That night, Rai was told that the enemy at Baramula would be strafed the next day.
The loss of Baramula brought home to everyone the seriousness of the situation. By 2 November, 161 Infantry Brigade was in position in the valley. It had earlier been deployed near Gurgaon. Besides 1 Sikh, it now had under command 1 (Para) Kumaon,9 1 (Para) Punjab,10 two companies of 4 Kumaon, and about 80 machine-gunners from 1 Mahar. At this time, many infantry battalions were a hotchpotch of sorts. The final position was that 1 (Para) Punjab had two companies from 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment, and 1 Sikh had men from 1/1 Punjab and 3/15 Punjab, besides the gunners temporarily attached to it. Even 4 Kumaon had a Dogra company from 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles.
The newly arrived brigade Headquarters got off to an unlucky start. Its first commander, Brigadier J.C. Katoch, had to be evacuated to Delhi two days after his arrival; he was wounded during a visit to 1 Sikh at Pattan. His relief, Brigadier L.P. (‘Bogey’) Sen, arrived on 2 November. Tall, fair and handsome, this Sandhurst-trained Bengali was originally from the Baluch Regiment. He had a fine war record and had won the Distinguished Service Order in the Arakans. At 37, with only 16 years of service, he had just been promoted to brigadier and was full of enthusiasm.
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The situation around Srinagar was extremely fluid when Sen arrived. Reliable intelligence about the enemy was lacking. A large enemy force was investing the Sikhs at Pattan. This was the best-equipped lot, having mortars and motor transport. A lashkar, 1,500-strong, was reported to be making for Srinagar from the North by way of Sopur-Bandipura after skirting the Wular Lake. A smaller force was approaching the capital from the South.
The loss of Baramula brought home to everyone the seriousness of the situation.
Four 3.7-inch Howitzers belonging to the Patiala state forces had been flown to Srinagar a few days earlier. Unfortunately the guns had no dial sights and were, therefore, hardly of any use. The Air Force was doing good work. It had been attacking enemy concentrations wherever these could be spotted. An ad hoc fighter base had been established at the Srinagar air-strip, from where Spitfires and Harvards flew to strafe the enemy. Tempests, based at Ambala, also flew over occasionally. Both 1 Sikh and 1 (Para) Kumaon had suffered casualties in minor clashes with small parties of the enemy. Soon after the arrival of 161 Brigade, Headquarters JAK Force had been set up at Srinagar under Major General (later lieutenant General) Kalwant Singh, for the overall control of operations in the state. A short, stocky Sikh with a somewhat unkempt appearance, he was abrasive at times, but his drive and determination were to have a tremendous impact on the Indian Army’s operations in Jammu & Kashmir. Originally from the 1st Punjab Regiment, he had been Brigadier General Staff at Headquarters Northern Command (Rawalpindi) before partition.
The Kumaonis repulsed the first assault, but further attacks followed with relentless fury. The enemy numbered about 700. Sharma asked the brigade for help”¦
The Frontier tribesman is unbeatable as a guerrilla, trained as he is in the rugged, strife-torn mountains of his native land. He is bold, ruthless and wily. It is seldom that he comes out to fight a battle in the open, relying mostly on ambush and sniping to wear down his adversary. After their conventional advance upto Pattan for the next phase of getting into Srinagar they adopted their classical irregular techniques moving in small groups through jungle and hill paths taking toll with heavy sniping till again they felt they could concentrate on their main task. On the other hand, Sen had to get them to present a concentrated body. This was a fatal mistake committed by the commander of the tribal invaders. They simply could not fight this way.
Badgam was a small village South-West of Srinagar, only a few kilometres from the airfield. According to reports reaching Sen, the tribesmen were collecting at this village, and his first move on taking over command was to investigate these reports. The enemy could threaten the air-strip, and he decided to send out patrols to the village. The result was a battle in which the tribesmen achieved complete surprise. Two patrols, one of two companies and the other of one company, were sent out in the early hours of 3 November to search Badgam. There was a sizeable enemy force in the village, but the tribesmen were able to hoodwink the parties that went to look for them: they were disguised as Kashmiris, their weapons hidden under their loose cloaks. The patrols reported by radio to brigade Headquarters that no enemy had been seen. Sen thereupon recalled two of the companies from the village and told the third to stay put for a while.
He is bold, ruthless and wily. It is seldom that he comes out to fight a battle in the open, relying mostly on ambush and sniping to wear down his adversary.
The company that remained in Badgam was from 4 Kumaon and was under Major Som Nath Sharma. When the tribesmen were sure that the company was isolated and the other troops were no longer in the vicinity, they opened up with a mortar, followed by machine-gun fire. The Kumaonis were naturally surprised, but Sharma soon had the situation under control. His automatics and rifles began to answer. Immediately thereafter, a group of yelling tribesmen attacked from a flank. The Kumaonis repulsed the first assault, but further attacks followed with relentless fury. The enemy numbered about 700. Sharma asked the brigade for help, and was told that air support was on the way. Short of men, he himself laid the marker panels to guide the aircraft. Spitfires and Harvards came over soon after and strafed the enemy, but the tempo of the attack did not abate. Sen ordered 1 (Para) Punjab which was at the time deployed near Shalateng on the Srinagar-Pattan road to move quickly to Badgam. By the time the battalion arrived, however, the battle was over. Som Sharma had meanwhile assured the brigade commander over the radio that though he was hopelessly outnumbered he would not withdraw even an inch and would fight to the last man and the last round. ‘With utter disregard for his own safety he rushed from section to section across the bullet-swept battlefield to cheer his men and to direct their fire. They were greatly stirred by his personal example and decided to kill as many of the enemy as possible before going down’.
Due to an earlier injury, Sharma’s hand was in plaster but when he saw that casualties were affecting the functioning of his light machine guns, he began to fill magazines and hand them to the machine-gunners.11 While he was thus occupied, a mortar bomb fell on some ammunition dumped near him. He was killed on the spot. Som Nath was a fine officer and his death was a great loss to his regiment and the Army. By his conduct, he had set an example for others. In 1950, when gallantry awards were introduced in India, Som Nath Sharma was posthumously awarded the first PVC. It was India’s highest award for gallantry in the face of the enemy and is considered equivalent to the Victoria Cross of the British Army.12
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