Indian Defence Review

War or peace

Certainly, the vast majority of ordinary people of Pakistan, as of India, only want peace. But they have little or no influence on policy, especially foreign policy, in their respective countries, because they are immersed in simply surviving – on less than Rs.20 a day in India and goodness knows how little in Pakistan. Besides this, in both countries they are either uninformed or fed motivated information regarding the goings-on between India and Pakistan. In keeping with the debate of January 10, 2013, since civil society is merely the educated and socio-economically upper crust (not more than 10% of the population), it is the Government of India with the military under its control, and the Pakistani establishment dominated by the Pakistan military with an agenda for armed conflict, that can influence India-Pakistan relations one way or another.

In modern times, especially with India and Pakistan being nuclear-capable, relations between them cannot be viewed as a choice between war and peace, even though the Pakistani army labouring under the Quranic concept may see it that way. The current position is the ceasefire agreement made in 2003. This agreement has not only been repeatedly violated, but this time around, Pakistani troops have upped the ante by beheading and mutilating the bodies of Indian soldiers. This barbaric act is strong provocation for enlarging the conflict, and Pakistan’s interest in this is discussed below.

Pakistan’s military has failed to comprehend its misadventures of 1965, 1971 and 1999 against India. On the other hand, Pakistani Prime Minister Z.A.Bhutto’s words to the effect that Pakistan would bleed India through a thousand cuts as retaliation against the dismemberment of Pakistan, seems to have been internalized by the Pakistani military because of its repeated humiliation. India’s having treated 97,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (who surrendered at Dhaka in 1971) with soldierly respect and returned them to Pakistan, without having even bargained to get back a handful of Indian soldiers held prisoner in Pakistan, appears to have been considered as India’s weakness.

It is well to recall that Pakistan has warned of nuclear response to Indian conventional attack beyond a certain point, as happened in 1999 after the Indian army evicted the Pakistani incursions in the Kargil sector at great cost of officers and soldiers killed and wounded; Indian forces were ordered not to cross the LOC.

Indian strategic planning

The National Security Council (NSC) with the Prime Minister as Chairman, formed in November 1998 by the BJP-led NDA union government, is the apex agency for national security. It was formed to address the need to systematize higher defence management, particularly following India’s dramatic entry into the nuclear club with Pokharan II six months earlier. The functions of NSC were earlier being carried out by the Principal Secretary to the PM and, since formation of the NSC, a senior bureaucrat is the National Security Advisor (NSA). Thus earlier and also currently, the advisor to the Prime Minister on national security is a bureaucrat. The decision-making members of the NSC include the NSA, the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. The three defence services chiefs are not a part of the NSC; their advice to NSC is inputted from the immediate lower rung that is the Strategic Policy Group.

In the context of the present military-diplomatic low in Indo-Pak relations, the NSC would call for advice from the rotational Chairman of the CoSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee), at present the air chief, ACM N.A.K.Browne. He would seek information from the army chief before he advises the NSC. That would happen even if the Chairman CoSC happened to be the naval chief. But in view of the present matter solely pertaining to the army, the NSC would also call the army chief to obtain his views and seek his advice, based upon the army perspective of the strategy and tactics involved in the present situation. Should the matter get up-scaled to a wider conflict with Pakistan, the air force and navy would necessarily have to be involved, and only the army chief’s advice would not be sufficient. The advice of CoSC, whichever service he belongs to, would not be really useful to the NSC since he would have only scanty knowledge of the other two services. Also in question is whether the other two service chiefs would abide by the advice rendered by the CoSC Chairman (who also heads his own service), since it can lead to decisions impinging on the operational capability, functioning or logistics of their respective services. [Ref.3].

National strategic planning should include all possible situations including the outside possibility of the present sectoral stand-off snow-balling into a wider zonal conflict or even a full-fledged war with nuclear ramifications. Planning for that outlying possible contingency would be on the table of any responsible government. But from the fact that in the last 15 years of the NSC’s existence, no national strategic guideline document has been produced, it is clear to even a casual observer of military-political matters (and Pakistan’s ISI is certainly not casual) that the Indian establishment is practically rudderless inasmuch as national defence strategy is concerned. The absence of statements by the Prime Minister and defence minister even after a week, and equivocating statements by Mr.Salman Khurshid are indicative of a kind of strategic paralysis stemming from the fact that there are no strategic guidelines. Again, it is necessary to emphasize that these critical comments are not directed at the present political dispensation, but at the Indian political-bureaucratic setup over the decades, which suffers from endemic strategic “illiteracy” coupled with ignorance in defence matters.

It is knowledge of the Indian establishment’s lack of strategic understanding in defence matters, and the knowledge that the Indian establishment cares little for its own military, that emboldens a military-led Pakistani establishment to cock a snook at the Indian establishment even in a matter as serious as the 26/11 attack. It is no wonder that Pakistan is assuming such an aggressive stance in the current stand-off.

The middle path

In the Indian public arena today, there appear to be two options, namely, (1) strong military response, taking the risk that it could widen or escalate, and give the Pakistani army the break it badly needs at home, or (2) continue with the present mild, don’t-rock-the-boat approach, and confirm Pakistan’s assessment that it can get away with mutilating and beheading Indian soldiers. Either of these options would have negative effects on the Indian military. Thus, there has to be a middle path between these two extremes, consisting of a combination of different measures that will deny the Pakistani military the “pleasure” of a war that can help it consolidate its domestic power, and at the same time will deal Pakistan economic blows that will hurt.

Options for India include a combination of the following:  (#) give a free hand to make strong sectoral military (including air power) response to Pakistani violations of ceasefire, (#) take demilitarization of Siachen off the table, (#) take the army out of IS duties to the maximum extent possible, to return troops to their primary role, (#) coordinate and step up military and civilian (RAW) intelligence gathering inside Pakistan, (#) cease cricket matches and other sporting events with Pakistan since these events only monetarily benefit the organizers in both countries and do not help the general public, except to provide a false bon homie, (#) restrict trade with Pakistan in those sectors that will hurt Pakistan’s economy, (#) engage in aggressive diplomacy at the international level without internationalizing the issue of the LOC or Kashmir, (#) continue issuing visas to Pakistani civilians for cultural or personal visits to India even if Pakistan does not reciprocate, to show the Pakistani public the true face of their own establishment and at the same time display India’s openness and tolerance, (#) continue to encourage Indian films for Pakistani viewership, (#) plan psychological warfare directed at Pakistan’s civilian population and its military personnel, including specially designed radio and TV transmissions directed at Pakistan.

Apart from the above measures, the most important measures would be for Government of India to

(1) Immediately Include within the NSC, a military officer superior to the three defence services chiefs as NSA for “Defence” or “External security” to render single-point advice on defence to the NSC, in tandem with the civilian NSA who would deal with “Home” or “Internal security”,

(2) Take immediate steps to formulate, formalize and declare a national security strategy, taking into account all regional and continental powers, on a time-bound basis, and

(3) Urgently set up the Indian National Defence University (the recommendations of the Committee convened for the purpose are already with government) “to provide synergy between academic research in the field of security and the government’s requirements in security policy formulation” [Ref.4] and create a centre for strategic thinking and updating.

Only these three measures can yield long-term security dividends to convince any powers that may contemplate interfering with India’s strategic interests, that India cannot be trifled with. India’s demand to be included as a permanent member of the UN Security Council without its own strategic guidelines in place and without military representation in its NSC, is slightly farcical, and may not be taken seriously.