Indian Defence Review

The visit of President Ram Nath Kovind to Djibouti (October 3 -4) is the first ever high level political visit by an Indian leader to that small nation in the Horn of Africa. While India has old, traditional trade-related linkages with this former French colony that attained independence in 1977, current political and diplomatic contact has been limited. Thus Kovind’s visit  marks the emergence of  Djibouti on the Indian radar, albeit in a modest manner. 

Djibouti is a small nation with a population under one million and an area of 23,000 sq. km. (similar to Rwanda) but few natural resources. Often referred to as an ‘oasis of stability’ in a turbulent region, its neighbours Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland and their recent political history provide the contrast.

The strategic significance of Djibouti is inversely proportional to its small demography and derives from its geographical location at the entrance to the Red Sea and proximity to the Gulf of Aden. The maritime connectivity and related trade relevance that this location accords has been acknowledged over centuries and Djibouti has become a nation of relevance for most major powers.

The Djibouti government is deeply cognizant of the advantages that accrue to it due to geography and has been leasing its real-estate to external entities in a pragmatic manner. Thus, six countries have varying degrees of military presence in Djibouti – the largest being the 4,000 strong US troop deployment in the only permanent military base that the Pentagon has in Africa.  Other nations include France, Britain, Italy, Japan and, most recently China, which commissioned its first overseas military ‘support’ facility in the Horn of Africa in July 2017. India has now made its first substantive political contact with Djibouti and is likely to progressively enhance its engagement.

During the Kovind meeting with his counterpart President Ismail Omar Guelleh, reference was made to maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the options for Delhi to enable Djibouti in capacity building in certain niche areas that could generate local employment. India may not immediately emulate the USA, China and France in stationing military personnel in Djibouti in a sizeable manner. Yet the strategic importance of the extended Indo-Pacific maritime domain (that links the Red Sea through the Malacca strait to East Asia) for the major powers is reflected in the way the Horn of Africa has become such a sought after destination for extra-regional powers.

While the USA and its allies including France and Britain have a century old inheritance by way of their political presence in the littoral and Indian Ocean islands, China is the most recent entrant to the IOR.  The strategic compulsion driving Beijing is evidenced in the high degree of importance accorded to the One Belt-One Road (OBOR or Belt Road Initiative) by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his core team. This macro rail-road-sea connectivity project envisions a total transformation of the existing trade connectivity links in critical parts of Asia, Africa and Europe; the Horn of Africa is a critical node in this ambitious endeavour.

The challenge for India, which has voiced its reservations about OBOR, will be in arriving at an astute determination about Beijing’s intent in either jeopardizing or inhibiting Delhi’s pursuit of its own national interest in the extended IOR. China has been steadily increasing its footprint among the Indian Ocean island nations and Maldives is a case in point.

Diego Garcia and Djibouti already offer the USA the equivalent of permanent aircraft carriers in the IOR and Beijing has its own anxiety about US military-maritime presence that is distilled as the Malacca dilemma. The Indian presidential visit would suggest that Delhi is not oblivious to the strategic index currently accorded to Djibouti, but how this will be concretised remains a work in progress and will be closely watched in the neighbourhood and beyond.

Courtesy: First published on www.southasiamonitor.org