Military & Aerospace

Indian Air Force: Looking into the future
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Issue Vol. 26.4 Oct-Dec 2011 | Date : 30 Jan , 2012

The IAF’s third phase of modernisation will be completed by around 2020. This begs the question: After 2020 what? Will it take another Kargil or something on a larger scale to make the government buy weapon systems and equipment a fourth time? Unfortunately the IAF has no means of knowing.

Modernisation should be an ongoing process rather than in distinct phases since it takes time to absorb technology. Air Force personnel will have to be spared for training on the newly inducted systems even as day-to-day activities continue. As in any other organisation the “good guys” are only so many. When everything arrives together it may easily result in wastage of time and money. There may be sophisticated equipment lying unpacked in a corner because no one knows how to use it. There could be other equipment in the open, covered with tarpaulin sheets, because there is nowhere to keep it. A minor problem might render a system unserviceable, but nobody knows how to rectify it. Meanwhile the warranty clock continues ticking.

In the Longer Term

According to IAF thinking, the service’s transformation into a potent and networked aerospace power hinges on three things. First, induction and integration of new technology weapon platforms and upgrading of the existing inventory; second, induction and training of manpower to handle the new inventory; and, finally, revision of concepts and doctrines. Its present focus is to transform into a “capability-based force” rather than an “adversary-centric” one. It also needs to be ready to fight across the entire spectrum of conflict – from the strategic and distant to the smallest localised encounter.

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The equipment being inducted by the IAF during the decade will remain in service only up to 2050; assuming upgrades perhaps till 2060. It is necessary to lay the groundwork for a 45-combat-squadron force that will be required for the IAF to go on the offensive against one of its adversaries, while keeping the other at bay, as well as to shoulder responsibilities that might arise far beyond the nation’s boundaries.

However, besides combat aircraft, greater emphasis is needed on UAVs. Sub-conventional and asymmetric conflict is rising in prominence across the globe. Often, high-end aircraft are being used for low-level conflict. UAVs may be better employed. The much-feared American MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs have become the most prominent face of the Af-Pak operations. The IAF could also take a leaf out of Israel’s book – within 10 to 12 years a third of Israeli Air Force aerial platforms will probably be unmanned; this could increase to half by 2030.

Around 2050, when India may emerge as the worlds largest economy, its military power should be commensurate with its status. The dangerous depletion of the IAFs combat strength in the recent past seems to have bottomed out at last.

The IAF’s fleet of AWACS needs to be enlarged to at least a dozen in order to permit round-the-clock coverage of the borders. It is also necessary to induct more AD systems. A repeat of the situation where missiles like the SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK had to be depended on, long after they should have been replaced, must be avoided at all costs. It is merciful that these systems were not tested by a live intrusion.

Not much is known about the IAF’s plans to revamp its electronic warfare (EW) capability. All modern combat aircraft have self-protection suites. But the importance of EW will only increase, so the IAF’s dedicated EW capability needs to be enhanced.

Both China and Pakistan lag the IAF in net-centricity. But China is streets ahead in the militarisation of space. According to a recent US study, China’s satellite reconnaissance capabilities are rapidly approaching those of the United States and are increasingly military in character.

The IAF is acutely conscious of the fact that absorption of new technology is the need of the hour. It is committed to revamping training across the board. However, there hasn’t been a basic trainer since July 2009 and none is likely before 2013. This hardly inspires confidence in the flying training pattern. Some years from now when the first MMRCA accident is attributed to shortcomings in training (as a downed MiG-21 routinely is nowadays) the loss to the nation will be an order of magnitude greater.

Crucially, the IAF is still almost totally dependent on foreign sources for frontline equipment and cutting-edge technology. India still imports nearly 70 per cent of its defence equipment and produces only 30 per cent indigenously. Ideally, this ratio should be reversed. There are stray signs of hope, with the private sector willing and eager to play a greater role in aerospace manufacture.

Around 2050, when India may emerge as the world’s largest economy, its military power should be commensurate with its status. The dangerous depletion of the IAF’s combat strength in the recent past seems to have bottomed out at last. The only way to go is up. But future acquisitions need to be part of a long-term national strategy rather than a knee-jerk reaction to a crisis. Strangely, India has never undertaken a Strategic Defence Review in order to lay down military goals and objectives and determine the force levels needed to attain them. Yet the new IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, recently said, “The IAF is well poised on the path of transforming itself into a potent strategic force.” Hopefully, the optimism is not misplaced

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Gp Capt Joseph Noronha

Former MiG-21 Pilot and experienced IAF instructor before he turned to writing articles on aviation.

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