The Customs Department: There is a Customs office at every major fishing centre. Strictly in accordance with the rules and regulations and in accordance with its charter of activities, every Customs office at the fishing harbours and along the coast has the following responsibilities:
- It issues photo-passes and keeps records of various fishing crews going out into the sea.
- Issues Registration Numbers to boats after it has carried out sea worthiness checks. A nominal fee is charged for this.
- Should develop an information gathering system by generating source-based human intelligence gathering from within Fishing Co-operatives and Societies. If such information gathering systems are actually functional this would have been a significant deterrent to outsiders inimical to national interests.
“¦ few sprinkling of check posts along the coast and the coastal police stations set up a little far away from coast are the only visible, physical police presence in the entire stretch from the coast to Mumbai.
- The Customs should have small speedboats (carry a crew of two or three), and should regularly patrol their area of jurisdiction. But in reality the Customs does not have speedboats and the patrol boats purchased after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts are in a dilapidated and unusable condition. Most Customs outposts on the coasts are under staffed and many are shockingly under lock and key because the Customs officers prefer to cool their heels in urban centres far away from their offices on the coast. Morale and work interest are low because the days of incentives and rewards as a result of traditional anti-smuggling operations has long receded into the past. With the opening and liberalization of the Indian economy smuggling of consumer goods, gold and gems and other such items became non-lucrative for Customs officers and staff. And over the years the much sought after Customs service has degenerated into a third rate government agency. This coincided with rise of narco-terrorism related smuggling operations in the 1990s. Dawood Ibrahim and his network of Mumbai underworld operatives also invested heavily in setting up a fleet of ocean going vessels owned by shipping companies funded by the underworld. From the 1990s smuggling operations along the Indian coast was increasingly associated with anti-national subversive activities and the Customs was neither trained nor equipped to deal with this maritime threat. Information gathered from Customs officials, serving and retired, suggest that posting to fishing centre outposts was seen within the organisation as a ‘punishment posting’. In fact, Customs officials and staff considered a posting to urban trading centres, export-import centres and large ports as ‘good posting’ because these were lucrative postings where “moolah” could be made.
On paper the Customs outposts in the fishing centres and its relatively bigger presence in ports should combine together to generate crucial coastal security inputs. But on ground the reality is that while this system has the potential for generating intelligence on activities in the high seas, this system is just isn’t operational and real security enforcement is completely absent. The Customs does not watch fishing docks. Most Customs outposts are abandoned and the staff is perpetually on casual leave. Barring having their paperwork in order the department does very little else.
The joint sea patrols of the Navy, Coast Guard and Customs initiated after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts are mere eyewash. In fact, the Navy pulled out of the joint patrols soon thereafter after Naval intelligence found out that Customs officers were collecting hefty commissions from boat owners and crews of fishing boats by threatening to lodge fraudulent arms smuggling cases against them.
Local Police Station
The existing local coastal police station is not geared to tackle coastal security threats. However, the current role of these police stations give them important tasks.
- The police station has copies of registration of boats and photo-passes. The police station, therefore, should play an important role on gathering intelligence from fishing cooperatives and societies on criminal activities in the coastal region including smuggling and other related activities.
Most Customs outposts on the coasts are under staffed and many are shockingly under lock and key because the Customs officers prefer to cool their heels in urban centres far away from their offices on the coast. With the opening and liberalization of the Indian economy smuggling of consumer goods, gold and gems and other such items became non-lucrative for Customs officers
- Each coastal police station is supposed to set up check posts (chowkie) on roads with easy access to the coast. In some case the police have indeed set up chowkies on the main road leading to fishing harbours, jetties and landing points. But wherever there are checkposts or chowkies only one or sometimes two constables (unarmed) are deployed. Most check posts do not have wireless sets. These few sprinkling of check posts along the coast and the coastal police stations set up a little far away from coast are the only visible, physical police presence in the entire stretch from the coast to Mumbai.
- At the checkpost most trucks are cursorily checked. Those transporting fish carry a pass from the Fishing Cooperative or Society that mentions the quantity and value of the fish being transported. So comprehensive checks of cargo are rare and it is easy for anyone to smuggle arms into the hinterland.
- The coastal police stations are under equipped and short staffed. Such police outposts are few and far between. The coastal police force is small, untrained and low on motivation. One police station on an average has 30 police men, and controls over 60 villages. They don’t have speedboats and patrol vehicles and so their response to an emergency can be expected to be slow and confused.
Bottom Line: The existing system of coastal police is absolutely ineffective.
The coastal police is not aware of the significance of its duties. Even the basic duties of patrolling the coastal waters and coastal roads rarely happen. It is not surprising to find incongruities, for instance, three coastal boats have been provided to Raigad police in Maharashtra but no staff has been allocated to it. So three new spanking patrol boats purchased in 2004 have been pushed into a mangrove forest on the coast away from prying eyes and allowed to rot.
The Indian Coast Guard
Set up in the seventies, the Coast Guard is the strongest link in the security chain. It is very active at sea. The patrol vessels are well armed and equipped with good maritime radars. Each Coast Guard patrol vessel on normal patrol duty checks between 30 to 40 boats in a span of 24 hours. Most large vessels have their own helicopters.
When checking of fishing boats is undertaken then it is very thorough. Cargo, papers and identity cards everything is checked. So the failure of the Coast Guard to check Kuber, the fishing trawler that was hijacked by the 10 Mumbai 26/11 terrorists, comes as a surprise.
- When checking of fishing boats is undertaken then it is very thorough. Cargo, papers and identity cards everything is checked. So the failure of the Coast Guard to check Kuber, the fishing trawler that was hijacked by the 10 Mumbai 26/11 terrorists, comes as a surprise. The Navy Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said in a press conference that the Coast Guard merely asked for identity cards and allowed Kuber to carry on. If Kuber was boarded and checked by the Coast Guard Mumbai 26/11 could have been foiled. A rough estimate of the probability of checking of fishing boats based on information gathered from Fishing Cooperative and Societies suggest that there is a 1/3 (33.3%) chance of a boat being checked each time it goes out to the sea.
- The Coast Guard has a well equipped air wing. The inventory includes Dorniers, Chetak and Sea King Helicopters. All these are equipped with good maritime radars and have reliable communication links with the patrol vessels.
- The Coast Guard gets regular inputs from Naval Intelligence and from RAW and Intelligence Bureau.
Bottom Line : The Coast Guard is grossly under-equipped. There are only 60 ships to patrol 7000 km. All 60 of these are never out at sea at any given point. Thus the Coast Guard is unable to carry out its duties as required. Checking at sea and boarding of boats is rare which is a cause for concern.
Indian Navy
The Navy’s mandated presence is outside the territorial waters. It is involved in tracking movements of big ships, maintaining deterrence, protecting the country’s EEZ, countering maritime terrorism in the sea, fighting piracy and keeping out foreign intruders. The Navy generally maintains contact only with the major Port Trusts regarding activity on the shipping lanes and normally checks vessels deviating from the normal routes.
Bottom Line: The controversy over the existence of prior intelligence of a ship, Al Hussaini, setting sail from Azizabad near Karachi, followed by the hijack of fishing trawler Kuber, and the failure of both the Coast Guard and Navy to intercept either Al Hussaini or Kuber, shows the lack of information sharing and problems of coordination.
The Broad Overview
There is no single agency in control of the coast. This is a huge problem. Neither the Coast Guard nor the Navy are in complete control. This is a problem area.
For coastal patrolling there should only be one agency, instead of having the coastal police and Customs working at cross purposes, and repeating their tasks with no coordination between the two.
- The Navy should not be involved in looking after coastal security. It is a task that will blunt the very purpose of the Navy. The Navy should be like the Army, called in only for emergency duties, and be free to train and be battle ready, engage in maritime counter-terrorism operations and power projection in the Indian Ocean region.
- The Coast Guard should have overall command of coastal security. At this point it would seem the Coast Guard only has this command on paper and does not get to know of details like the kinds of ships coming into Indian waters or to Ports.
- There should be provision to bring all other coastal agencies like the Maritime Boards, the Port Trusts to a Unified Coastal Authority or Command under the overall supervision of the Coast Guard.
- For coastal patrolling there should only be one agency, instead of having the coastal police and Customs working at cross purposes, and repeating their tasks with no coordination between the two.
Offshore Security
- The Coast Guard should be strengthened with fast patrol vessels and other assets to protect oil rig in Bombay High. The current system of hiring fishing trawlers for security duties must be done away with as soon as possible.
- Currently, perimeter security around the rigs is maintained by disallowing boats from venturing within one nautical mile of the oil rigs. But this should be increased to at least three kilometer radius.
Customs
- The Marine and Preventive wing of the Customs should be disbanded because it’s a hot bed of corruption and in any case its activities are restricted to the Port.
- This Customs department is incapable of patrolling because it has neither the requisite assets nor training to do so.
- The duties of coastal patrolling should be handed over exclusively to the coastal police.
Coastal Police
- As has been laid out in the new Coastal security plan the coastal police needs to build more coastal police stations.
The force needs to be trained in maritime policing roles and more importantly be nautically oriented.
- The force needs to be trained in maritime policing roles and more importantly be nautically oriented. It needs to be a separate wing altogether and not men simply drawn from the State Police. Perhaps, their training could be undertaken by the Coast Guard.
- The frequency and stringency of coastal road patrols needs to be increased and check posts need to be setup.
- Initially may be the police coastal patrol boats could be staffed by ex-servicemen from the Coast Guard/Navy.
Coast Guard
- The force needs to be empowered with enhanced infrastructure and personnel to carry out its task. It should be designated as the nodal agency for coastal security.
- It needs to be in full command of the coast and have the rights to control movements of merchant ships in and out of the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone.
- All other marine agencies should be function under a coordination agency, like a Unified Coastal Authority/Command, supervised by the Coast Guard.
The Fishing Cooperative or Society
Indian fishermen who earn their living from the sea need to be actively engaged and utilised as the eyes and ears of coastal security establishment.
Conclusion
Given these realities on the ground, the warnings issued by the India’s National Security Advisor M K Narayanan in 2007 and 2008, ended in the brutal Mumbai 26/11 attack. India’s largely ill-informed media projected this terror strike as the first case of terrorist assault through the sea route.
The police interrogation reports reveal that terrorists first breached coastal security along Indias west coast in February 2008. Was this is a dry run for Mumbai 26/11?
But the first case of LeT terrorist infiltrating through the sea route was recorded in February 2008. Out of the eight terrorist infiltrators two were arrested by the Jammu & Kashmir police. Abdul Majeed and Mohammad Jameel, suspected LeT militants, were arrested by J&K police from Rajouri in March 2008.
The police interrogation reports reveal that terrorists first breached coastal security along India’s west coast in February 2008. Was this is a dry run for Mumbai 26/11? According to the revelations made the arrested LeT terrorists on February 23, eight LeT militants left a coastal village in Pakistan. Once in Indian waters they were transferred to an Indian fishing boat. Manning this boat were two alleged Indian LeT operatives Asif and Abbas. On shore, the group was met by another Indian LeT operative codenamed Sameer.
The coincidences between the February 2008 infiltration and Mumbai 26/11 are uncanny. J&K police found that Jameel had a student ID card on the name of ‘Dheeraj’ from Chembur in Mumbai. All the terrorists had fake documents from Delhi and Chandigarh and they even had Voter I-cards. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Officer B R Sharma said, “The preliminary investigations have revealed that 64 voter cards are not available with us and two have been used by militants.” Similarly, all the Mumbai 26/11 terrorists had college ID cards and other such fake ID documents. Since 2007 Indian intelligence agencies had been issuing warnings of about 500 marine terrorists trained in sea sabotage waiting to enter India by the sea-route. Maritime terrorism requires deep rooted logistic support on land. This is why the latest terror threat faced by India needs new counter terrorism preparedness.
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