Indian Defence Review

Of course, in a way, the current challenge in India’s look-east policy arises from the disturbed regional strategic balance in East Asia due to China’s rise and the perception of US constraints on playing its traditional role of ensuring stability. The revival of tensions in South China Sea over territorial disputes between China and the Southeast Asian countries, and between China and Japan in East China Sea and now the North Korean offensive against the South are all indications of the disturbed regional strategic balance. But then the fact remains that the growing Chinese assertiveness over territorial issues in the region provides India an opportunity to expand its influence by deepening relations with countries along China’s periphery.

Against this background, how will Modi deal with China has evoked a lot of queries in India. Because, on the one hand, Modi has visited China many a time(four times as the Chief Minister) and invited the Chinese industry to come to Gujarat in a big way. On the other hand, at a rally in Arunachal Pradesh he expressed his concerns over “Chinese assertiveness” and comforted the audiences that under no circumstances will China be allowed to grab the border state. On the campaign trail, he in fact warned   Beijing to shed its “mindset of expansionism” and said that “I swear in the name of the soil that I will protect this country”. Incidentally, Arunachal Pradesh is being claimed by China as part of its territory.

Under Modi, security or India’s defence sector will be an important component in India’s foreign policy. The military’s inputs in foreign policy, particularly relating to China and Pakistan, will be given due weightage. Modi has said many a time that his government will give primacy to the modernisation of Indian military, and, that, in turn, will mean more arms, built indigenously and procured from abroad.  In January 2013, at an international conference on ‘defence offsets’ as part of the 6th Vibrant Gujarat Global Investors’ Summit (VGGIS), Modi called for framing a holistic policy to make India self-reliant in defence production for the security forces alongside training skilled human resources. Secondly,  a special economic zone promoted by Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), devoted exclusively to manufacture of niche electronic products, had  attracted global arms majors like Lockheed Martin for material and scientific knowledge investment some time back, although nothing much happened due to  the inaction on the part of the central government.

Finally, let me have few words on India’s nuclear policy. As you know, it was under a BJP Prime Minister in 1999 that India had declared itself as a nuclear weapon power. Modi and BJP say that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress.  Going by the BJP manifesto, the assumption of Modi to power will mark the beginning of a new thrust on framing nuclear policies that would serve India’s national interest in the 21st century. Modi will follow a two-pronged independent nuclear programme, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes, especially as nuclear power is a major contributor to India’s energy sector. Modi is an unabashed champion of nuclear power and he will like to set up more nuclear plants. For this he will need nuclear fuel and for this countries such as Australia will be very important for him.

As regards the military dimension of the nuclear power, the BJP has promised to study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times. Of course, this assertion of revising and updating the nuclear doctrine, has invited criticisms from many quarters under the specious plea that Modi will change India’s promise of no first use of nuclear weapons.  I personally think this posture of  India’s nuclear doctrine does require a review because no nuclear weapon power in the world today, including China, believes in the principle of No First Use (Its latest biannual defence white paper (2013) omitted for the first time a promise never to use its own nuclear weapons first.

Even otherwise, China had asserted before that its NFU would not apply against countries that are in possession of the Chinese territory. That means that China’s NFU does not apply to India as it claims over our lands in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. That leaves Pakistan, our other major adversary. But Pakistan too does not believe in NFU). However, Modi has clarified that he will stick to it. He recently told the press that “No first use was a great initiative of Atal Bihari Vajpayee – there is no compromise on that. We are very clear. No first use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance.” However, Modi has made it that his government will “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities”.

Does it mean that under Modi, India will have a bigger number of nuclear weapons? Of course, officially, nobody knows what exactly this number is at present. But one thing is clear that fixing a number is a critical task. Given the fact that principally China and Pakistan are the countries from which India fears a nuclear attack, it is difficult to have a credible minimum, because what may be minimum for Pakistan may not be the minimum against China, a much stronger power. In other words, what is credible towards China will likely not be minimum toward Pakistan; and what is minimum toward Pakistan cannot be credible toward China.  Of course, some experts in India have argued for India to have “minimal deterrent”, rather than “minimum deterrent”. ‘Minimal’ is seen as a word better suited than ‘minimum’ to qualify India’s deterrent, which is subject to numerical changes in response to its strategic environment. In conceptual terms, ‘minimal’ provides greater flexibility than ‘minimum’. On the other hand, ‘minimum’ deterrence seals the lower limit of the arsenal, indicating that any number below this limit could endanger deterrence. The term ‘minimal’ therefore better conveys therefore the relationship between the credibility of the deterrent and its numerical flexibility. ‘Minimum’ is both an adjective and a noun. ‘Minimal’, on the other hand, can only be used as an adjective, which emphasises its dependent usage”.

Anyway, these are all conceptual exercises. For real clarity, we will have to wait till Modi forms a government.