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Indian Foreign Policy under Modi
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Prakash Nanda | Date:07 May , 2014 0 Comments
Prakash Nanda
is a journalist and editorial consultant for Indian Defence Review. He is also the author of “Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look-East Policy.”

This being the background, it is interesting that Modi has promised to convert the centrifugal winds of India’s political system into a core strength of the country’s external policy. Despite being widely perceived to be authoritarian in his working style, Modi has said that he would work with India’s Chief Ministers, the elected heads of the governments of India’s 30 states/provinces, in resolving the country’s myriad problems. In its election manifesto for the 2014 general elections, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has promised that the Modi-led central government “will place Centre-State relations on an even keel through the process of consultation and strive for harmonious Centre-State relations”, that it “will be an enabler and facilitator in the rapid progress of states. We will evolve a model of national development, which is driven by the states” and that “Team India shall not be limited to the Prime Minister led team sitting in Delhi, but will also include Chief Ministers and other functionaries as equal partners”.

The foreign policy should be decided by the people and not by some politicians sitting in Delhi,” Modi said. He wondered why bilateral or international conferences and summits should not be held in States.

While talking of making the chief ministers as equal partners, Modi has said that the partnership would deal with all the issues, including foreign policy challenges, facing the country. Delivering the Nani Palkhivala memorial lecture at a function organised in Chennai in October 2013 by the Palkhivala Foundation, Modi  attacked the incumbent Congress-led United Progressive Alliance(UPA) government’s  foreign policy as “a mockery” and “Delhi-centric”. He, instead, advocated an assertive foreign policy that would also involve the States. “India is not just Delhi. The foreign policy should be decided by the people and not by some politicians sitting in Delhi,” he said. He wondered why bilateral or international conferences and summits should not be held in States. Giving a hypothetical example, he said that if and when the Prime Minister of Britain visited India next, all his official meetings need not be held in New Delhi. Instead, Chennai should be allowed to host the visit. Pointing out that his State, Gujarat, had entered into partnership with Japan and Canada, he mooted a new role for States in external affairs and suggested that each State be allowed to have partnership with one country.

In other words, Modi wants to legitimise the newly emerging trend in India of the states or provinces in interfering in the foreign policy matters that have been, otherwise, exclusive preserve of a select few in the central government.  But what about restructuring the process within the central government, be it the coordination between the MEA and PMO or revamping the IFS, which is not only highly exclusive and terribly short-staffed?  Well, I will not like to guess any answer as I have not found any reference from Modi in this regard.

We may now turn into Modi’s foreign policy goals.  As I have pointed out his most comprehensive speech on foreign policy so far has been the one in October at Chennai. The imprint of that speech has been reflected in the section in BJP’s election manifesto this time. At Chennai, Modi talked of regions and regional organisations of the world and how India could be linked with them. Modi scrupulously has avoided taking the names of countries that India under him will like to deal with, though at some election rallies he has mentioned China and Pakistan. But that was in the context of the security threats emerging from these two countries, which happen with whom India fought wars in the past.  BJP’s 2014 election manifesto, thus, speaks of in terms of regions and regional forums rather than countries. This is in sharp contrast to the BJP’s election manifesto of 2009 which had clearly identified its specific views to specific countries.

At Chennai, Modi talked of regions and regional organisations of the world and how India could be linked with them.

Let me quote the BJP’s 2014 manifesto which says that a Modi-led India will be guided by the following principles:

  1. Equations will be mended through pragmatism and a doctrine of mutually beneficial and interlocking relationships, based on enlightened national interest.
  2. It will champion uniform international opinion on issues like Terrorism and Global Warming.
  3. Instead of being led by big power interests, it will engage proactively on its own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond. In the neighbourhood it will pursue friendly relations. However, where required it will not hesitate from taking strong stand and steps.
  4. It will work towards strengthening Regional forums like SAARC and ASEAN. And it will continue India’s dialogue, engagement and cooperation, with global forums like BRICS, G20, IBSA, SCO and ASEM.
  5. States will be encouraged to play a greater role in diplomacy; actively building relations with foreign countries to harness their mutual cultural and commercial strengths. I have already discussed this in details.

It is obvious that there is the centrality of economics in Modi’s thinking about foreign policy.

Both in Modi’s speech at Chennai and the BJP manifesto, another noticeable aspect is the emphasis on India playing a global role based on its national interests. The manifesto says: “We will create a web of allies to mutually further our interests. We will leverage all our resources and people to play a greater role on the international high table”. While emphasisisng a no-nonsense toughness towards threats to national security, Modi government, it is said, will strive for peace. For instance, Mod has criticised the outgoing government of Manmohan Singh for being “weak where we needed to be strong, insensitive where we needed to be sensitive”. To illustrate, Modi contends that India has adopted a timid stance vis-a-vis China and a weak posture in counterterrorism and cyber warfare. On the other hand, he castigates the present Indian government for failing to demonstrate responsibility in dealing with smaller neighbours and forgetting India’s “healing powers” to enrich international relations. And here, a Modi-led government will give a lot of importance to what says “soft power”.

The BJP manifesto says that “There is a need to integrate our soft power avenues into our external interchange, particularly, harnessing and focusing on the spiritual, cultural and philosophical dimensions of it. India has always played a major role in world affairs, offering a lot to the World. India has believed in what is said in Sanskrit, vasudhaiv a kutumbakam (the world is one family).  This has been its tradition since time immemorial. The magnetic power of India has always been in its ancient wisdom and heritage, elucidating principles like harmony and equity. This continues to be equally relevant to the world today in today’s times of Soft power. We will adopt Proactive Diplomacy to spread the same. India was reckoned also as a vibrant trading society. Our ancestors used to trade with foreign nations through the routes of sea, centuries ago. This was based on the strength of our business acumen and integrity, our products and crafts. The symbols of our ancient civilizations stand as a testimony to our architectural and urban planning excellence. We will revive Brand India with the help of our strengths of 5 T’s: Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology”. This is the typical Modi stamp on the manifesto. Similarly, Modi thinks that the NRIs, PIOs and professionals settled abroad are a vast reservoir to articulate the national interests and affairs globally. A known support base of his, he will like to harness this resource to strengthen what he says Brand India.

It is obvious that there is the centrality of economics in Modi’s thinking about foreign policy. He has addressed this theme at greater length and in greater detail than any other theme. He wants India to increase exports, build its future on its strong information technology sector, and garner foreign investments and other business opportunities for India’s entrepreneurs. Those familiar with Modi’s style of economic management say that there is every likelihood that under the Modi government, the banking and insurance sectors will be open  to external investment, more aggressive foreign investment in infrastructure will be allowed, and foreign universities, particularly community colleges and vocational schools, will be facilitated  to come in and help boost the number of Indians with the college degrees that would actually make them employable in a globalised 21st century environment.

India’s Look-East policy will be the most important priority area under Modi.

Here, Modi he wants to build on his record as leader of one of India’s fastest growing states. In fact, as the chief minister of Gujarat, he has made several trips to, China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. I am told that he has also come to Australia. He has attended some economic meets in Europe, but the thing I will like to stress on is that if you see the list of countries that he has visited of late, it is clear that for him the Indio-Pacific region is very important. He is going to attach utmost importance to the Indo-Pacific region in terms of trade and commerce. In other words, India’s Look-East policy will be the most important priority area under Modi.

As is wellknown, the Look-East policy began in the 1990s and it has developed through three phases. Broadly speaking, the first phase under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao revived our historical and civilisational connections with South East Asia. In the second phase under the BJP rule, the areas of interaction expanded to cover East Asia (Japan and Korea) and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand). Both these phases were heavily marked by economic undertones. The third phase, and this is the current phase under Manmohan Singh, is now marked by both economic and defence ties with the region.

We see now regular high level security visits between India and the East and Southeast Asian countries taking place. Along with the ‘Milan” naval exercises, India has also conducted joint naval exercises with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993 and with Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as part of the Search and Rescue Operations (SAREX) since 1997. India has been conducting joint naval exercises with Vietnam since 2000, which has been complemented by reports that Indian Navy vessels have been offered permanent berthing rights at Na Thrang port. India and Japan have  participated in the tsunami relief regional core group in the Indian Ocean in 2004 (along with Australia and the United States), which emerged as a catalyst for subsequent wider strategic cooperation as manifested in the India-Japan Global Partnership Summit  and  the US-Japan-India trilateral dialogue .  In fact, India has now strategic partnership with almost all the countries in the region that matter.

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