The idea of Pakistan survives on the premise of enmity towards India. This premise came into existence well before Pakistan became a reality. Some in Pakistan believe that the country started incubating the moment the first Muslim stepped on the soil of the subcontinent. That belief originates from the conviction that the Islamic civilisation cannot intermingle with another civilisation because it always seeks to conquer and subjugate. That is how Islam has spread all across the world from a tiny enclave in the desert of Arabia, destroying frontiers, borders, kingdoms, empires, traditions, cultures and civilisations.

Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan was not based on any theological attachment. He simply wanted a territory where Muslims would not be outnumbered by non Muslims...

The Muslim rulers of India could not overwhelm the indigenous culture. Therefore, the Islamic and non Islamic communities lived their lives in a milieu of uneasy coexistence. The British arrived on the scene and could make no impact on the prevailing realities. The two communities, while maintaining a broad harmony, did not allow customary sociological and religious barriers to be crossed. The impetus for this mainly came from those who were the descendants of the outsiders, the Ashrafs. At the same time they were keen to resurrect the glory of the Mughal empire. Their effort in this direction has been labelled as the first war of independence in 1857.

From another perspective, this mutiny was the first Islamist war in India. It was basically a military uprising against the British but it became a magnet for many Islamists to come together to bring back the Muslim rule to India. The debacle of the mutiny led subsequently to the creation of the Islamist Deoband movement and the establishment of an institution at Deoband for propagating Islamic fundamentalist interpretations. After Pakistan’s creation its descendant, the Pakistani Deoband movement, became the fountainhead of jihad.

Ever since, Pakistan has wallowed in its hate for India. Therefore, from day one, its leadership has been looking for ways and means to diminish India and to destroy it, if possible.

Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan was not based on any theological attachment. He simply wanted a territory where Muslims would not be outnumbered by non Muslims who might otherwise dominate over them. Thus, a fear of the majority which had at its root a hatred for the majority was the prime mover for Pakistan. Unfortunately the horrific carnages at the time of the partition of India in 1947 and the agony resulting from population movements magnified these visceral sentiments. Ever since, Pakistan has wallowed in its hate for India. Therefore, from day one, its leadership has been looking for ways and means to diminish India and to destroy it, if possible.

Pakistan has followed many strategies to achieve this end. The tribal incursion it engineered in 1947 in J&K was the first of the many wars it unleashed against India. It lost each one of them – in 1965, 1971 and Kargil, 1999. Each loss made it determined to do more and better next time. The thinking, of some senior generals like former chief of army staff Jehangir Karamat, that war alone could solve India-Pakistan problems has never been abandoned. The drive for parity with India remains despite growing evidence that geography and demography cannot support such ambitions. These wars disclosed the pattern in decision making: the decisions were taken by a coterie without involving the army brass, the navy, the air force, the foreign office or civilian leaders. The pros and cons, including international reactions, were never been fully assessed. Individual impulse by and large seemed to have been the trigger in each case, inevitably, ending in failure.

The Pakistan nuclear weapons programme is now focused on evolving tactical nuclear weapons, designed as an antidote to India’s Cold Start strategy.

This mindset resulted in Pakistan landing up in the lap of the US in the early stages of the Cold War between the Soviets and US. In 1955 Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO, and received extensive military hardware like Patton tanks for defending itself against possible onslaughts of international communism. However, the unstated Pakistani intentions were to strengthen its military to counter India. Pakistan’s 1965 war against India was undertaken on the comfort of these supplies. When the US failed to meet Pakistan’s subsequent expectations Pakistan moved closer to China after the 1962 Indo-China war. In the following years the anti communist Pakistan became China’s closest ally and China its chief source of arms supplies. The common point of agreement was containment of India.

The 1971 war again proved that Pakistan was no match for India. The war brought a regime change in Pakistan with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becoming the new President. Bhutto was convinced that only a nuclear arsenal could bring safety and security to Pakistan. A crash nuclear weapons development programme was launched and China readily agreed to be the source of nuclear weapon technology and other know-how. It furnished the design of an early atom bomb to Pakistan - which it developed and China offered its Lopnor facility for testing it. China has now become the mainstay of Pakistan in various nuclear energy related programmes, with China circumventing international nuclear policy agreements to assist Pakistan. China also put Pakistan in touch with North Korea from where it obtained advanced missile technology which has enabled it to develop delivery weapons, with nuclear tips, capable of hitting any Indian city. The Pakistan nuclear weapons programme is now focused on evolving tactical nuclear weapons, designed as an antidote to India’s Cold Start strategy. It is now estimated that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is growing at the fastest pace in the world creating anxieties for all nations that cherish non-proliferation.

It is now estimated that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is growing at the fastest pace in the world creating anxieties for all nations that cherish non-proliferation.

The anxieties arise because Pakistan has been the biggest and the most dangerous proliferator ever since nuclear weapons were developed. Apart from providing nuclear centrifuge technology to North Korea, as a quid pro quo for advanced technology for developing long range missiles, Pakistan has considered transferring the know how to other Muslim nations like Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Actually it did sell centrifuge technology to Iran and Libya. Pakistan saw its bomb not merely as a bulwark for its own defence but also as an Islamic bomb, for safeguarding Islamic interests in other parts of the world. The Islamic bomb would primarily target Israel but would could come in handy against any nation identified as an enemy of Islam.

Pakistan does not subscribe to the ‘No First Use’ doctrine and has at least on four occasions, considered a nuclear strike against India. The first was in mid 1980s when Pakistan apprehended a joint attack on the Kahuta enrichment plant by Israel and India. Operation Brasstacks in 1986-87 was the trigger for the second. The third was in April-May 1990 when Pakistan expected that the insurgency supported by it in J&K would invite retaliation by a massive IAF air strike that would target training camps in POK. The seriousness of Pakistani intentions can be judged from the fact that it sent its foreign minister, Sahabzada Yakub Khan, to convey a veiled threat to his Indian counterpart, Inder Kumar Gujral. The Americans were so alarmed by Pakistani actions that they dispatched their deputy national security advisor Robert Gates to Islamabad to read out the riot act to them. Gates thereafter svisited India also but did not disclose the reason for his mission to Pakistan. India thus remained unaware that a nuclear Armageddon had just been averted.

The Kargil war of 1999 was the fourth occasion. It was President Bill Clinton who on July 4 warned the visiting Pak PM Nawaz Sharif against his army’s plans to use its nuclear arsenal against India in this war. Two conclusions are manifest from these episodes: one, the Pakistani military leadership is quick to put its finger on the nuclear trigger; and two, it takes such decisions alone. All the nuclear triggers in the National Command Control are under the control of the chief of army staff as if he is also the principal executive of the government. With a creeping jihad mentality in the Pak military, how their leadership will handle their nuclear arsenal in the event of another crisis remains an imponderable.

The ISI commenced training of Kashmiris in the Afghan camps from 1983. A part of funding from US and Saudi Arabia was quietly diverted to the financing of the training and upkeep of Kashmiris.

However, it is the asymmetric proxy war of Pakistan against India, orchestrated by the ISI, which is acquiring dangerous proportions. The objectives of the ISI are synchronous with those of the military leadership i.e. to destabilise and destroy India. The ISI has gone about it in a methodical manner. It has identified the fault lines of India and is seeking to aggravate them. The war in Afghanistan created opportunities galore for them.

The Durand Line which marks an international border through the heart of the Pakistani tribal territory had strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the latter’s inception in 1947. The Pakistani Intelligence apparatus had, therefore, maintained close links with the Afghan Pashtuns. When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Pakistan, aided by US and Saudi Arabia, supported the Afghan Mujahidin. Thus commenced the jihad in Afghanistan with the Pakistani ISI in the lead, and exercising exclusive control on the flow of arms and finances received from US and Saudi Arabia for the Mujahidin. It has been estimated that 80000 to 90000 trainees had been imparted skills in terror warfare at these camps by the time the Soviets moved out of the country.

The Pakistani military leadership was quick to recognise the potential of these cadres for unleashing an insurgency in Kashmir. The ISI, already in charge of the Afghan operations, was instructed to do the ground work for Kashmir. The ISI commenced training of Kashmiris in the Afghan camps from 1983. A part of funding from US and Saudi Arabia was quietly diverted to the financing of the training and upkeep of Kashmiris.