Historically, Afghanistan has been the most difficult country for military campaigns and equally difficult to govern. The nature of terrain, the climate and the tribes that inhabit the land make an amalgam of harshness and lawlessness. The “Great Game” of the British ended in a woeful failure. Then the Russians had to beat a humiliating retreat. And now, after a decade-long struggle, the US and its allies, too, are preparing to bid goodbye without leaving behind any trace of peace and stability.

The Pakistan military has always dreamt of exercising control over Kabul, albeit through its proxies, and of acquiring strategic depth...

The recently concluded strategic accord between India and Afghanistan covers wide-ranging areas of trade, infrastructure, creation of facilities to exploit minerals and hydrocarbons, education, etc. More importantly, India will now be involved in training and equipping the Afghan national security forces. There will also be regular political contacts and cooperation at the United Nations. This agreement has vastly enlarged the scope of cooperation between India and Afghanistan and, understandably, raised eyebrows in Pakistan.

India training the Afghan security forces and the use of the term “strategic alliance” conjure up Pakistan’s worst fears, more than all the other provisions in the agreement. The Pakistan military has always dreamt of exercising control over Kabul, albeit through its proxies, and of acquiring “strategic depth” against its perceived enemy. The possibility of this perceived enemy gaining considerable influence in Kabul is an anathema to Pakistan. Speaking to David Bradlay of the Atlantic Media Company, Gen Pervez Musharraf reflected the Pakistan military’s view when he said, “In Afghanistan, there has been a kind of proxy conflict going on between Pakistan and India. India is trying to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan and has the vision to dominate the region and weaken Pakistan.”

President Obama and former President Clinton, too, have warned Pakistan against this duality in its stance.

President Hamid Karzai’s writ does not run in most parts of Afghanistan. He has failed to persuade the Taliban to agree to participate in a peace dialogue. The recent killing of ex-President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was appointed by Karzai as an interlocutor with the Taliban, is an indication that the latter are not willing to accommodate Karzai in any future political dispensation. Pakistan’s own designs and its backing of the Haqqani group is a factor that will inevitably play its full course after the US-led NATO troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan’s obsession with “strategic depth”, flawed as it may be, is the very raison d’etre of its Afghan policy. It would not like India to fish in what Pakistan considers its backwaters. Pakistan has had an inalienable relationship with the Taliban and other extremist organisations. It has travelled too far down the terrorist highway to pull back.

American frustration with Pakistan’s continued support to the Haqqani network finally came into the open when Admiral Mike Mullen accused Islamabad of playing a “double game” of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. President Obama and former President Clinton, too, have warned Pakistan against this duality in its stance. At some point America will distance itself from Pakistan and cut down its aid which will impact Rawalpindi, but may not be able to dissuade it to delink itself from the Taliban. On the other hand, it will drive it more and more into the arms of China.

While Pakistan is likely to view the Indian alliance with Afghanistan as an attempt to squeeze it from two sides, China may feel that its plan for the exploitation of Afghan mineral wealth will be in jeopardy.

Establishing a Taliban regime in Kabul gives Pakistan the added advantage in that Afghanistan would have neither the influence nor power to aggressively assert its historical claims to territories seized from the defeated Afghan rulers by the Imperial British power, which termed this new boundary as the Durand Line.

While Pakistan is likely to view the Indian alliance with Afghanistan as an attempt to squeeze it from two sides, China may feel that its plan for the exploitation of Afghan mineral wealth will be in jeopardy. China has already got a contract for copper mines in Afghanistan and is now extracting this valuable mineral. It is also exploring the possibility of more such contracts. Moreover, China will be loathe at the prospect of spread of Indian influence in this important region. China’s relentless quest for hydrocarbons and minerals would seek to negate Indian influence in the region for obvious reasons.

On its part, India does not have the capacity and the will to carry through this strategic alliance with Afghanistan, especially when Pakistan, in cahoots with China, militates against it. For India there is no air or land link with Afghanistan except through Iran. The geography itself is a major roadblock against this alliance with Kabul. It will also bring to naught Dr Manmohan Singh’s persistent efforts aimed at befriending Pakistan. Flip-flop in its policy on the issue of granting the Most Favoured Nation status to India is the result of uncertainty in the direction Pakistan wants to take though it does realise the tremendous economic advantage Pakistan will draw from this trade agreement with India. In any case, India is well acquainted with the duality of Pakistan’s politics.

President Karzai has been making friendly overtures to Pakistan, calling it Afghanistan’s “twin brother”, but he does know, well enough, that amends are not possible and Pakistan has a different game plan in mind. With the deadline of 2014, when the bulk of the foreign troops will have left Afghanistan, approaching fast and Pakistan’s intentions being known, he has tried to latch on to the only country he could find willing to help him out. On India’s part, the contours of this alliance and their likely fallout on Pakistan have simply not been fully thought through.

Pakistan is quite unmindful of its disastrous policy of building the jihadi network and the inevitable fallout of this on itself.

Given the constraints of geography and India’s own limitations to go the whole hog with Kabul, the deal should have been purely trade-oriented. Peace in this region is in the best interests of all — Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. New Delhi can think of trans-border trade with Central Asian republics and revival of something akin to the old Silk Route only by fully involving Pakistan in this grandiose scheme. That is the reality India must come to terms with. On the other hand, China is well on its way to building trade corridors with Pakistan and the Middle East and, finally, a land bridge linking the Pacific coastline with the Atlantic.

Given the ground reality, this hopping across Pakistan and working out a strategic tie-up with Kabul is not without its own pitfalls. This alliance with Kabul will bring added pressures from China on our borders, and terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir may increase. Such are the dynamics of the geo-political realities of the region. Pakistan is quite unmindful of its disastrous policy of building the jihadi network and the inevitable fallout of this on itself.

When Maharaja Ranjit Singh was shown the map of India, he wanted to know what the area marked in red indicated. When he was told that it indicated the spread of the British, moving his hand on the rest of the map prophetically he said, “All of it will become red.” This was when his empire was at the very pinnacle of its glory. It would be no prophesy to predict that once the Americans leave Afghanistan, the Taliban, duly supported by Pakistan, will come back with a vengeance and India will be able to do little to thwart it.