in view of its growing fishing fleet and coastal trade and passenger traffic.

The threat from China in our coastal waters is marginal unless it manages to secure bases closer to sensitive Indian areas. Chinese naval strength is based mainly on submarine and patrol boats and lacks the inherent capability to sustain operations so far distant from the mainland and its sea base. There is a possibility of its securing such facilities in some East African countries and possibly in Pakistan, but the mere fact that its intervention against India would invite Soviet retaliation under the treaty of friendship between the two countries keeps the Chinese threat rather diffused. Although all precautions should be taken to meet such a threat, this should not tilt our defence development plans in that direction. At the best, China can be considered only a long-range threat.

The most potent and immediate threat is from Pakistan. The present weakness of the Pakistani Navy lies in its lack of air cover for naval operations away from the airfields at Malir and Badin close to Karachi. Thus the freedom of action of its flotilla is confined to the radius of action of its medium-range Mirage Ills, which covers that portion of the Arabian Sea extending downward north of Bombay. By neutralizing these airfields by air and ground action this radius can be further reduced. The vulnerability of the Indian coastline, as well as its coastal waters, to attack by larger Pakistani warships is greater north of Bombay than south of it.

As deployment of the Pakistani fleet south of Bombay without air cover would invite disaster, especially when Pakistan has no carrier-borne air capability, it is likely that its naval operations in this area would be mainly confined to undersurface activities by Daphne submarines, which have the range and speed to undertake such distant missions. At present, submarine tenders are not in Pakistan’s list of shopping priorities, but once they become available it would be able to extend these operations a great deal.

As deployment of the Pakistani fleet south of Bombay without air cover would invite disaster, especially when Pakistan has no carrier-borne air capability, it is likely that its naval operations in this area would be mainly confined to undersurface activities by Daphne submarines, which have the range and speed to undertake such distant missions.

Although as a result of losing the eastern wing Pakistan has little strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal, the nuisance value of disrupting port facilities at Vishakhapatnam and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be considerable. It therefore becomes imperative that the bias of our defence planning should be to deal with a major Pakistani naval offensive along the Kathiawar coast to the north of Bombay, including submarine activity.

The best antidote for submarine attacks is early detection and engagement with lethal weaponry, whether the attacking vessel is submerged or on the surface, Much controversy has gone on in India with regard to the choice of maritime reconnaissance aircraft to replace the aging Constellations. There has been brisk advocacy of the British Nimrod, the American Lockheed P-3C Orion and the Russian Ilyushin-38 by different vested interests. Some have even advocated the purchase of the Japanese Shim-Melwa flying boat.

All these are long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft with both detection and strike capability. Except the Japanese craft, all operate from land bases. The flying boats need calm, protected waters for operation.

There was a hot debate, in Parliament and outside, on whether the Air Force or the Navy should man these aircraft. It was argued that since. the Navy was primarily concerned with surface and subsurface craft at sea the task should be handled by naval aviation, which would know what to look for and would have a sense of urgency for engagement both from air and sea. The participation of naval agencies from detection to target destruction should help better coordination at every stage of the process.

On the other hand, the Air Force felt that if the Navy handled these aircraft this would entail the creation of a separate infrastructure for maintenance and repair, resulting in unnecessary duplication of effort. Moreover, the naval air arm was accustomed to handling only small aircraft. Naval pilots would have to be trained afresh at considerable cost while IAF had a ready pool of pilots suited to fly bigger, more sophisticated aircraft. Both sides missed the basic assessment of the requirement: Does India really need these long-range aircraft? As I said earlier, our immediate task is defending coastal waters, while that of patrolling the high seas lies in the distant future. There is no great urgency to spend money on long-range reconnaissance requirements at the cost of developing other more pressing capabilities. It is just as well that economic constraints impelled the Government to suspend a decision, for otherwise the purchase of these aircraft would have led to lopsided priorities in the Indian Navy’s growth. Lately, the Government opted for the Ilyushin-38 to be manned by the Navy as a long term measure.

Overdependence for supply of shipping requirements on a single source, however pressing the need, should be avoided for obvious reasons.

At the moment Pakistan has considerable offensive capability. If it launches an all-out surprise attack anywhere along the Kathiawar coast it has a high probability of success, provided the Pakistan Air Force plays its part in full accord with naval plans. Midget submarines could create havoc in the offshore drilling establishments in the Bombay High area. As brought out earlier, this capability progressively diminishes in relation to objectives farther south.

Since the threat south of Bombay in the Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Bengal is mostly from submarines, it is essential that airfields should be located all along the coast and that the infrastructure should be created to enable older types of aircraft belonging to the Navy and the Air Force to operate in reconnaissance and strike roles against submarine and surface craft. Since there is no likelihood of interference by either the Chinese and the Pakistan Air Force in this region, Seahawks, Alizes, Toofanis, Vampires and similar craft could be suitably modified for this role. The infrastructure should provide flexibility to transfer aircraft to the threatened sector at will. This can be supplemented by surface and underwater counter-measures possible with the resources at hand, especially in sensitive areas.

The threat to the coastal waters and the trade routes through the Arabian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and to Europe through the Suez Canal, is very potent, and will increase progressively, with the pace of Pakistan’s high speed naval buildup. In matching responses, as well as to achieve an edge in strike power at sea, it is imperative that our air and naval punch in the threatened sector should be greatly increased. Most ships of the Indian fleet are old, and about a third of them need immediate replacement.

It is also necessary to increase its submarine power and its antisubmarine measures too. Our antisubmarine frigates are mostly old. Leander class frigates are useful, but the rate of production is far behind the envisaged wastage. It is learnt that India plans to build the A-69 Aviso in collaboration with France. This is a small craft of about 1,200 tons displacement which carries four fixed launchers for homing torpedoes. It is primarily an antisubmarine frigate and should be handy in coastal waters against Daphnes. Since the pace of indigenous production lags behind the aging process of the Indian fleet, it is necessary to fill the gap with warships acquired abroad.

Also read: Evolution of Indian Submarine Arm

The Government has from time to time announced a program of replenishing and adding to the present fleet. The cost of modern warships with sophisticated surveillance and firing systems and weaponry is prohibitive. It is therefore essential for an expert committee to carry out a systems analysis and work out a practical naval growth plan to match the potential threats. The plan should consider the rate of waste and match it with indigenous production and then work out an acquisition plan consistent with the availability of fiscal resources.

The effort should be to have not only a defensive capability in the region north of Bombay but also to create a formidable offensive capability both in naval guns and missile power and a sizable amphibious landing capability on Pakistan’s open coast. The potential of this threat would tie up a good portion of the Pakistan Army on the west coast, thus helping Indian operations farther north. Growth should be by stages, in such a manner that the balance between defensive and offensive is not upset at any time. Overdependence for supply of shipping requirements on a single source, however pressing the need, should be avoided for obvious reasons. Diversity, although irksome from the logistical angle, always pays in acquiring weapons.

Book_India_wars_sinceThe overall naval picture envisages a large inventory of ant. submarine vessels, missile and patrol boats working with the naval air arm and the Air Force as an integrated team as a defensive measure. On the offensive side, it visualizes a combination of gun and missile power in terms of surface and under-surface warships, with adequate escort and supply ships, hard-hitting enough to take on Pakistan’s navy both at sea and in harbor. Matching enhancement of the supporting Air Force strike and maritime reconnaissance capability needs to be ensured. There is no room for pessimism till the desirable is achieved. Admiral Nanda has more than amply proved that an offensive outlook and human ingenuity can make up for material and technological shortcomings with telling effect. The Indian Navy needs to imbibe this spirit as part of its glorious tradition.

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One thought on “The Navy in War-II

  1. Just today I was able to sign-in to LinkedIn and found your comment recognising my participation in 1971 war from the Indian Navy. Yes we did a major part in the war which shortened the length of the war if not for the mistake by Gen Manekshaw , we would have done more. Well, it has refreshed my memory.

    Appreciate your study and the article which is rare.

    Regards

    Thomas

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