Indian Defence Review

 

To understand the role of the Navy in the 90s it may be important to review the circumstances in which the Navy was required to operate in that time “” especially with regard to the increased presence of other navies in the region.

By the early 90s, the Indian Ocean had a marked central presence in the affairs of the world, not just from an economic but also a military point of view. Not surprisingly, the region abounded with the presence of many navies. The Indian Navy was a significant force in the Ocean with an expanded sphere of operations. The US, with a base at Diego Garcia and owing to its naval operations in East Asia was also a dominant player. Britain (that formed the British Indian Ocean Territory, way back in the 60s) had since reduced its presence. The French possessed vital territory in the form of some critically positioned islands. The Chinese, the Japanese and other regional navies were also beginning to realise the oceans strategic significance and show interest in the region.

The Unfolding of Events (1945″“80)

The phenomenal rise in interest in the Indian Ocean had its roots in history. The question of its dominance, really, harks back to 1945 when, at the end of the Second World War, a cold war erupted between two powerful countries “” USA and USSR. This confrontation, which was primarily a conflict of competing interests and overlapping ambitions, ended with the dissolution of the latter and Russia emerging as the largest (but militarily weakened) constituent of a new confederation.

Chinas growing economy needed to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies. To secure themselves against disruptions through the sea route, the Chinese were in the process of developing overland pipelines.

Throughout the Cold War, the over-riding goal of US policy in the Indian Ocean was to safeguard the supply of Persian Gulf oil to the US and its allies. This was to be achieved by strengthening the Persian Gulf monarchies and sheikhdoms and by positioning forces to deter and counter any Soviet threat from landward to seize the oilfields.

From the 1960s onwards, Britain and the US ensured that as the British Navy withdrew from the Indian Ocean, the American Navy took its place. In the middle of the Indian Ocean, Britain carved out a British Indian Ocean Territory from the Chagos Archipelago to enable Diego Garcia to be leased to the US Navy. The pro-US monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Iran were encouraged to build up their navies.

During the 1970s, the US and Soviet Navies manoeuvred for base and refuelling facilities in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean  “” Berbera in Somalia on the Horn of Africa, Asmara in Ethiopia in the Red Sea, the island of Socotra off South Yemen, Muscat in Oman, and the island of Masirah off Oman. The US started building up Diego Garcia into a naval base. Neither Navy sought facilities from India. Warships of both navies enjoyed goodwill visits to Indian ports.

By the end 1970s, domestic opposition to the US supported Shah of Iran increased to an extent that a revolution was foreseeable. Nearby in Afghanistan, a pro-communist coup was initially successful but soon encountered opposition. Afghan leaders repeatedly sought urgent Soviet military assistance to suppress the opposition.

In anticipation of a Soviet threat to Western oil supplies from landward, the US had started pre-positioning the wherewithal, on board ships, for military intervention in the Persian Gulf from seaward.

Two separate crises coincided in end 1979. The Shah of Iran was overthrown in a coup. Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to assist the protégé government. Despite Soviet assurances that they had no intent to threaten Persian Gulf oil, the US felt it prudent to deploy, on a regular basis, ships from its 7th (Pacific) Fleet to the North Arabian Sea. A new US Central Command, headquartered in the US, was created for this theatre of operations. Whilst events in Afghanistan were still unfolding, the Iran”“Iraq War (1980-1988) erupted. Western navies had to be deployed to escort tanker convoys into and out of the Persian Gulf.

Significantly, this was also a time when relations between India and America showed signs of thawing following a visit by Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to the US in 1985. A rapport developed between him and President Reagan and Indo”“US relations brightened. Successive US Defence Secretaries and US Chiefs of Naval Operations visited India. An Indian Naval Delegation visited the US Navy which was followed by ships visiting each others ports.

Developments in the 90s

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the subsequent operations to evict Iraq, US warships bombarded Iraq from within the Persian Gulf. With bases in nearby Oman and Qatar and an overwhelming presence in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy had established itself in the Indian Ocean. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent withdrawal of its Navy from the Indian Ocean further helped its cause.

American desire to maintain a geo-strategic presence. It was a strategy based on long term considerations and not aimed at immediate objectives or securing access to oil.

In the years that followed, turbulence in Afghanistan, a rise in terrorist activities and the lessons that the US learnt in the war against Iraq forced it to review its strategy for the Indian Ocean, but that was in no way an indication of a reduction in presence. To the contrary, it only served to strengthen US resolve to maintain presence in the region.

In the northern Indian Ocean, India began to be seen as the pivotal regional power and her Navy as the pre-eminent regional Navy. Within the Indian establishment, there was a desire to engage with the US Navy that saw some high-level meetings on Confidence Building Measures and culminated with the introduction of the Malabar series of bilateral naval exercises. The exercises, which commenced in 1992, were held again in 1994 and 1995.

In 1995, the US established its Fifth (Indian Ocean) Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, to conduct operations in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf and the adjacent land areas. By 2000, the American Navy was the predominant Navy in the Indian Ocean.

In Perspective

By 1995, there were a host of navies trying to exert influence in the Indian Ocean region. Apart from the Americans there were the French, who had the next most significant presence, the British (who though, a considerably reduced lot, retained relevance), the Chinese and the Japanese, who too had begun to show some interest, primarily to protect their own maritime interests.

Most of these forces displayed a long-term perspective about their operations in the region with a consistent and compelling rationale for maintaining presence.

American Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

The American presence in the Indian Ocean had Diego Garcia1 at the core of its larger strategy. There were three major considerations for the US presence in the Indian Ocean.

For the Indian Navy, presence on the Indian Ocean was a new reality that it needed to cater for in its future plans.

French Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

France saw its perceived commitment to its “˜Overseas Territories in the Indian Ocean “” Djibouti and the Island of La Reunion as overriding and catered for the defence of her island territories and erstwhile French colonies (which also had a considerable majority of French speaking people) in the Indian Ocean, by maintaining a substantial naval presence.

A very substantial proportion of Frances oil supplies came from the Persian Gulf. France considered her naval presence necessary to guard her oil routes. To appreciate how important the region was in her plans it may be useful to highlight that during the Iran”“Iraq war is 1980″“88, it formed a multinational force with USA and Britain that opposed the threat of closure of the Straits of Hormuz and the consequent disruption of oil supplies.

France also considered her presence in Djibouti as a stabilizing force in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s, and saw itself as a significant equalising agent.

Chinese Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

In the early 90s, there were strategic drivers for Chinas presence in the Indian Ocean.

Japanese Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

After World War II, Japans security policy had been based on five basic tenets:-

Japan got its oil supplies from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. The country was totally dependent on imports for its oil and gas supplies. This overwhelming reliance on oil and gas imports required secure shipping lanes.

The nation had so far desisted from becoming a military power that could be perceived as a threat by neighbouring countries.  It focused its military effort on self-defence and sea-lane protection and eschewed the development of a stand-alone military capability that might provoke regional arms races. Japanese law also banned participation in collective security measures. For these reasons, there had hitherto been no Japanese Naval presence in the Indian Ocean4. In light of the prevailing circumstances, however, it made sense for it to gradually build up a Naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In line with its new strategy, the Japanese Navy began to participate in the safeguarding of SLOCs and in undertaking patrols and peacekeeping duties.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean remained a hub of major military activity in the 90s, primarily because of its strategic positioning on the map that resulted in a majority of the world sea traffic “” both in terms of energy trade and goods shipping, passing through its waters. It was an area inherently given to competition and rivalry. Navies of all hues vied with each other for “˜presence and “˜control. The “˜symbolism and status of controlling the waters of the Indian Ocean was also a significant factor. For the Indian Navy, presence on the Indian Ocean was a new reality that it needed to cater for in its future plans.