Approaching to Land – Viraat ready to receive one of its birds back

What were the causes for Hindu defeats? The simple and short answer is ‘Military non-performance of the Hindus’.

To examine the reasons of that non-performance, we have first to understand the nature of war, i.e. the factors that determine the outcome of war.

‘War’ is a three-letter dirty word, involving death and destruction, murder and mayhem, and everything unpleasant and unpalatable. However, it is war, which determines the fates of nations, and their pecking order in the comity of nations. Civilizations rose to their glory and grandeur on the shoulders of war; that was the case with all major civilizations, e.g. Greek, Roman, Christian and Islamic. War has dominated the human affairs right from the dawn of history, which is essentially a chronicle of wars. Those civilizations who could not understand the centrality of war in human affairs fell by the wayside; unfortunately, the Hindu civilization falls in this category. The one unimpeachable lesson of history is that maintenance of the delicate balance of civilizations requires War, or the ‘Threat of War’; that is the only language the world at large understands.

Civilizations rose to their glory and grandeur on the shoulders of war; that was the case with all major civilizations”¦Those civilizations who could not understand the centrality of war in human affairs fell by the wayside; unfortunately, the Hindu civilization falls in this category.

It is not that the Hindus could never appreciate the importance of war. Actually, one of the very first persons to understand the centrality of war in human affairs, was a Hindu; his name was Chanakya Kautilya. As early as the 4th century BC, Chanakya told everything that needed to be known about war; and he did that in a very blunt and forceful language. If Hindus had paid even part heed to Chanakya’s concepts, they could have gone on to dominate the world. However, the Hindus lost the script and their way very early in their history.

War is central to the issue under discussion by us. Like a computer, war has two aspects, i.e. Software and Hardware, viz.:

Strategy and Generalship — Tactics

Troops — Skill Levels

Hindu Mindset

Number of Troops

Weapons Technology and Quantities

Battle Venue — Distance from home base

War Animals — Horse vs Elephant

For victory in war, it is essential that both the Hardware and Software elements are present in reasonably adequate quantity and even more importantly, in quality. No war can be fought in the absence of either of these elements. However, there can be endless arguments as to which of the above element is more important. All that we can say is that history records many cases in which armies even severely deficient in Hardware but adequate in Software, recorded victory after victory. There are not many cases in which armies short on Software could record victory, even if overflowing with Hardware. The Software factor could also be called morale, though only in a limited sense.

Amongst the Hindus, Prithviraj Chauhan was a general of very high caliber. But, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that Prithviraj Chauhan was out-maneuvered and out-foxed by Muhammad Ghauri in 1192 AD.

The primary cause of Hindus going under was their comprehensive defeats by the Muslims in the following two battles:

The first battle showed how vulnerable Hindus were. The second battle demonstrated how easy it was to subdue them for the long term. In the following paragraphs, we examine the Software and Hardware factors of the Hindu and Muslim armies in the context of the above two battles.

Software Factors

Skill Levels: In terms of skill levels of troops, the Muslim armies appeared to have an advantage; they had an edge at least in one respect, i.e. they were better horsemen. The Muslim armies had special columns of ‘mounted archers’, who could fire arrows with precision, whilst at full gallop; Hindu armies had no answer for that.

Generalship: It is generally believed that Muslim generals were of higher caliber. Especially, Mahmud of Ghazni is counted amongst the best generals of the world. Amongst the Hindus, Prithviraj Chauhan was a general of very high caliber. But, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that Prithviraj Chauhan was out-maneuvered and out-foxed by Muhammad Ghauri in 1192 AD.

Hindu Mindset: This is the subject at the center of our study. It is a rather complex issue and is discussed in detail in chapters 40 and 41.

Hardware Factors

Troop numbers: As stated earlier, almost all the Rajput Rulers of North West India contributed their troops for both the battles. That would lead us to conclude that Hindus armies must have had a significant numerical superiority; they could have easily had twice or thrice the numbers of troops when compared to the Muslim armies.

Weapons Technology: At the start of the second millennium AD, Hindu civilization was a very advanced one. There is nothing to suggest that in weapons technology, Hindus could have been in any way less advanced than the Muslims could. As such, weapons of both sides could be considered to be of comparable class. In spite of the known and proven innumerable shortcomings and disadvantages of the elephant, the Hindu commanders, for some inexplicable reason, continued to use the elephant as their major weapon of war.

Battle Venue: Both the above battles, as all other Hindu–Muslim battles, were fought in the very backyard of the Hindus. Hindu armies had an enormous advantage in terms of Supply and Support Systems. Muslims were fighting far away from their home base and were thus at a major disadvantage.

War Animals — Horse vs Elephant

Before the invention of the machine, the horse was the most important weapon of war. It had been used in that role from times immemorial; almost from the beginning of human history. Every famous general has ridden it; and he has ridden nothing else. One common feature of all victorious generals was their unshakable faith in the horse as a weapon of war. The most famous horse of history was Busephelus belonging to the most famous general of history, Alexander the Great.

The horse, the rider, and the sword, constitute the first example of what in modern military terminology is called the ‘Weapon System’. The sword is held (firmly) in the hand of the rider, who is in (firm) touch with the body of the horse, through his legs. Through that physical touch, the horse can read the mind of his rider, including his state of confidence or panic. Thus, the horse can anticipate commands of his master and give a real-time response. This single factor of close and instant interaction of the ‘horse, the rider and the sword’, resulted in achieving innumerable victories.

Hindu armies, though using horses relied excessively on elephants. Hindu commanders used elephants in two ways:The horse is one of the most intelligent animals. It has all the qualities essential for the battlefield, i.e. speed, stamina, agility, flexibility, easy maneuverability and endurance. The greatest factor in favor of the horse is the positive control that the rider has through means of the reins; that ensures total control and instant response, an indispensable requirement in a war situation. In addition, there is the great sense of loyalty of the horse to his master. History records many instances where the horse saved his master from hopeless situations, and in some cases from certain death. In the Indian context, we have the case of the horse named Chetak, who saved his master Rana Pratap from a very tricky situation.

In addition to the Hindus, two other countries known to have used elephants in war in a major way were Iran and Carthage of North Africa. Hannibal (3rd century BC) of Carthage used elephants when attacking Europe. However, Hannibal did not ride the elephant himself; he always rode the horse.

For the Muslim commanders, it was horses all the way. In fact, all commanders all over the world used only the horse; these included Alexander, Caesar, Genghis Khan and all others. They might have heard of the elephant, but they knew its limitations as a weapon of war; it was never to be used as a mount for the commander.

Now, as a weapon of war, the elephant lacks almost all the qualities of the horse, which we have detailed earlier. All those attributes are either absent, or highly deficient in the elephant. Its most serious deficiency is the lack of any positive control; the elephant has nothing resembling the rein of the horse. Whatever limited control is there is not by the commander/rider, but through the means of a third party, called mahout in Hindi.

The commander/rider stands isolated in a sort of metal container (called howda in Hindi) on the top of the elephant. The commander has no interaction with the elephant and thus, lacks any type of rapport with it. The commander’s orders to the animal have to be given through the mahout. In the clutter and din of the battle, the mahout may not hear the order or misunderstand it, and sometimes even pretend not to hear. In some exceptional circumstances, the mahout may be bribed by the enemy to let down the commander at a crucial moment of battle. The mahout may try to get the order implemented by the elephant, who may not respond due to the lack of any positive control. There were many instances where elephants went out of control and acted as they wished.

The elephant has no speed, is cumbersome in movement and sluggish in response — all self-destructive attributes in a war situation. It has lot of mass and strength; that often proved delusive in actual war situations. The elephant has no loyalty to the commander/rider and hardly even recognizes him. So, it cannot be expected to save its rider from tricky situations, as horses have reported to have done.

…there is the great sense of loyalty of the horse to his master. History records many instances where the horse saved his master from hopeless situations, and in some cases from certain death.

Now in an actual war situation, the commander cum king stands/sits perched high on the back of the elephant. That might generate a feeling amongst the troops that the commander is isolated from them, and sitting rather safely on a high perch; in other words, not sharing the risks with them. Further, if a mishap were to occur to the commander, it would be almost instantly noticed by the troops; that may demoralize them and result in chaos. That actually happened in at least two cases of crucial battles, as will be seen in later paragraphs.

There is still another serious disadvantage of the elephant. In the earlier days, the sword was the primary and most important weapon of war; warrior’s reputation was known by his skill and mastery of the sword. It is the only weapon useable in close combat situations, which invariably determines the final outcome of war. When the general is sitting on the top of an elephant, he is in no position to use the sword. That is a major drawback and liability.

With national armed forces across Europe undergoing changes, a surplus of in-service or new military equipment is expected. This trend might increase as European nations gradually withdraw from operations around the globe over the coming years. In the current financial climate European nations need to make best use of military surplus equipment.

In March 2012 the European Defence Agency proposed and Defence Ministers supported the set-up of a government to government (G2G) electronic on-line market place to sell or transfer this equipment. Consequently, EDA developed, with the support of Member States’ experts, EDA’s new G2G online defence market tool, called e-QUIP. “E-Quip is a concrete and practical tool to foster cooperation among Member States. By exchanging information on available surplus equipment and services, it will help Member States not only to get best value for money but also to maintain and develop military capabilities in an environment of shrinking defence budgets”, says Giampaolo Lillo, Armaments Director of the European Defence Agency.

“We see the launch of e-QUIP both as a follow-up to the Ghent-initiative on enhancing national capabilities with decreasing defence budgets and as another element in the efforts towards a better functioning European defence equipment market, ensuring cost efficiency and value for money for the tax payers. EDA’s work on both dimensions is crucial. I am sure that e-QUIP will be a helpful tool for both Pooling & Sharing and for a better functioning market. We welcome and support EDA’s initiative and will certainly make use of e-QUIP from a national perspective”, confirms Ulf Hammarström, Director General of the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency.

Poonch and its surroundings were formerly a part of a Hindu principality in the state of Jammu and Kashmir under Dogra rule. Its political importance to Pakistan lies in its large Muslim population with ethnic affinities with dwellers across the line of control, and its economic importance in its large tracts of fertile agricultural land. It was once a profitable recruiting ground for the British Indian Army. Having failed to capture it in the 1947 and 1965 wars,1 Pakistan had made this a prestige issue, and this led to a third attempt to annex it in 1971. Its capture would give access to the gullies over the Pir Panjal range for infiltration into Kashmir Valley and enlarge the adjoining Haji Pir bulge, already in Pakistani possession, right up to the Poonch river.

The area is generally hilly and forested as it ascends the Pir Panjal range. The town and the valleys are about 900 metres above sea level, with mountain ridges rising to double this height, higher still nearer the range. Spurs run north to south from a ridge protruding from the Pir Panjal range. The old ceasefire line gave Pakistan the advantage of higher terrain to the extent that most of the area, including the airfield and parts of Poonch town, is overlooked from the Pakistani-held side. Most of the nullahs drain into the Poonch river, and prominent among them are Betar and Tanti-di-Tangar. The Betar irrigates agricultural tracts, works the turbines at Poonch power house and is the source of the town’s drinking water.

From 1947 onward, the defence of the Poonch area had been the responsibility of Headquarters 93 Infantry Brigade, commonly known as the Poonch Brigade. In the peculiar no peace no war situation prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir, Indian and Pakistani troops faced each other in close confrontation, manning picquets all along the line in the form of a hard crust, with some positions in depth in the rear. The defence potential of these picquets had been progressively increased over the years by laying mines and improving field fortifications, but their location and strength were known to the opposing side fairly accurately. Moreover, the roads from Hajira and Darwandi leading to Kahuta, the administrative base, from the Pakistani picquets were under observation from the Indian side, and any movement along them could be noticed. Two main roads led to Poonch from the Indian side, one from Surankot and the other from Mendhar via Krishna Ghati.

Its capture would give access to the gullies over the Pir Panjal range for infiltration into Kashmir Valley and enlarge the adjoining Haji Pir bulge, already in Pakistani possession, right up to the Poonch river.

The Pakistani plan for the capture of Poonch was hatched sometime in August or September 1971. To this end Akbar Khan, commanding Pakistan 12 Infantry Division in the area, assembled about two brigades and ran an operation-oriented exercise sometime in October in the Sudan valley in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, in terrain similar to that around Poonch. The exercise practised attack by infiltration based on Chinese tactics and ended on 16 October. In summing it up, Akbar Khan emphasised the security aspect to his officers and ordered all papers connected with it to be destroyed.

The force was later inducted opposite Poonch in the Kahuta area in November. The buildup compriscd constructing a road from Kahuta to the Pakistani forward picquets, deployment of about 14 to 16 artillery fire units, dumping ammunition, concentrating the two chosen brigades—26 Infantry and 2 POK-in the area, and relieving some regular and POK troops with Mujahids in the picquet line. Despite the spread of this buildup over a month and a half, our troops had noticed this unusual activity and the presence of Pakistan 26 Infantry Brigade in the Kahuta bulge. But they could not grasp whether it would be used against Poonch or Uri, across the Haji Pir Pass. It was known that Pakistan 7 Infantry Division had moved out of Peshawar, but its destination had not yet been ascertained.

Some personnel wearing 7 Div formation signs were noticed in Muzaffarabad, and this indicated that a part of it might be used in Jammu and Kashmir, and perhaps against Poonch. This apprehension led to the induction of 33 Infantry Brigade into the area in November to reinforce the Poorch sector, and eventually this proved a wise move. Its deployment was rather dispersed, with one battalion at Banawat near Poonch, another in the Krishna Ghati, and the third at Jarna Wali Gali, presumably as reserves in their respective subsectors.

The Pakistani intention appeared to be to capture Poonch and subsequently to develop operations with a view to securing all the territory up to the Pir Panjal range. The road from the Changal bridge to Kirni Gali was completed in record time just before the outbreak of hostilities. The construction of this road enabled Akbar Khan to deploy three medium and three field batteries well forward to support the operation.

…Akbar Khan, commanding Pakistan 12 Infantry Division in the area, assembled about two brigades and ran an operation-oriented exercise sometime in October in the Sudan valley in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, in terrain similar to that around Poonch.

The plan conceived and rehearsed for the capture of Poonch was certainly bold and ingenious. It visualised establishing a corridor in the crust of the Indian defences along the ceasefire line by capturing the defended localities on Shahpur and Danna features and at Guterian, along the Darangla nullah, about six to nine kilometres north and northeast of Poonch town, in the early hours of the night of 3/4 December, and later infiltrate two battalions through the corridor the same night.

One battalion was to occupy the heights dominating Mandi, and the other the Thanpir feature and Chandak ridge overlooking the Kalai bridge, thus severing Poonch from Sauji, Mandi and Surankot. In addition, one commando company was to be inducted much deeper to carry out extensive sabotage and disruption in the rear. On completion of this phase, the town was to be carried to enable Akbar Khan to stage a triumphant victory march. Throughout the above operation, the ceasefire line was to be kept alive all over so as to tie down Indian troops and conceal the initial thrust lines.

Soon after sunset on 3 December,2 the Indian forward localities were subjected to heavy artillery bombardment, and under its cover two brigades struck east and west of Darungali nullah simultaneously, 26 POK battalion attacking the Shahpur feature and Guterian and 7 POK battalion the Danna feature. 26 POK battalion contacted the Shahpur and Guterian defences about 2200 hours, and 7 POK battalion pushed back an outpost of the Danna defences, and both units issued signals for the infiltration to start. 9 POK and 16 POK battalions accordingly made for their respective objectives, led by subverted local guides.

The elements of 3 J&K Militia occupying the Thanpir feature were moved in the early part of the night to reinforce Shahpur and Guterian localities before the troops ordered to relieve them could reach the area. 9 POK battalion consequently found the Thanpir feature unoccupied except for a few administrative personnel like cooks, whom they murdered brutally. When the relieving troops arrived at Thanpir they were surprised by the Pakistanis already in occupation and suffered heavy casualities. 9 POK battalion later extended its operations to occupy the Chandak and Nangli spurs, thus dominating the Kalai bridge over the Poonch river.

These elements ambushed a 9 BSF patrol near the bridge next morning, and this gave the brigade commander the first indication of a deep infiltration in his sector. A prisoner revealed on interrogation that he could see a portion of Poonch town and a portion of the Mandi-Poonch road from the Chandak spur and spied a convey of 50 to 60 vehicles halted on the road. Since the artillery observers’ wireless sets had become defective, no fire could be brought down.

16 POK battalion had likewise made its way to its objectives and managed to secure the Mandi heights dominating the bridge, thus cutting off the Sauji and Loran valleys and the northern portion of the Poonch Brigade sector. These elements were able to raid Shakhlu and lay an ambush at Khot, but with little success.

9 POK battalion received orders to exfiltrate about 1500 hours and abandoned Thanpir an hour later. The Indians moved in soon afterwards, but by then the Pakistanis had gone. They shed much arms and equipment in withdrawal and reached Kirni village about 0100 hours on 6 December. 16 POK battalion also withdrew the same night, almost using the same route, and this resulted in frequent exchanges of fire between these two battalions. The attacks on the Danna, Guterian and Shahpur complexes were called off on 7 December, and the infiltration troops fell back except for some elements of Liaquat Commando Company. 26 POK battalion fell back on Neza Pir, and there was feverish activity to prepare a defended area by laying mine-fields and extensive digging of defended localities.

It was amusing to view the Singh Duo RPN Singh, Minister of State for Home Affairs and RK Singh,  Home Secretary describing the Maoist attack on a train in Bihar as “Frustration” on the part of Maoists due to the “Pressure” mounted on them post the Chhattisgarh attack of 25^th May on the Congress convoy killing 27 (17 Congressmen and 10 policemen) and wounding 36. Equally amusing was the all-party meeting chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the Maoist problem unanimously agreeing to fight the Maoists. Reminds you of the 1994 Parliament Resolution stating whole of undivided J&K is integral part of India, followed by a second Parliament Resolution to the same effect this year under Manmohan Singh amidst much thumping of tables. But despite these two resolutions, when the Chinese intruded 19 kilometres deep, it only turned out to be a “small acme” on Salman Khurshid’s cheek that has kept him guessing to-date why this acme apeared. Less said about the Singh Duo’s political master who washed off his hand by saying, “we have no jurisdiction in the area”.

But coming to this business of “Frustration” and “Pressure on the Maoists”, can the Singh Duo explain what this pressure is, where was it applied, in what manner and more importantly with what results? Yes, additional 1000 CRPF were pumped into Bastar post the 25^th May attack, but what has been achieved? By the looks of it, this Maoist attack on the train in Bihar was perhaps the final exercise for a new batch of women cadre Maoists. If the “pressure” assessment is because they attacked a train, well attack on soft target is the modus operandi of terrorists and insurgents globally – whether it was Ajmal Qasab and Co in Mumbai or the bombings during the Boston Marathon.

But what the Singh Duo did not talk about is that the Maoists took away the weapons of all the Railway Protection Force (RPF) personnel killed and abducted. Axiomatically these RPF personnel would not have fired a shot as was the case of 10 policemen killed on 25^th May whose weapons were taken away by the Maoists. Media reports of the Maoists having fired some 10,000 rounds of ammunition on 25^th May are also laughable considering insurgent / terrorist organizations are trained for rigorous ammunition control besides they hardly needed to expend 10,000 rounds to kill 27 and wound 36 with firing positions next to the road.

The solace being drawn by the authorities is that the Maoists are: dwindling in numbers; are on the run and on that count do not have permanent headquarters; are short of arms and ammunition; tribals are only a small part of Maoists; Maoists do not have ‘popular’ support; they would not attack high profile targets for fear of reprisals; they don’t have much external support and: mis-governance and poverty are not confined to Maoists infected areas only.

To this, some analysts add Maoists have no “liberated Zones”, going by semantics of the classical definition – much to the glee of the hierarchy. But if all these beliefs of the hierarchy have substance then Manhohan Singh is needlessly creating fear by describing the Maoist insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country”. We might as well repeat what Chidambaram said as Home Minister in 2010, that the Maoist problem will be resolved in next 2-3 years. Don’t mind if three years have elapsed already since 2010 and nothing will be resolved in the next three years either. So we can give the same statement in 2016 and for subsequent years. But this apart, here is why the Maoist insurgency will continue to flourish:

•  Quoting the Constitution that Law and Order is a State subject, the Centre has washed off its hands beyond dishing out more and more Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) battalions and intelligence tidbits by the Intelligence bureau.

•  Concurrently, the Centre has deliberately failed to implement Schedules 5 and 6 of the Constitution with respect to the Forest Act and Land Ceiling respectively.

•  Schedule 5 of the Constitution requires Tribal participation in management of forests and forest produce including mining activities but this is ignored because of the politician-mafia nexus involving lakhs of crores in mining (both legal and illegal). Though the Government has a Ministry of Tribal Affairs, it is obviously ineffective or part of the politician-mafia nexus.

•  Schedule 6 requires implementation of the Land Ceiling, which is grossly lacking. For example, in a State like Andhra Pradesh, there are scores and scores of landlords who own anything from 2000 to 8000 acres or more of land. The Governor, who represents the President of India (Constitutional Head India), is supposed to ensure implementation of the Constitution. However, in Andhra Pradesh, the Governor has abdicated this responsibility and has left it to the Chief Minister who does not move one finger because of vote-bank politics. Ironically, Andhra Pradesh is a Congress Governed State.
• Aside from ideology (involving small cross section) the Maoists dissent is about land, forests and gross and lack of governance but greed of money and vote-bank politics of the hierarchy deters taking remedial steps.
•  The States have little capacity to fight the Maoists – no police reforms have been undertaken pan India and CRPF provisioned not capable enough either.
•  The CRPF is just not organized to fight the Maoists, as proved by all previous encounters. Raising of more and more police battalions in nothing more than empire building. The units earmarked for counter insurgency operations need to be reorganized akin to Rashtriya Rifles or Assam Rifles; organization, manning, equipping, training and building of ethos.
•  The stated policy by Ministry of Home affairs of “Clear – Hold – Build” is ambiguous to say the least and there is no shortcut to simultaneously tackle the issue at the socio-politico- economic and military levels not discounting the secessionist angle but not losing focus on the population as the ‘centre of gravity’.

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Left to the States, there is lack of a holistic appreciation for the Maoists problem as a whole despite contiguity of Maoist infested areas, unhindered Maoists movement from one state to another and capacity of insurgents to muster large numbers from various states for a major strike at a place of their choosing.

•  If armed Maoists cadres are estimated around 20,000. We need to remember that just 5000 Naga insurgents had kept insurgency alive for decades.
•  We should not be carried away by assessment of “dwindling” numbers of Maoists cadres. The number of the Maoists cadres would have actually expanded with inclusion of women and children. In 2011, the Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) had reported at least 3000 child soldiers in India – perhaps a conservative estimate considering Maoists follow a policy of forcibly recruiting at least one boy from each tribal family of around 16 years of age. The fact that Maoists in the 25^th May were of 18-25 years of age indicates that the young cadre has expanded.
•  It will be naïve to view the 20,000 Maoists and more than double the number of militia as a separate entity discounting their links with other insurgent / terrorist outfits that facilitates strikes in other States. While tactical pauses reduced number of incidents, Maoists influence is actually expanding to Tamil Nadu, Uttrakhand, West Bengal, Assam and even Tripura. They have firm links with the PFI (Popular Front of India) headquartered in Kerala and the Maoists of Nepal. There are confirmed reports of PLA of Manipur training jointly with the Maoists.
•  The quantity and quality of arms and equipment with Maoists can always be conjectured to suit our comfort levels since there is little ground intelligence. The Purulia drop was discovered by default ‘after’ the drop had taken place. Studies on the web tell you that of the 73 million illegal weapons in the world today, 40 million are in India. In September 2012, recoveries from Silodar Forest (on border of Bihar and Jharkhand) included a US-made Colt and Hart-manufactured M-I6 rifle (a prohibited bore by US Army), an Italian pistol and UK-made bulletproof jacket. Simultaneously, an AK-56 was recovered from Patna. Earlier, sophisticated Chinese assault rifles and communications equipment were discovered in Odisha buried underground wrapped in weatherproof bags in same fashion they used to be recovered in J&K few years back. Obviously these are being stored for future use. Explosives and detonators are just no problem with all the legal and illegal mining in the area.
•  Government has been downplaying China-Pakistan collusive support in fanning the Maoists insurgency; focused on upgrading their armament and tactics plus efforts to coordinate their operations in conjunction other insurgent groups, particularly in the northeast. It is for this reason that representatives of the LeT have been attending Maoists meetings periodically. Not only are sophisticated arms and communication equipment being pumped in by China and Pakistan, China has also provided arms manufacturing capabilities to the Maoists. The recovery of 1.5 kg uranium IED in Assam earlier this year is ominous. There is every possibility of China pumping in shoulder fired air defence missiles to the Maoists under garb of deniability, similar to having supplied them to Shia insurgents in Iraq, Taliban and the USWA (United State Wa Army) in Myanmar. China has even supplied helicopters fitted with air to air missiles to USWA in February-March this year despite close political, economic and military relations with Myanmar. The cold disdain with which China treats India is indication enough that China will have no compunction to upgrade Maoist insurgency in India’s heartland. There are already newspaper reports suggesting Paresh Barua is lurking on the border to get in touch with the Chinese. It maybe recalled that post rout of the ULFA from Bhutan, China gave them sanctuary on Chinese soil.
•  Finance is hardly a problem. Financial back up of the Maoist terror industry was estimated at Rupees 1,500 crores in 2010 growing annually by 15 percent through drugs, ransom, looting, extortion, robbery and poppy. Income from poppy cultivation is estimated at Rupees 1 crore per acre – cue taken from Al Qaeda / Taliban poppy bonanza in Afghanistan.

•  We may play around with semantics of “liberated zones”, but there are hundreds of square kilometers of territory that is no go for security forces and with proper Maoist manned barriers only those get through who are allowed to enter by the Maoists hierarchy. It is the Maoists who collect taxes, oversee administration and hold ‘Jan Adalats’ attended by thousands. There is plenty of support though you may argue it is not popular. In any insurgency, population is fed up with violence. Same was the case in Tamil populated areas of Sri Lanka but what does the population do when there is no effort to establish the rule of law. Media personnel who get through have clicked training events and proper camps, akin to what ULFA had in Bhutan. There is no reason Maoists will have proper Headquarters with underground tunnels in the thick of Dandakaranya Forest akin to Prabahkaran’s lair in Alampil Forest of Sri Lanka.
•  Intelligence in any insurgency has to come primarily from ground level but in this case the hundreds of square kilometers insurgent areas are no go for others. No apparent effort has been made to tap the hundreds of young boys and girls from these interior areas working in the NCR region. Similarly, there is apparently no system of feedback for security personnel from these areas returning from leave. It is on record that Nepalese Maoists were forcing our Gorkha soldiers while on leave to impart arms training to their cadres and teach tactics of raids and ambush to insurgent cadres under threat of life to the soldier’s family residing in Nepal. There is no reason why Indian Maoists would not follow suit.
•  The logic that mis-governance and poverty is in other areas as well does not cut any ice. Fudging below poverty line figures through unsustainably benchmarks and only 17 percent out thousands of crores of poverty alleviation schemes reaching ground level can hardly help.
•  The Ministry of Home Affairs list of 35 terrorist organizations does not include organizations like the PFI firmly linked with Al Qaeda and LeT (as confirmed by both R&AW and IB), picked up weapons against the India State four yeatr back and whose cadres were caught in Kupwara (north J&K) two years back trying to cross over to POK. Another example is the National Army of Meghalaya that the security forces have been battling for past few years now. These organizations and many others may well join up with the Maoists eventually but our hierarchy looks the other way because of vote bank politics.
•  Maoists ideology also appears to be finding support in the youth in educational institutions like the JNU and DU, intellectual segments and have even participated in seminars and discussions in the national capital. The reason is not communist ideology but resentment against an administration that is mired in corruption, refuses accountability and cannot think beyond money making and votes. Look at the ping-pong about the responsibility of law and order in Delhi, the horrific rape of Nirbhaya last December, quelling of the agitated young and the promises of quick justice – all forgotten.
•  Maoists appear to have considerable influence on sections of the media both at the regional and national level. Awareness and communications of the Maoists are excellent. Within minutes of an incident they inform media channels. Even the demise of VC Shukla was passed on to certain media channels within 15 minutes of his passing away. It would not be surprising that the second attack on the CRPF patrol on 13^th June was a message after the Singh Duo televised comments that Maoists are a frustrated lot under pressure.
•  Any proposals like the NCTC-SCTC will not get through unless a total threat appreciation (if done at all) is shared along with the overall plan of action and road map for its implementation. Patchwork solutions will remain unworkable.

The fact is that in the current dispensation, the Indian State has no will to deal with the Maoists and lives have no value. But it will be foolish to pass off the Maoists attacks in Bihar of today (13^th June) as acts of ‘frustrated’ Maoists under ‘pressure’ or waive them off as the hundred gun salute for Nitish’s Third Front. Maoists insurgency has the potential to be turned into the actual ‘Third Front’ threat to India assisted by our adversaries in times of conflict. Let us not fool ourselves that the Maoist insurgency is waning. No matter how much we want to downplay it, Maoists have actually affected 180 districts in 16 States in varied levels of intensity (35 percent of population in 40 percent of area) and are establishing urban bases. Core of the Maoists are trained by the LTTE under aegis ISI and they have integrated this with Mao’s ideology of mass guerilla attack. There is likely to be much more violence and mayhem. We should not take them lightly.

The Sin that is Committed by Killing One, Who Does Not Deserve to Be Killed, Is As Great as the Sin, of Not Killing One Who Deserves to Be Killed.

Mahabharat Udyoga Parva. Chapter 72, Verse 18

We entered the 21st century with Y2K bust. Visionaries who predicted doomsday had to redeem their stature and come up with something quite different. At that point in time, Indian Diaspora was flourishing, emails heralded monumental achievements of Indians, our girls had won most beauty pageants, Indian Armed Forces were unconquerable  - recollect Kargil of 1999 and shooting of the Atlantique – our economy was expanding; things looked hunky-dory for good old Bharat. Do we have the military, bureaucratic and most of all political courage to become the Regional Policeman? In this exuberant ambience we were told that the 21st century belongs to Asia and it caught every Indian’s imagination. Just imagine we said, Western intelligentsia looks at India with respect. India with China will decide international matters for a century? Finally our 5000 year old civilisation is getting its place in the sun. India has arrived.

The euphoria permeated the psyche of the Indian Armed Forces and ‘Think Tanks’ comprising mainly retired military officers. They started writing and expounding theories and critiques on why India must become a regional power, especially since the West is saying so. The source of this astounding deduction seemed to be the single Super Power, USA. Unfortunately we ignored that policies and doctrines emerging from USA on use and impact of military power, have failed consistently after the Second Great War, and that many American doctrines during World War II were utter failures too. But since the victor writes history, they were smothered. So here we were, in 2001 CE, basking in the assumed glory of becoming the Regional Power. No one asked why we should become a Regional Power. Strange? This article may be construed as a diatribe against preferred thought, and seems defeatist. On the contrary, it is time for the Indian Armed Forces, and their mentors in and out of Govt, to question favourite theories and pleasant conclusions based on unsubstantiated and easily demolished deductions that please the ego, but not the soul.

What Does It Mean to be a Regional Power

First it is pertinent to remind ourselves that we have essentially been branded as a Regional Power by the USA and her partners. So what does being a Regional Power mean in real terms? Are we to Police this region? If yes, do we have the capability to do it? Do we have the military, bureaucratic and most of all political courage to become the Regional Policeman? 

Has our infrastructure in transportation on land, air and waters been enhanced as befits a Regional Power? Have we come anywhere close to the energy demands that are imperative to be a Regional Power? Events from 2001 till now have proven otherwise. Does Regional Power mean that other powers should consult us before engaging militarily/economically/diplomatically in this region? But the USA and its allies never bothered to tell, let alone ask India, before they intervened in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Has China talked to us before their interactions with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar? In fact does any nation of this region seek India’s advice before making agreements with other nations of or outside this region? The answer to each of these questions is a No. If we take the way ahead to become a Regional Power, will this change? Doubtful.

To be able to project power, we bought Groshkov and named her Vikramaditya. But where is the ship? Where is that power on high seas. And the horizon does not show the outline of a carrier. The Arihant has not been armed as yet and we do not have the indigenously manufactured fighter/bomber. We still do not have the Missile regime that makes the military might of a Regional Power credible. Our MBT is an utter failure. How then can we call ourselves a Regional Power? Who accepts or even believes that India is, or can be a Regional Power? No one. Is there not something amiss in this perception? How can there be ‘a way ahead’, when we do not have the means to pave the path? Readers may be probably getting annoyed at the direction this article is taking? It is intentional.

Governance in India

What type of governance have we shown since the dawn of the 21st Century? What reliability and continuance of policies, both internal and external have we demonstrated to the world? Who were the visionaries and planners that we showcased to buttress the mantle of Regional Power? All our luminaries are abroad. There has been much dismay at India not getting a permanent seat in UNSC, and we have blamed others for this. But we have never accepted that governance in India has been of consistent poor quality, and just being the second largest nation in Asia with one billion plus population, and about a million strong army, does not qualify for permanent seat in UNSC. Has our infrastructure in transportation on land, air and waters been enhanced as befits a Regional Power? Have we come anywhere close to the energy demands that are imperative to be a Regional Power? Has the Govt of the day, NDA or UPA, shown the tidiness and resolve of an aspiring Regional Power? Has our ability to educate Indians to behave as a Regional Power been honed and upgraded? Have Govts, both Central and State, taken appropriate actions to secure India and Indians? Once again the answer to each question is a sad No. Then how can we write so laudably and convincingly about the way ahead, when there is no one to tread that path? Just soldiers, sailors and airmen with some paramilitary thrown in for colour, do not make a Regional Power.

How has our Cabinet functioned under crisis? What quality of administrative advice is given by bureaucrats from Finance, Energy, Defence, Intelligence, Agriculture, Security, to the political leadership? Is that advice evident to Indians and other nations? How pliant is the Cabinet to political party bosses? How aware are the powerful ‘behind the scene’ actors of what a Regional Power means, or do they just parrot the jargon? There has been much dismay at India not getting a permanent seat in UNSC, and we have blamed others for this. But we have never accepted that governance in India has been of consistent poor quality, and just being the second largest nation in Asia with one billion plus population, and about a million strong army, does not qualify for permanent seat in UNSC. India herself is to blame for remaining just another member of UN. The basic cause for this embarrassment is poor governance over many years, with no visible signs of change for the better. How can there be ‘a way ahead’ as a Regional Power if we are unable to govern ourselves? 

Absence of Military Advice in Decision Making

Forget about a Regional Power, even an ordinary power keeps its military closely associated in their decision making process. Indian bureaucracy and its political patrons make sure that that faujis are the last to know about decisions that intimately and intricately involve military forces. This is not the hallmark of a Regional Power. The dictum that military must remain under civilian control does not mean keeping the military out of the decision making loop. It means closely integrating military advisers for all decisions that may or may not demand military action, and finally making a decision that is binding on all elements of Indian governance. The sad truth is that there is nothing vibrant about our democratic processes, nor about our parliamentarians and legislators. Media reports now talk of getting a military adviser to tackle the Naxal menace.

It has taken the Indian politico-bureaucratic-police establishment more than 30 years to realise that military advice on Naxals may be worthwhile? Is this how a Regional Power functions? Other nations observe the patterns of Indian governance, and decide whether India can be ignored, and we are disregarded. How can a civilian centric decision to engage in a military campaign succeed, if military advice is not taken from the start? But the disdain that bureaucrats and politicians have for the military, results in poor strategic military decisions like IPKF, Parakram, Cease Fire of 1947-48, the return of 93,000 POWs to Pakistan without any quid pro quo, the return of Haji Pir salient in 1965, non-use of the IAF fighters in 1962, and many more. What is frightening is that others know about it, but Indians are blissfully ignorant, and with more than 75 percent of the educated populace unaware of its military capability, such a nation cannot be a Regional Power. The military is prohibited from informing their civilian brethren about the gaping holes in the decision matrix, thus preventing public debate and outcry. This is not the hallmark of a Regional Power. How can we ‘go ahead’, there is no one to tread the path?

Indian Military Umbrella?

Which ‘umbrella’ is being alluded to? Is there a nation in this region that will accept Indian Military Umbrella (IMU)? When the Indian military hierarchy is surprised by its own Govt about the Course of Action, who will accept cover under this fragile and poorly administered arrangement? Even laymen know that when the military is screened from military decisions, the result has to be a failure, the umbrella becomes unreliable. A Regional Power does not get sucked into dead-end military adventures that are doomed to fail. When super powers are failing, we without the wherewithal, want to offer a tattered umbrella? Our airborne assault in Maldives in Nov 88, was successful despite civilian-bureaucratic, and to some extent military gung-ho attitudes. To be considered a Regional Power, by ourselves and others, a well educated, healthy, motivated, disciplined youth needs to be the bedrock of our strength. Just witness the way we have callously destroyed our education system with crass political interference, regular messing around with syllabi, poorly paid teachers, inadequate infrastructure. Lady luck played a greater role than strategic decision making. Notwithstanding that more than 20 years have elapsed, the process remains unchanged. It is pertinent to warn ourselves of the dangers of being overwhelmed by jingoistic jargon like ‘Study of Contemporary Conflicts’, ‘Comprehensive National Power’, ‘Hard and Soft Power’, ‘From Euro-Atlantic West to Asia’. Goldman Sachs says that India has 4th largest GDP, and she will be a developed nation by 2050. These are doctored reports, controlled by the host nation to place India on a pedestal, saying that the path we follow is correct creating a false sense of well being, though evidence shows otherwise.

We fail to remind ourselves that the very same West feared an undivided India and created a permanent schism in our sub-continent. Economic disinformation campaigns by super powers have caused untold misery across the globe, and we are falling into that trap. What kind of Indian Military Umbrella can we build without a strong, reliable, accountable, and efficient Defence industry? DRDO, PSUs and Ordnance Factories have floundered for ages. The world knows it, the regional nations know it, the Govt of the day knows it, the military knows it, but ordinary Indians are blissfully unaware that military hardware with the soldier, sailor and airman is unreliable and certainly not ‘state-of-the-art’ as befits a Regional Power. The equipment supplied to the Armed Forces, Paramilitary, Police hinders rather than enhancing their fighting capability. The INSAS rifle, Arjun tank. Indra radar, Aakash, Nag, Kaveri, LCA, Saras, armoured jackets, winter clothing, simple webbing, are significant failures in content, time frames, effectiveness, reliability, robustness. What military umbrella can India offer with unreliable design, manufacturing and maintenance from her Defence Industries? Where is ‘the way ahead’ for India to be a Regional Power, when her military might is poorly supported by indigenous industry?

The private sector can willingly take over defence production if we hand over most of our DRDO, Ordnance Factories and PSUs that have consistently failed India. Military umbrellas demand uninterrupted support by reliable, disciplined, innovative industrial capacity, not behemoths that exist as job creation cesspools controlled by self serving politico/bureaucratic powers.

Human Resources – Our Youth

To be considered a Regional Power, by ourselves and others, a well educated, healthy, motivated, disciplined youth needs to be the bedrock of our strength. Just witness the way we have callously destroyed our education system with crass political interference, regular messing around with syllabi, poorly paid teachers, inadequate infrastructure. Are these the hallmark of a Regional Power? It is no secret that our media is far from mature, and is unfailingly aping western media styles. Higher education is an uncontrolled disaster. IIM and IIT products seek avenues outside India, and we have encouraged this trend with gross salary in dollars as evidence of huge success stories.

There are no Mohans of Swades in real life, youngsters do not want to work towards making India a Regional Power. The dissatisfaction levels are scary, and politicisation of our under-graduate community is frightening. Who then will look at us as a potential Regional Power, and we want to remain so for another 90 years? The situation is comic. We want to be a Regional Power without the wherewithal in governance, military hardware, military inputs into decision making, educated and motivated youth, energy generation, food security, and to top it all, a political leadership that takes its cues from filial rather than professional unbiased advice. Central as well as State leadership is created on family contacts rather than political acumen. Why should other nations of this Region have faith in such a flimsy political frame-work without any genuine signs of the youth wanting to remedy it?

The C-17, shown here, was transferred today after completion of a flight test program at Edwards Air Force Base in Palmdale, Calif., that began following the Jan. 22 delivery.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) flew its first Boeing C-17 Globemaster III to India today, becoming the newest operator of the leading airlifter.

“The C-17 will equip the Indian Air Force with amongst the world’s most advanced humanitarian and strategic capabilities,” said Air Vice Marshal SRK Nair, Assistant Chief of Air Staff Operations (Transport and Helicopters). “We have looked forward to this day when our Indian Air Force flies the first C-17 to its new home in India.”

Boeing is on track to deliver four more C-17s to the IAF this year and five in 2014. This first aircraft was transferred today after completion of a flight test program at Edwards Air Force Base in Palmdale, Calif., that began following the Jan. 22 delivery.

“Congratulations to the Indian Air Force on this milestone as India joins the worldwide community of C-17 operators,” said Tommy Dunehew, Boeing vice president of Business Development for Mobility, Surveillance and Engagement. “Nations turn to the C-17 for the capability to perform a wide range of operations, from peacekeeping and disaster relief to troop movements from semi-prepared airfields. This aircraft will provide the Indian Air Force with the versatility to augment airlift capability.”

Boeing has now delivered 254 C-17s, including 222 to the U.S. Air Force and a total of 32 C-17s to Australia, Canada, India, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations.

Boeing will support the IAF C-17 fleet through the Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP) Performance-Based Logistics contract. The GISP “virtual fleet” arrangement ensures mission readiness by providing all C-17 customers access to an extensive support network for worldwide parts availability and economies of scale.

Dr Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan from May 27 to 30 was opportune as the circumstances today are more propitious than ever for India and Japan to forge a solid strategic partnership.

Japan’s ties with China have frayed badly, with massive trade and investment ties between the two failing to shield Japan politically from aggressive Chinese territorial claims on Senkaku islands. Even if the two countries manage to defuse the situation to avert the incalculable risks of an actual military brawl, China has lit a fire under the relationship that would be very difficult to douse.

To deal with the emerging Chinese threat, Japan has to develop a new mix of diplomatic and military tools. In addition to a defense cordon provided by its US alliance, it needs a diplomatic cordon comprising of select countries anxious about the unpredictable consequences of China’s rise visible in its aggressive posturing in the South China and East China waters and its recent incursion into Ladakh. Japan’s ties with India have thus become more relevant strategically.

Circumstances

Economic reasons too favour close India-Japan bonds. Japan is already heavily over-invested in China; China’s politically motivated squeeze of Japan on rare-earth supplies carried a lesson. Rising India, with all its shortcomings, has the market, consumption potential, investment needs and manpower assets of interest to an ageing Japanese society and the Abeconomics-pushed revival of Japan’s economy.

Prime Minister Abe lays stress on democracy as a source of security and has proposed in that perspective the concept of an Asian Security Diamond comprising of US, Japan, India and Australia. Tactically, grouping select countries sharing similar poitical values to work together to promote regional security is a defensible approach, and China’s protests, as an opaque, authoritarian state have no legs.

Japan’s current political overtures towards India are unprecedented. Sensing this, the Chinese have tried to interfere with the developing momentum of Indo-Japanese partnership, with Premier Li Keqiang inserting his visit to India before that of our Prime Minister’s Japan travel, and manipulating its results in rhetoric and substance to suit China’s diplomatic strategy.

We went along with Li Keqiang to describe the India-China relationship as “an effective model of friendly co-existence between…neighbouring countries” and emphasized its “regional, global and strategic significance”. We agreed to establish a Joint Study Group to develop a BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) Economic Corridor. Enhanced bilateral cooperation on maritime security and cooperation in safeguarding sea-lanes and freedom of navigation was also endorsed, as well as the establishment of an open and inclusive security framework in the Asia-Pacific region. We even approved  bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy.

In effect, by unduly projecting congruences with China, we distanced ourselves from key aspects of Japan’s China concerns in advance of Shri Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan. As we pragmatically separate our relations with China from those with Japan, we should avoid creating space for China to shoot at Japan from our shoulders, as Chinese commentators have done in lecturing Japanese politicians- described as “petty burglars”- on the edifying manner in which India and China managed to properly solve their border stand-off quickly.

Ties

Prime Minister’s visit highlighted several positive features of the India-Japan political, economic and security agenda in the years ahead. He was shown unusual regard, with the Japanese royal couple hosting a lunch for him and  his wife and their visit to India getting announced for November/December this year. The two countries intend strenghtening their Strategic and Global Partnership “taking into account changes in the strategic environment”. In addition to existing multifarious dialogues at the level of their Foreign and Defence Ministries, India and Japan have also launched a Maritime Affairs Dialogue in January this year.

Importantly, India and Japan intend expanding defence ties, with regular and more frequent bilateral naval exercises planned following the first one in June 2012. In this connection we should be less reticent about trilateral India-Japan-US naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. Japan is keen to sell its amphibian aircraft US-2 to India, which interests the Indian Navy. A Working Group will explore the modalities of its acquisition.

In the context of Japan’s highly inhibited posture on external defence cooperation, such overtures need an encouraging Indian response to solidify other aspects of our bilateral ties.

Partners

On South and East China Sea wrangles, we joined Japan in reiterating our commitment to the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce based on international law. On terrorism, the Japanese endorsed our preferred formulations. On the sensitive nuclear cooperation issue, the gain from the visit was Prime Minister Abe’s recognition of India’s sound non-proliferation record, Japan’s commitment to work for India’s membership of the four international export control regimes- the NSG, MTCR, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and proposed acceleration of negotiations on the India-Japan civil nuclear agreement.

The visit provided an opportunity to emphasize the need to boost the current bilateral trade of $18 billion. India accounts for only 4% of Japan’s investment in Asia, though it has committed $4.5 billion for key Delhi-Mumbai industrial and rail freight corridors as part of developing our infrastructure, is eyeing the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high speed railway route, and could potentially participate in the Chennai-Bengaluru industrial corridor. India is seeking Japanese investments in solar power generation and clean coal technologies.

Prime Minister rightly called India and Japan natural and indispensable partners for mutual prosperity and a peaceful and stable future for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Beyond words, we need clarity about our strategic choices in action. The China factor should not interfere with the strategic direction of our Japan relationship.

In a season where scams are tumbling out of Lutyens’ Bhavans with an embarrassing regularity, it may appear that the AgustaWestland helicopter graft case has receded from public memory. Rather than let criminal law take its own course, we are being led to believe that the weakness actually lies in higher policy. Incidentally, the defence minister said that India needed to speed up indigenization in defence production to root out corruption. That indigenization of Tatra trucks by a defence public sector unit had not eliminated corruption was conveniently forgotten.

This inauspicious background notwithstanding, a new Defence Procurement Procedure was born in April. The high points included pushing back the purchase of military equipment from foreign vendors and providing incentives to the private sector to collaborate with global firms in order to compete for defence contracts. Even a layman knows that given the present state of our defence industry, the former is a pipe dream. Expecting meaningful privatization while limiting foreign direct investment to 26 per cent is a joke being played with the dynamic private sector.

DPP covers all defence procurements. But the following discussion is limited to aeronautics, which leads the pack in terms of technology and investment. As if to prove the futility of its own plan, no sooner had the ink dried up, the ministry of defence requested eight foreign aerospace vendors to replace the Indian Air Force’s fleet of Avro 748M aircraft.

To come back to the two crucial elements of the new DPP that were to be the panacea for the corruption itch. We are forced to look at a foreign supplier primarily because while we boast of the largest aeronautical industry in Asia, we have no worthwhile aerospace vision or strategy to guide it. It remains content with low technology licence manufacturers as contracts come its way. International companies are delighted with this status quo, as the alternative of a vibrant Indian aeronautics industry would prove to be a major competitor.

The second element, that of allowing a foreign supplier to choose its Indian partner, has now been invoked. This innocuous change in procedure reveals far less than what it hides. In actual practice, it is a major departure of policy, which has strategic consequences not just for Indian aerospace but for national security and the economy itself. On the one hand, even civil airlines need to clear their aircraft import requirements with the aviation ministry. On the other hand, the MoD now permits a foreign supplier of military aircraft to choose its manufacturing partner in the open market in a sector of strategic importance.

As is known, the IAF’s medium multi-role aircraft requirement was finally decided in favour of the French Rafale. One of the points of contention during negotiations is reported to be the supplier’s desire to execute the Indian part of the contract through an Indian private company of its choice against the tender requirements of using Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Had the tender been floated today, this would have been perfectly in order. Understandably, there is reluctance on the part of the MoD because allowing such a deviation could well draw protests from the competitors who had lost.

If the MoD genuinely believes that going through the private route is beneficial for the larger national good, why should it not have the right to do so? But herein lies the rub. We can only attempt such a bold departure if we are surefooted and capable of working out an aeronautical strategy born out of a national vision. If we believe in substituting procedures for policy, the future of our aeronautics industry will be bleak. The former are processes to implement policies and can change to suit changing needs. The latter has long-term goals, and should evolve out of an aeronautical industrial strategy. Can a decision as far-reaching as permitting a foreign military aircraft vendor to choose its own Indian private partner be taken as a matter of procedure without weighing its complex consequences? Do we sincerely believe that the market values national security interest above its bottom line?

If we are to go by the logic enunciated by the defence minister, we now have not one flank to guard against potential corruption, but two. Competition among foreign suppliers with the ghost of agents behind every bush and Indian corporate partners of foreign suppliers peddling influence in the labyrinthine corridors of New Delhi where crony capitalism abounds.

The global security and economic climate today is extremely challenging. The international arms market is far more global and integrated, R&D costs involved in producing high-technology weapon systems have escalated sharply and defence budgets across the globe are coming under strain. This has resulted in considerable rationalization of defence industries within the traditional arms-exporting nations and their desire to form mutual partnerships within and outside their countries. A similar push to rationalize and make our aeronautical industry and associated R&D more efficient and open to the private sector should be drawing strategic attention.

Indigenization of the aeronautical industry cannot, however, be driven by a lowly desire to curb corruption, but one born out of the need for a dynamic and internationally competitive aeronautics industry. This requires a well-calibrated strategy that takes into consideration the complex ingredients that go into the making of a strategic air power.

The challenge is not unique to India. Such a change in the United States of America was overseen by Jacques Gansler, the under-secretary of defence for acquisition and technology in the Bill Clinton administration, who, earlier, had said, “In order to understand the economic operation of the US defence industry, it is first absolutely essential to recognize that there is no free market at work in this area and that there cannot be one because of the dominant role played by the federal government. The combination of a single buyer, a few large firms in each segment of the industry, and a small number of extremely expensive weapons programmes constitute a unique structure for doing business.” This aptly sums up the challenge to governments and aeronautical industries across the globe — how to keep this unique structure for doing business finely balanced between free markets on the one hand and State control on the other.

In 2004, the Aeronautical Society of India had submitted a proposal for an overarching national aeronautics policy, along with a supporting organization, with a view to accord national aeronautics the status of a national mission, bringing it on the international stage as an equal partner rather than a perennial buyer. If there is one lesson that emerges from the current scene, it is that this dormant proposal needs a long, hard look.

It has been widely reported that when the former army chief broke the news to the defence minister of a bribe being offered on behalf of a defence PSU, the minister had buried his head in his hands. The MoD should not bury its head in the sand and believe that formulating newer DPPs will help meet the humungous challenges facing India’s defence industrial complex.

“Even if the founder of the post-independence dynasty, Jawaharlal Nehru may have emerged in bad light in the Henderson Brooks Report, why put a blanket on the entire archives? Are we living in a modern democracy?

…if one day a stable, confident and relaxed government in New Delhi should, miraculously appear and decide to clear out the cupboard and publish it, the text would be largely incomprehensible…” Neville Maxwell

                           Neville Maxwell: the Authority on the 1962 Conflict

On February 23, 1972 in Beijing, an interesting discussion took place between Richard Nixon, the US President; Dr. Henry Kissinger1, John Holdridge2, Winston Lord3 and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.

The Premier opened discussion about the Panchsheel Agreement4: “Actually the five principles were put forward by us, and Nehru agreed5. But later on he didn’t implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned a book6 by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.”

The US President immediately retorted: “I read the book”.

Mr Antony claimed that the report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.”

After Kissinger said it was he who gave it to the President, Nixon explained: “I committed a faux pas — Dr Kissinger said it was — but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the war [1971 Bangladesh Liberation War], I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn’t react very favorably when I said that.” Zhou burst into laughter: “Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn’t a faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev.7”

“…President Nixon then asked Zhou what Khrushchev had told him. The Premier answered to the Soviet leader’s argument was: “The casualties on the Indian side were greater than yours, so that’s why I believe they were victims of aggression.”

Zhou remarked: “If the side with the most casualties is to be considered the victim of aggression, what logic would that be? For example, at the end of the Second World War, Hitler’s troops were all casualties or taken prisoner, and that means that Hitler was the victim of aggression. They just don’t listen to reason.”

Then he quoted again Neville Maxwell who “mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused.

He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out. You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.”

Thus spoke Zhou Enlai in 1972, giving the Chinese version of the 1962 War, based on the writings of Neville Maxwell.

The Most Well-kept Secret Since Independence

While the information contained in Maxwell’s book originates from the Herderson Brooks Report of the 1962 debacle, this document is today the most well-kept secret of the Indian government.

Does it make sense that an episode commented on by Heads of State of the United States and China in the 1970’s, is still hidden from the Indian public in 2010?

It seems that the official answer is ‘yes’.

In 2008, the Defense Minister, Mr AK Antony told the Indian Parliament that the Herderson Brooks could not be declassified. Mr Antony claimed that the report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.”

At first sight it seems strange that this 47 year-old report is still of ‘operational value’. The officials who drafted the minister’s reply may not be aware that another report, the Official History of the Conflict with China (1962)8 prepared by the same Defense Ministry, details the famous ‘operations’ in 474 foolscap pages.

Amongst other things, the ‘official’ Report pointed to the real issue: “No major security threat other than from Pakistan was perceived. And the armed forces were regarded adequate to meet Pakistan’s threat. Hence very little effort and resources were put in for immediate strengthening of the security of the borders.”

Nobody had even thought of China!

The man quoted by Zhou Enlai, Neville Maxwell was the South Asia correspondent for The Times in 1962. He is one of the very few persons to have had (unauthorized) access to the report.

Maxwell commented on Antony’s statement: “Those reasons are completely untrue and quite nonsensical …there is nothing in it concerning tactics or strategy or military action that has any relevance to today’s strategic situation.”

It is worth going deeper into the issue.

What is the Henderson Brooks Report?

A book can help us to understand the background of the Herderson Brooks Report. Between 1962 and 1965, RD Pradhan was the Private Secretary of YB Chavan9 who took over as Defence Minister from the disgraced Krishna Menon after the debacle of October 1962.

Pradhan’s memoirs10, give great insights on the reasoning of the then Defence Minister who ordered the report: “For Chavan the main challenge in the first years was to establish relationship of trust between himself and the Prime Minister. He succeeded in doing so by his deft-handling of the Henderson Brooks’ Report of Inquiry into the NEFA11 reverses.”

Pradhan continues:

[Chavan] learnt some ‘lessons’ that helped him in the conduct of the 1965 Indo-Pak War. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the Herderson Brooks Report which remains an extremely closely guarded secret till this date12.

Contrary to general expectations the report did not directly indict any political leaders. It was done obliquely.

During one of the debates [in Parliament], the Prime Minister has assured the Parliament that an inquiry will be held into the debacle. After much deliberation, Chavan proposed an inquiry by a committee of two serving army officers rather than a judicial probe or a public enquiry as expected by the Parliament. Further instead of the Defense Minister appointing a committee, he asked the Chief of the Army Staff13 to set-up the same. Accordingly, a two-man committee with Lieutenant General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat was formed. Both officers had impeccable record of service. Henderson Brooks, an Australian national, had opted to serve the Indian Army after partition and Prem Bhagat was the first Indian officer to be conferred the Victoria Cross during World War II for bravery on the battle field. Their report was presented by the COAS to Chavan in July 2, 1963. The report contained a great deal of information of an operational nature, formations and deployment of the Indian Army.”

As mentioned earlier, the operations are described in greater detail in the Official History of the Conflict with China (1962).14

But Pradhan explains further: “In 1965, it was considered too sensitive to be made public and although outdated today, the report unfortunately remains secret. Pradhan says that he is the only person alive15 who had examined the report16.

The Private Secretary elaborated on the Defence Minister’s sentiments during the following months: “During the conduct of the enquiry Chavan was apprehensive that the committee may cast aspersions on the role of the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister.”

The art of war teach us not to rely on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him”¦

“His main worry was to find ways to defend the government and at the same time to ensure that the morale of the armed forces was not further adversely affected. For that he repeatedly emphasized in the Parliament that that the enquiry was a fact-finding one and to ‘learn lessons’ for the future and it was not a ‘witch-hunt’ to identify and to punish the officers responsible for the debacle.

It was a tribute to his sagacity and political maturity that he performed his role to the full satisfaction of the Parliament and also earned the gratitude of the Prime Minister. Some lessons that he learnt are be found in the statement he presented to the Parliament. But it is also a fact that while doing so, he also suppressed certain critical observations. A few words about those might throw light on Chavan’s conduct at political level in the 1965 war.

Contrary to general expectations the report did not directly indict any political leaders. It was done obliquely. On the lack of proper political direction, the committee quoted British India’s first Commander in Chief Field Marshal Robert’s dictum: “The art of war teach us not to rely on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; nor on the chance of not attacking but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable”.

There was another observation: “the Higher Direction of War and the actual command set-up of the Army were obviously out of touch with reality”. In a way, this was an indirect indictment of the political leadership and the manner in which the operations in NEFA had been handled. Chavan found these observations a very harsh judgment on Pandit Nehru’s handling of India’s relations with the People’s Republic of China and for which many felt at that time that he was so much wedded to the Panchsheel that he refused to believe that China had some other intentions. By accepting that comment publicly, he did not want to cause any more anguish to the Prime Minister who was already shattered by the perfidy of the China’s leadership in subscribing to the Panchsheel but all the time preparing to attack India.

The fact that “the report was a great education for the novice defence minister” is important to keep in mind, because it was the main purpose of the work of Herderson Brooks and Bhagat.

The Facts

On April 1, 1963 in reply to a question, the Defence Minister announced in Parliament that an inquiry into the conflict in NEFA had been instituted: “Thorough investigation had been ordered to find out what went wrong with:

For Chavan the main challenge in the first years was to establish relationship of trust between himself and the Prime Minister. He succeeded in doing so by his deft-handling of the Henderson Brooks Report”¦”

There was no question of witch-hunting; the Report was just to help “derive military lessons” and “bring out clearly what were the mistakes or deficiencies in the past, so as to ensure that in future such mistakes are not repeated and such deficiencies are quickly made up”

The Defence Minister affirmed that the Army Headquarters had already [in April 1963] learned “from their observations — there are competent people there, professionally very able people — made their own studies about the problems and drawn certain lessons and efforts are being made on the basis of those lessons…”

He added that it was necessary to “improve the quality of planning for the campaigns and those well-thought-out plans will have to be backed by logistic supplies rather well-prepared in advance”.

He specifically mentioned the importance to have a closer understanding, collaboration and cooperation between the Army and the Air Force. He also said that “the physiological and psychological problems of acclimatization of troops at high altitudes were seriously engaging the attention of the Government”.

He pointed out that the Indian Army was “traditionally… trained and taught to think in terms of fighting on plains”, adding that closest relationship between officers and men were now being inculcated.

He stressed the importance of an intelligence system for the Army, “the machinery for intelligence cannot be created overnight. It required very thorough planning. It is a very complicated process… There is a feeling that there is no intelligence system in our country. Possibly this is a misunderstanding. There is a very effectively working intelligence system in India… We can claim to have our own eyes”.

The House was also informed that a chain of airfields was being constructed at various places of strategic importance.

The Inquiry Report17 was submitted to the Chief of the Army Staff on May 12. 1963. It was finally handed over to the Defence Minister on July 2.

At that time, Chavan stated in Parliament that the “the contents were not disclosed for considerations of security” and because they were likely to “affect the morale of those entrusted with safeguarding the security of our borders”.

On September 2, 1963, the Defence Minister spoke again and disclosed that the Inquiry Committee had not confined its investigations to the operations in NEFA alone but examined the “development and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the Army at the outbreak of hostility”. Further, a detailed review of the actual operations both in Ladakh and NEFA had been carried out “with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of our troops”.

It is clear that the decision of Lt. Gen. Herderson Brooks and Brig. Bhagat to go into “development and events prior to hostilities as also the plans” embarrassed the Government18.

Summary of the Recommendations of the Report

In the Parliament, Chavan gave a summary of the main recommendations of the Report:

Training

It was found that “our basic training was sound and soldiers adapted themselves to the mountains adequately”. But troops had not been prepared for a war with China and hence they had “not requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics and ways of war, their weapons, equipment and capabilities”.

There was “an overall shortage of equipment both for training and during operations”,

“Toughening and battle inoculations” were recommended, as also training in leadership” and correct “concept of mountain warfare”.

Equipment

There was “an overall shortage of equipment both for training and during operations”, though “the difficulty in many cases was that while the equipment could be reached to the last point in the plains or even beyond it, it was another matter to reach it in time, mostly by air or by animal or human transport, to the forward formations who took the brunt of fighting”. It further noted: “The speed with which troops were inducted from the plains to high altitudes and the lack of proper roads and other means of communication — road transport was both inadequate and weak for the steep gradients in mountainous terrain — added to the problems of logistics”. It was nevertheless stated that “our weapons were adequate to fight the Chinese and compared favourably with theirs”.

It was recommended that the deficiency in equipment, particularly equipment required for mountain warfare be made up and the modes of communication which could make the equipment available to the troops at the right place and at the right time be improved.

System of Command

‘Basically’ nothing was wrong with the system and chain of Command provided it was exercised in the accepted manner at various levels. It was revealed that “during the operations difficulties arose only when there was departure from accepted chain of Command”. Such departures occurred mainly owing to “haste and lack or adequate prior planning”. The Inquiry revealed “the practice that crept in the higher Army formations of interfering in tactical details even to the extent of detailing troops for specified tasks”.

Maxwell will elucidates about this tactical aspect.

Physical Fitness of Troops

It was encouraging to find that “our troops, both officers and men) stood the rigours of the climate, although most of them were rushed at short notice from plains. But it was stated “they were not acclimatized to fight at the heights at which some of them were asked to make a stand”.

Capacity of our Commanders

By and large, it was found that the “general standard amongst the junior officers was fair… At Brigade level, but for the odd exception, commanders were able to adequately exercise their command. It was at higher levels that shortcomings became more apparent.19 It was also revealed that some of the higher commanders did not depend enough on the initiative of the lower commanders…”

“ He (Chavan) also earned kudos of his service chiefs for not carrying “˜witch-hunt. His relation of mutual trust to each one of them was crucial to conduct the 1965 War as evidenced in his Diary.”

The Inquiry spent time on the question of military intelligence and procedures and higher direction of operations. The Committee’s conclusions were that “the collection of intelligence in general was not satisfactory. The acquisition of intelligence was slow and the reporting of it vague… The evaluation may not have been accurate”.

The field formations had little guidance on the Chinese build-up and troop deployment and movements. The Report further stressed that “much more attention will have to be given, than was done in the past, in the work and procedures of the General Staff at the Services Headquarters, as well as in the Command Headquarters and below, to long-term operational planning, including logistics as well as to the problems of co-ordination between various Services Headquarters “.

The Defence Minister told the Members of the Parliament that the reverses suffered by the Army during the 1962 operations were “due to a variety of causes and weaknesses”. The Chinese attack “was so sudden and in such remote and isolated sectors that the Indian Army as a whole was really not tested. In that period of less than two months… only about 24.000 of our troops were actually involved in fighting”.

Chavan also pointed out that in both Ladakh and Walong troops, fought with daring and courage20.

A week later the Defence Minister presented to Parliament a 3,500 word statement on defence preparedness. He confirmed that the “expansion of armed forces, expansion of their training facilities, modernization of their equipment and re-fitting them to step-up their operational efficiency’ was in progress.21

Forty-Seven Years Later

Today the Government is breaking its own laws to keep the Report as well as the entire corpus of related diplomatic correspondence, notes, briefings, and reports under wraps. Why?

Even if the founder of the post-independence dynasty, Jawaharlal Nehru may have emerged in bad light in the Herderson Brooks Report, why put a blanket on the entire archives?22 Are we living in a modern democracy?

While Wikileaks daily provides us with fascinating details of the present NATO Af-Pak policy, the Government in Delhi is stuck on its antediluvian position; India is today one of the few nations which refuses to declassify archival material and this despite the fact that in 2005, the Right to Information Act was passed with fanfare by the Indian Parliament. In fact the law seems to have indirectly helped those who do not want India’s history to be known.

Article 8(1)(a) says: “There shall be no obligation to give any citizen, (a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offense.”

He (Chavan) stressed the importance of an intelligence system for the Army, “the machinery for intelligence cannot be created overnight. It required very thorough planning”¦”

For the past 45 years, this theory has gone around not only amongst the Chinese and US leaders23 but also some Indian intellectuals, that the conflict was triggered by Nehru’s policies, more particularly his Forward Policy.

Maxwell admits: “the report includes no surprises and its publication would be of little significance but for the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a 1962 Chinese ‘aggression’. It seems likely now that the report will never be released. Furthermore, if one day a stable, confident and relaxed government in New Delhi should, miraculously appear and decide to clear out the cupboard and publish it, the text would be largely incomprehensible, the context, well known to the authors and therefore not spelled out, being now forgotten.”

Notwithstanding the fact that the British journalist believes that nobody has enough knowledge today to understand the background of the 1962 War, it is probably a fact that the Report itself does not contain anything really new24.

In his Introduction, Maxwell first goes into the ‘Origins of Border Conflict’ and explains: “But in the Indian political perspective war with China was deemed unthinkable and through the 1950s New Delhi’s defence planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only ‘thinkable’ but inevitable. From the first days of India’s independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India’s inheritance.”

Nobody disagrees with the first part of this statement: in the government circles, a conflict with China was unthinkable in the 1950’s25, but it is a wrong interpretation of the history to say that India “adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only ‘thinkable’ but inevitable”. India merely took steps to defend her borders.

Nehru was naive, in the early 1950, he thought that there was no border issue. It was not the case for his Chinese counterpart.

I have written elsewhere on the issues of the Sino-Indian border dispute26, which, for Nehru was not ‘disputed’ or even ‘disputable’. Nehru was naïve, in the early 1950’s, he thought that there was no border issue. It was not the case for his Chinese counterpart. It is enough to quote the words of Zhou Enlai when the Panchsheel Agreement on Tibet was signed in April 1954, the Premier said: “all the issues ripe for settlement had been solved”. In other words, Zhou knew that the border issue was ‘unresolved’. The problem was not due to ‘India’s inheritance’ as Maxwell put it, but to Communist China’s new territorial claims, unknown to Nehru in 1954.