Military & Aerospace

Gaps in Maritime Security-III
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Issue Vol 24.1 Jan-Mar2009 | Date : 02 Aug , 2011

The joint sea patrols of the Navy, Coast Guard and Customs initiated after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts are mere eyewash. In fact, the Navy pulled out of the joint patrols soon thereafter after Naval intelligence found out that Customs officers were collecting hefty commissions from boat owners and crews of fishing boats by threatening to lodge fraudulent arms smuggling cases against them.

Local Police Station

The existing local coastal police station is not geared to tackle coastal security threats. However, the current role of these police stations give them important tasks.

  • The police station has copies of registration of boats and photo-passes. The police station, therefore, should play an important role on gathering intelligence from fishing cooperatives and societies on criminal activities in the coastal region including smuggling and other related activities.

Most Customs outposts on the coasts are under staffed and many are shockingly under lock and key because the Customs officers prefer to cool their heels in urban centres far away from their offices on the coast. With the opening and liberalization of the Indian economy smuggling of consumer goods, gold and gems and other such items became non-lucrative for Customs officers

  • Each coastal police station is supposed to set up check posts (chowkie) on roads with easy access to the coast. In some case the police have indeed set up chowkies on the main road leading to fishing harbours, jetties and landing points. But wherever there are checkposts or chowkies only one or sometimes two constables (unarmed) are deployed. Most check posts do not have wireless sets. These few sprinkling of check posts along the coast and the coastal police stations set up a little far away from coast are the only visible, physical police presence in the entire stretch from the coast to Mumbai.
  • At the checkpost most trucks are cursorily checked. Those transporting fish carry a pass from the Fishing Cooperative or Society that mentions the quantity and value of the fish being transported. So comprehensive checks of cargo are rare and it is easy for anyone to smuggle arms into the hinterland.
  • The coastal police stations are under equipped and short staffed. Such police outposts are few and far between. The coastal police force is small, untrained and low on motivation. One police station on an average has 30 police men, and controls over 60 villages. They don’t have speedboats and patrol vehicles and so their response to an emergency can be expected to be slow and confused.

Bottom Line: The existing system of coastal police is absolutely ineffective.

The coastal police is not aware of the significance of its duties. Even the basic duties of patrolling the coastal waters and coastal roads rarely happen. It is not surprising to find incongruities, for instance, three coastal boats have been provided to Raigad police in Maharashtra but no staff has been allocated to it. So three new spanking patrol boats purchased in 2004 have been pushed into a mangrove forest on the coast away from prying eyes and allowed to rot.

The Indian Coast Guard

Set up in the seventies, the Coast Guard is the strongest link in the security chain. It is very active at sea. The patrol vessels are well armed and equipped with good maritime radars. Each Coast Guard patrol vessel on normal patrol duty checks between 30 to 40 boats in a span of 24 hours. Most large vessels have their own helicopters.

When checking of fishing boats is undertaken then it is very thorough. Cargo, papers and identity cards everything is checked. So the failure of the Coast Guard to check Kuber, the fishing trawler that was hijacked by the 10 Mumbai 26/11 terrorists, comes as a surprise.

  • When checking of fishing boats is undertaken then it is very thorough. Cargo, papers and identity cards everything is checked. So the failure of the Coast Guard to check Kuber, the fishing trawler that was hijacked by the 10 Mumbai 26/11 terrorists, comes as a surprise. The Navy Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said in a press conference that the Coast Guard merely asked for identity cards and allowed Kuber to carry on. If Kuber was boarded and checked by the Coast Guard Mumbai 26/11 could have been foiled. A rough estimate of the probability of checking of fishing boats based on information gathered from Fishing Cooperative and Societies suggest that there is a 1/3 (33.3%) chance of a boat being checked each time it goes out to the sea.
  • The Coast Guard has a well equipped air wing. The inventory includes Dorniers, Chetak and Sea King Helicopters. All these are equipped with good maritime radars and have reliable communication links with the patrol vessels.
  • The Coast Guard gets regular inputs from Naval Intelligence and from RAW and Intelligence Bureau.

Bottom Line : The Coast Guard is grossly under-equipped. There are only 60 ships to patrol 7000 km. All 60 of these are never out at sea at any given point. Thus the Coast Guard is unable to carry out its duties as required. Checking at sea and boarding of boats is rare which is a cause for concern.

Indian Navy

The Navy’s mandated presence is outside the territorial waters. It is involved in tracking movements of big ships, maintaining deterrence, protecting the country’s EEZ, countering maritime terrorism in the sea, fighting piracy and keeping out foreign intruders.  The Navy generally maintains contact only with the major Port Trusts regarding activity on the shipping lanes and normally checks vessels deviating from the normal routes.

Bottom Line: The controversy over the existence of prior intelligence of a ship, Al Hussaini, setting sail from Azizabad near Karachi, followed by the hijack of fishing trawler Kuber, and the failure of both the Coast Guard and Navy to intercept either Al Hussaini or Kuber, shows the lack of information sharing and problems of coordination.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

VK Shashikumar

is a Systems Strategist and writes occasionally on Defence and Strategic Affairs. Recipient of 'Ramnath Goenka Award for Excellence in Journalism'

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