Military & Aerospace

Navies in the Indian Ocean
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The nation had so far desisted from becoming a military power that could be perceived as a threat by neighbouring countries.  It focused its military effort on self-defence and sea-lane protection and eschewed the development of a stand-alone military capability that might provoke regional arms races. Japanese law also banned participation in collective security measures. For these reasons, there had hitherto been no Japanese Naval presence in the Indian Ocean4. In light of the prevailing circumstances, however, it made sense for it to gradually build up a Naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In line with its new strategy, the Japanese Navy began to participate in the safeguarding of SLOCs and in undertaking patrols and peacekeeping duties.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean remained a hub of major military activity in the 90s, primarily because of its strategic positioning on the map that resulted in a majority of the world sea traffic “” both in terms of energy trade and goods shipping, passing through its waters. It was an area inherently given to competition and rivalry. Navies of all hues vied with each other for “˜presence and “˜control. The “˜symbolism and status of controlling the waters of the Indian Ocean was also a significant factor. For the Indian Navy, presence on the Indian Ocean was a new reality that it needed to cater for in its future plans.

Notes:

  1. Refer to Reference Notes  “˜Diego Garcia.
  2. Mr. John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy enunciated the American Doctrine towards the Indian Ocean in his report for Fiscal year 1987 to the US Congress:-
  3. “We no longer depend on West Asia and the Gulf for our vital energy needs. Oil from this area now forms less than 5 percent of our total oil imports. Today the United States has an Indian Ocean orientation at least equal to our involvement with Europe in war. We plan to deploy two Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) and one Battle Ship Group to operate in the Indian Ocean”.
  4. If the Strait of Hormuz closes, oil and gas could come by pipeline to Gwadar and thence by tankers to ports in China. If the Strait of Malacca closes, tankers could bring oil and gas via the Bay of Bengal to Sittwe port on Myanmars northwest coast and thence by pipeline to southwest China. Should an international consortium share the cost, a canal across the Isthmus of Kra (if Thailand agrees) would dispense with the need to transit the Strait of Malacca “” tankers could cross from the Andaman Sea into the Gulf of Thailand and thence through the South China Sea to ports in China. For the longer term, China has invested in trans-Asian pipelines and offshore and onshore fields in many countries across the globe.
  5. In 1992, Japan adopted a law enabling Japans Self Defence Force (SDF) to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations. It was argued that peacekeeping operations belonged in the international security category and not in the category of military contributions. The peacekeeping role enabled the role of Japans Self Defence Force (SDF) to be changed from “˜forces devoted strictly to assuring Japans own self defence to “˜forces that would share the tasks of assuring international security.
  6. But in recent years, Japan has come under growing pressure from the United States to assume a greater security profile. It is also taking initiatives to promote a multilateral security dialogue as typified in ASEAN through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). An important example is the first visit in 15 years by a Japanese Prime Minister to Myanmar in 1999. Myanmars southern coast opens both to the Bay of Bengal and the western end of the Straits of Malacca, the regions most important trade route.
  7. In February 2001, Japan announced that it was considering deploying ships to patrol the Straits of Malacca where shipping is plagued by piracy. Japan has also proposed that forces from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and China patrol the waterways.
  8. After 9/11, Japan joined the US war against terrorism and enacted a new Anti-Terrorism Law. This enabled the Japanese Navy, in November 2001, reportedly for the first time since the II World War, to dispatch a group of three ships, two destroyers and a support ship, to the Indian Ocean to support the US Navys operations against Afghanistan.
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