Field Marshal Wavell was no prophet. But he was unquestionably a great soldier who admired the Indian Army. Indian troops had fought under him while he was Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, during the war, and he had been Commander-in-Chief, India, before he became the country’s Viceroy. His term in the latter office saw the intense political activity that preceded the British withdrawal. He was at the helm of affairs when the situation moved towards its climax, though it was to remain a matter of regret for him that he did not preside over the transfer of power. He relinquished office on the eve of Independence. Before leaving India, he broadcast a message to its people on 21 March 1947. It was natural for him to make a reference to the Indian Army, but what he said turned out to be a prophecy. “I believe,” he said, “that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be a deciding factor in the future of India. It has shown how all communities may work together to meet a common danger with comradeship and devotion”.
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The Indian Army has lived up to Wavell’s forecast. Its stability has without any doubt been crucial in the history of this country since the very first day of freedom. It may not appear to have played a part in much that has happened, or in preventing what could have happened. But the very fact that it was there – a strong, apolitical force at the Government’s disposal – has had a healthy influence on the course of events. The integration of princely states with the rest of the country is a good example of this.
“I believe,” he said, “that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be a deciding factor in the future of India”¦”
The declared policy of the Government of India was voluntary accession, but at the back of every prince’s mind was the fear of the Indian Army that had once been instrumental in bringing his ancestors under the British sway. There was a big difference, though – it was now the Army of the nation to which the princes and their subjects also belonged.
The basic principle of accession was that it was vested in the personal discretion of a state’s ruler. But it was recognized that this discretion should be qualified by the geographical contiguity of the state to the successor dominion, the communal composition of the state and a plebiscite, if necessary, to ascertain the will of the people. Trouble arose wherever a ruler disregarded these considerations.
The three exceptions were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu & Kashmir.
By 14 August all except three of the states had acceded to either of the dominions. The three exceptions were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu & Kashmir. Junagadh was a small state of some 8,000 square kilometres in Kathiawar (Gujarat). It had a Muslim ruler but a predominantly Hindu population. Disregarding the wishes of his subjects and also the fact that his state fell within the Indian Union, the Nawab of Junagadh announced his accession to Pakistan. Then, claiming overlordship, he sent his troops into Mangrol, a neighbouring state that had acceded to India. To protect Mangrol, a brigade of the Indian Army was sent there. The people of Junagadh now rose against the Nawab and formed a provisional government, which repudiated the state’s accession to Pakistan. The Nawab fled to Pakistan. His Prime Minister, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (father of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), and the state council decided to accede to India. The accession was accepted subject to confirmation by a plebiscite. When held, the plebiscite was overwhelmingly in favour of joining India.
Congress leaders had no objection to this and had given indication to Mountbatten of their intention despite the strategic importance of the state and its ancient ties with India.
While the trouble in Junagadh arose from the ruler’s desire to join Pakistan against the wishes of his people, the rulers of two major states – Jammu & Kashmir and Hyderabad – created trouble for themselves with dreams of sovereignty. In November 1947, the Nizam of Hyderabad signed a Standstill Agreement for a year with the Indian Government. In the case of Jammu & Kashmir, the Maharaja’s vacillation brought the Indian Army its first major challenge after Independence.
The state of Jammu & Kashmir has an area of 148,445 square kilometres and lies in a region that has vital strategic importance. Many nations and cultures meet here. In the East and the North the state’s borders run alongside Tibet and China. To its North-West lies Afghanistan, and in the West and the South-West its borders touch Pakistan. In the South lie the Indian districts of Gurdaspur, Kangra, Lahaul and Spiti. In the North-West, where Afghanistan and China meet, Russia is not many kilometres away. The strategic location of the state and its beauty have attracted adventurers and invaders since the dawn of history.
Though the ruling dynasty was Hindu, the population of the state was predominantly Muslim, 77.11 per cent to be exact. Kashmir was integral to Jinnah’s dream of Pakistan and he expected the state to join it. Congress leaders had no objection to this and had given indication to Mountbatten of their intention despite the strategic importance of the state and its ancient ties with India.
While the trouble in Junagadh arose from the rulers desire to join Pakistan against the wishes of his people, the rulers of two major states ““ Jammu & Kashmir and Hyderabad ““ created trouble for themselves with dreams of sovereignty.
Sir Hari Singh, who had been Maharaja for 22 years, sat on the fence. In June 1947, Lord Mountbatten paid him a visit at Srinagar and advised him to accede to either of the Dominions by 14 August. He remained in Kashmir for four days, but returned without obtaining a decision from the Maharaja. All that Sir Hari Singh did was to sign a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He sought a similar arrangement with India, but Nehru refused to oblige unless there was a popular government in the state. The Maharaja was out of tune with the times and had paid scant regard to the aspirations of his people. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, leader of the movement for a democratic government in the state, was in prison.
While the Maharaja wavered on the question of accession, Mr. Jinnah became impatient. His advisers had a scheme ready for ‘direct action’ and he gave the green signal. The scheme was well-conceived and was executed with considerable skill, at least in the initial stages. To begin with, a propaganda campaign was unleashed. A communal twist was given to the issue of accession and the Muslims of the state were urged to rise against their Dogra ruler. Then followed a series of raids, beginning in early September. The raids were executed by armed civilians from West Pakistan at several points on the state’s border. Major General H.L. Scott, a British officer, was Chief of Staff of the State Army. All he did, or could do, was to send out detachments of troops to deal with each raid. This dispersed his Army, which was exactly the enemy’s aim.
The Maharaja sent many protests to the Pakistan Government. These brought no relief. Among the raiders were Pakistan Army personnel, some in uniform. Many of the raids were led by their Army officers in civilian clothes. Pakistan disclaimed any responsibility for the raids. The presence of Pakistan Army personnel was explained away by saying that they were released personnel or men on leave.
While the Maharaja wavered on the question of accession, Mr. Jinnah became impatient.
In case the Maharaja needed a warning of the grand design against his state, he received it early enough, in Gilgit. This outlying district in the North-West of Kashmir had been under British administration, having been leased by the Maharaja in 1935 for a 60-year term. It reverted to the state after Mountbatten made the announcement on 3 June 1947 regarding the transfer of power. However, when a governor was sent there at the end of July to take over the administration, Major General Scott, who accompanied the governor, was informed that all British officers of the Gilgit Scouts had opted for Pakistan. Three months later, the Gilgit Scouts besieged the governor’s residence and set up a provisional government, their British commander hoisting Pakistan’s flag over their barracks.
With hostile activity on its borders and unbridled communal propaganda by Pakistan, the situation in the state deteriorated rapidly. The Maharaja’s Army was in action against hordes of well-armed raiders all along the state’s border South and West of Punch. Fort Owen had to be abandoned on 15 October, the Kotli-Punch road was cut and Bhimbar, Mirpur and Mangla were under siege.
This dispersed his Army, which was exactly the enemys aim.
Sheikh Abdullah had been released on 29 September to help curb the wave of communal fury that was sweeping the state but this did not bring much improvement. The situation became more complicated due to the economic blockade that Pakistan now imposed on the state. The state’s communication routes with the outside world ran through Pakistan. The only railway line ran from Jammu, its winter capital, to Sialkot, in Pakistan. Srinagar, the summer capital, was connected with Pakistan by a good tarmac road, which ran by way of Baramula, Uri, Domel and Muzaffarabad to Abbotabad, Havelian and Wah. There was an alternative route that led from Domel to Rawalpindi by way of Murree. The route from Jammu to Pathankot, in East Punjab, was at the time merely a track.1 The state depended entirely on imports for petrol, kerosene oil, cotton cloth, salt and foodgrains. Pakistan’s blockade hit the state and its people badly.
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On 22 October came a major assault along the Murree-Srinagar road. This was supported by a very large force entering the Jammu province from Punch to Bhimber in the South and a smaller flanking force entering the state via Tithwal-Handwara to the North. The Pakistanis named this invasion Operation ‘Gulmarg’. The central invading force consisted of some 5,000 men, mostly tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. They rode in civilian lorries and were equipped with service rifles, mortars, machine guns, demolition charges, mines and radio sets. Civilian trucks carried their ammunition, rations, petrol and medical supplies.
The first objective of this tribal lashkar was Muzaffarabad (see Fig. 3.1). This border town had a garrison of one infantry battalion, consisting of Punchi Muslims and Dogra Rajputs. At the approach of the lashkar, the Punchis went over to the enemy after killing their commanding officer and most of the Dogras in the unit. The town was thereafter thoroughly sacked. Domel, the next objective, fell to the enemy on 23 October.
Three months later, the Gilgit Scouts besieged the governors residence and set up a provisional government, their British commander hoisting Pakistans flag over their barracks.
At this stage Brigadier Rajinder Singh, who had taken over from Scott, made a gallant attempt to stop the invaders. Unfortunately, the force that he had with him was quite inadequate for the purpose. It consisted of some 200 men whom he had collected from the rear parties at Srinagar. He rushed off with these men, reached Uri on 23 October, and blew up a bridge on the Domel-Srinagar road. On the following day he was killed while fighting the enemy, but the blown-up bridge delayed the capture of Baramula till 26 October.2
Baramula was a prosperous town, only 56 kilometres from Srinagar. Once the tribesmen got there, they let loose an orgy of primitive savagery. They plundered the town and, regardless of age, sex or religion, massacred a large part of its population. Even the nuns at the missionary hospital were not spared; they, together with the rest of the staff, were butchered, and the building was put to flames.
After the pillage of Baramula, the tribesmen were so laden with loot that many of them decided to go back and deposit it before coming for more. Included in their takings were young women, carried away forcibly, ‘to be sold like cattle in the streets, of Rawalpindi and Peshawar or to live and die as slaves in the mountain fastness of the distant tribal territory’. The carting away of the loot of Baramula saved Srinagar. Had the lashkars gone on, there was nothing between Baramula and Srinagar to stop them.3 Those who directed the invasion could not perhaps control the tribesmen effectively. Or, maybe, they did not foresee the sharp reaction that the rape of Kashmir would arouse in India.
The situation became more complicated due to the economic blockade that Pakistan now imposed on the state.
The Indian Government had been watching the situation in Jammu & Kashmir with great concern. While it would have acquiesced in a peaceful accession of the state to Pakistan in case the Maharaja had taken such a decision, it could not countenance a forcible occupation. The onrush of the tribal horde shook the Maharaja and created chaos in his administration. Terror-stricken, his ‘officials were leaving their jobs to look after the safety of their families’. As a last resort, on 24 October, Hari Singh appealed to the Indian Government for troops. Earlier, Sheikh Abdullah had met Prime Minister Nehru in Delhi, and the Maharaja had requested the Government of India for arms and ammunition. When the appeal for troops came, arrangements were already being made to send these supplies.
The Maharaja’s request for troops reached Delhi late on the night of 24 October. To decide the issue, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet met the next day under the chairmanship of Mountbatten. Gerenal Lockhart was present at the meeting. He read out a telegram from Pakistan’s Army Headquarters stating that some 5,000 tribesmen had attcked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel, and that considerable tribal reinforcements could be expected. The Defence Committee considered that the most immediate necessity was to rush arms and ammunition. On Mountbatten’s advice, the decision on despatch of troops was deferred. He urged that it would be dangerous to send troops unless the state had first offered to accede to India.To explain the position to the Maharaja, V.P. Menon flew to Srinagar.4 At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Manekshaw of the MO Directorate was sent there to study the situation on the spot. The next day (26 October) Menon brought the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja, and Sheikh Abdullah also joined in the appeal for troops. As Governor-General, Mountbatten accepted the accession but it was subject to the proviso that ‘the question of [final] accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. . . as soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader’.5
The path was now clear for the Defence Committee to order the despatch of troops. Lieutenant General Russell was given the task of rescuing Jammu & Kashmir with the enemy only 56 kilometres from Srinagar, the need of the hour was to save this town and its air-strip, since Srinagar was 480 kilometres from the Indian railhead at Pathankot, and the only chance of success lay in sending troops by air.
Baramula was a prosperous town, only 56 kilometres from Srinagar. Once the tribesmen got there, they let loose an orgy of primitive savagery.
For many months, the troops under Russell had undergone no training. They had been collecting and escorting refugees, and doing other odd jobs, such as flood relief work. Their weapons and equipment had suffered in the process and, what was worse, units were dispersed in detachments over large areas. But every man now rose to the occasion. Foreign observers were struck by the skill and speed with which the airlift was handled.
On receipt of the Maharaja’s request for help, an Army Airlift Committee had been formed on 25 October under the chairmanship of the Air Marshal commanding the Royal Indian Air Force. It had originally discussed only the ways and means of sending supplies and arms. Once the Cabinet decided to send in troops, the Committee drew up a schedule of flights from Willingdon (now Safdarjang) and Palam airports. Air Force liaison officers were posted at the Palam and Srinagar airfields and a radio link was established between Willingdon and Srinagar. All available civilian Dakotas (about 30 in number) were requisitioned. No rear airfield maintenance organization6 was then available at Delhi, and the Command staff, assisted by some officers from the Delhi Area, had to take on the responsibility of despatching troops and the equipment needed by them.
Included in their takings were young women, carried away forcibly, “˜to be sold like cattle in the streets, of Rawalpindi and Peshawar or to live and die as slaves in the mountain fastness of the distant tribal territory.
No reliable information was available regarding the strength of the tribal lashkar in the Kashmir Valley, and it was initially decided to fly an infantry battalion to Srinagar and despatch a brigade group to Jammu by road (see Fig. 3.2).7 But with every unit out on internal security duties, it was a problem to get hold of troops quickly enough. The nearest infantry unit was 1 Sikh; it had been operating around Gurgaon, 20 kilometre from New Delhi. A signal was flashed to it shortly before midnight (26/27 October) that the battalion, less two companies, should reach Palam airport by 0400 hours (27 October) ready to fly on an operational mission; the rest of the battalion would be flown the next day. Like many other units, 1 Sikh was not upto full strength. To make it up, Sikh personnel from 13 Field Regiment that happened to be at the Red Fort were organized into an infantry company and placed under the battalion temporarily.
Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai was in command of 1 Sikh. His companies were spread over a large area. Getting them together and fitting them out for an operation was not easy. But Rai knew this had to be done. With a quiet efficiency that was characteristic of him, he got his men together and reached Palam. There, thanks to the good work put in by the staff of Command Headquarters and the airport authorities, everything was ready – ammunition, rations and ordnance stores — to equip the troops for their mission.
The Dakota carrying Rai and his tactical Headquarters touched down at Srinagar’s dusty air-strip at 0830 hours on 27 October. His orders were that in case radio communication between him and the Srinagar air-strip could not be established and the signal to land was not given, he was to turn back and fly to Jammu, whence he was to reconnoitre the land route to Srinagar. In fact, no one was sure of the fate of Srinagar when the airlift was undertaken, and it was a good start to the rescue operation that his plane, and those that followed, landed without mishap.
Foreign observers were struck by the skill and speed with which the airlift was handled.
The situation on the ground, however, was far from good. Between Rai’s small force unloading its baggage at the air-strip and the tribal lashkar at Baramula there was only a detachment of about 40 state forces troops. These men were holding a position some 5 kilometres East of Baramula. Instead of waiting for the enemy to come and attack him, Rai at once sent one of his companies forward. By noon it had joined the state troops.
Rai realized that the strength with him was woefully inadequate for the defence of Srinagar and he sent a signal to Delhi asking for reinforcements. Brigadier (later Major General) Hira Lal Atal had been deputed as liaison officer with the state government. He also reported to Delhi that at least a brigade group should be positioned in the valley. That night, Rai was told that the enemy at Baramula would be strafed the next day. He was also given the welcome news that a brigade would soon be in position at Srinagar.
The next day (26 October) Menon brought the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja, and Sheikh Abdullah also joined in the appeal for troops.
On 28 October, after most of his battalion had arrived, Rai went forward with two more companies of his unit. His intention was to drive the tribals out of Baramula. It was a wise decision. Baramula lies at the mouth of the Srinagar Valley. Once the tribal lashkar debouched into the valley it would be more difficult to deal with it, he thought. But he was unaware of the fact that the tribesmen were equipped with mortars and machine guns.
The enemy attacked soon after Rai’s arrival at the position held by the company that he had sent the previous day. The Sikhs fought hard but were badly outnumbered. When the enemy began to outflank his position, Rai decided to pull out. Unfortunately, while he was seeing off the last of his men, he was hit by a bullet and died on the spot. The battalion also lost a JCO and 20 men in the action.8
The Sikhs and the state forces troops now made for Srinagar. The second-in-command of 1 Sikh took charge of the situation and deployed the three companies at Pattan, a village about 25 kilometres from Srinagar. The lashkar followed up and fanned out into the valley after bypassing the Sikhs’ position. After the arrival of more troops on 29 October, the remaining company of the battalion, till then guarding the air-strip, joined the main body at Pattan.
That night, Rai was told that the enemy at Baramula would be strafed the next day.
The loss of Baramula brought home to everyone the seriousness of the situation. By 2 November, 161 Infantry Brigade was in position in the valley. It had earlier been deployed near Gurgaon. Besides 1 Sikh, it now had under command 1 (Para) Kumaon,9 1 (Para) Punjab,10 two companies of 4 Kumaon, and about 80 machine-gunners from 1 Mahar. At this time, many infantry battalions were a hotchpotch of sorts. The final position was that 1 (Para) Punjab had two companies from 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment, and 1 Sikh had men from 1/1 Punjab and 3/15 Punjab, besides the gunners temporarily attached to it. Even 4 Kumaon had a Dogra company from 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles.
The newly arrived brigade Headquarters got off to an unlucky start. Its first commander, Brigadier J.C. Katoch, had to be evacuated to Delhi two days after his arrival; he was wounded during a visit to 1 Sikh at Pattan. His relief, Brigadier L.P. (‘Bogey’) Sen, arrived on 2 November. Tall, fair and handsome, this Sandhurst-trained Bengali was originally from the Baluch Regiment. He had a fine war record and had won the Distinguished Service Order in the Arakans. At 37, with only 16 years of service, he had just been promoted to brigadier and was full of enthusiasm.
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The situation around Srinagar was extremely fluid when Sen arrived. Reliable intelligence about the enemy was lacking. A large enemy force was investing the Sikhs at Pattan. This was the best-equipped lot, having mortars and motor transport. A lashkar, 1,500-strong, was reported to be making for Srinagar from the North by way of Sopur-Bandipura after skirting the Wular Lake. A smaller force was approaching the capital from the South.
The loss of Baramula brought home to everyone the seriousness of the situation.
Four 3.7-inch Howitzers belonging to the Patiala state forces had been flown to Srinagar a few days earlier. Unfortunately the guns had no dial sights and were, therefore, hardly of any use. The Air Force was doing good work. It had been attacking enemy concentrations wherever these could be spotted. An ad hoc fighter base had been established at the Srinagar air-strip, from where Spitfires and Harvards flew to strafe the enemy. Tempests, based at Ambala, also flew over occasionally. Both 1 Sikh and 1 (Para) Kumaon had suffered casualties in minor clashes with small parties of the enemy. Soon after the arrival of 161 Brigade, Headquarters JAK Force had been set up at Srinagar under Major General (later lieutenant General) Kalwant Singh, for the overall control of operations in the state. A short, stocky Sikh with a somewhat unkempt appearance, he was abrasive at times, but his drive and determination were to have a tremendous impact on the Indian Army’s operations in Jammu & Kashmir. Originally from the 1st Punjab Regiment, he had been Brigadier General Staff at Headquarters Northern Command (Rawalpindi) before partition.
The Kumaonis repulsed the first assault, but further attacks followed with relentless fury. The enemy numbered about 700. Sharma asked the brigade for help”¦
The Frontier tribesman is unbeatable as a guerrilla, trained as he is in the rugged, strife-torn mountains of his native land. He is bold, ruthless and wily. It is seldom that he comes out to fight a battle in the open, relying mostly on ambush and sniping to wear down his adversary. After their conventional advance upto Pattan for the next phase of getting into Srinagar they adopted their classical irregular techniques moving in small groups through jungle and hill paths taking toll with heavy sniping till again they felt they could concentrate on their main task. On the other hand, Sen had to get them to present a concentrated body. This was a fatal mistake committed by the commander of the tribal invaders. They simply could not fight this way.
Badgam was a small village South-West of Srinagar, only a few kilometres from the airfield. According to reports reaching Sen, the tribesmen were collecting at this village, and his first move on taking over command was to investigate these reports. The enemy could threaten the air-strip, and he decided to send out patrols to the village. The result was a battle in which the tribesmen achieved complete surprise. Two patrols, one of two companies and the other of one company, were sent out in the early hours of 3 November to search Badgam. There was a sizeable enemy force in the village, but the tribesmen were able to hoodwink the parties that went to look for them: they were disguised as Kashmiris, their weapons hidden under their loose cloaks. The patrols reported by radio to brigade Headquarters that no enemy had been seen. Sen thereupon recalled two of the companies from the village and told the third to stay put for a while.
He is bold, ruthless and wily. It is seldom that he comes out to fight a battle in the open, relying mostly on ambush and sniping to wear down his adversary.
The company that remained in Badgam was from 4 Kumaon and was under Major Som Nath Sharma. When the tribesmen were sure that the company was isolated and the other troops were no longer in the vicinity, they opened up with a mortar, followed by machine-gun fire. The Kumaonis were naturally surprised, but Sharma soon had the situation under control. His automatics and rifles began to answer. Immediately thereafter, a group of yelling tribesmen attacked from a flank. The Kumaonis repulsed the first assault, but further attacks followed with relentless fury. The enemy numbered about 700. Sharma asked the brigade for help, and was told that air support was on the way. Short of men, he himself laid the marker panels to guide the aircraft. Spitfires and Harvards came over soon after and strafed the enemy, but the tempo of the attack did not abate. Sen ordered 1 (Para) Punjab which was at the time deployed near Shalateng on the Srinagar-Pattan road to move quickly to Badgam. By the time the battalion arrived, however, the battle was over. Som Sharma had meanwhile assured the brigade commander over the radio that though he was hopelessly outnumbered he would not withdraw even an inch and would fight to the last man and the last round. ‘With utter disregard for his own safety he rushed from section to section across the bullet-swept battlefield to cheer his men and to direct their fire. They were greatly stirred by his personal example and decided to kill as many of the enemy as possible before going down’.
Due to an earlier injury, Sharma’s hand was in plaster but when he saw that casualties were affecting the functioning of his light machine guns, he began to fill magazines and hand them to the machine-gunners.11 While he was thus occupied, a mortar bomb fell on some ammunition dumped near him. He was killed on the spot. Som Nath was a fine officer and his death was a great loss to his regiment and the Army. By his conduct, he had set an example for others. In 1950, when gallantry awards were introduced in India, Som Nath Sharma was posthumously awarded the first PVC. It was India’s highest award for gallantry in the face of the enemy and is considered equivalent to the Victoria Cross of the British Army.12
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