China’s economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA’s military capabilities, contrasted with Taiwan’s modest defence efforts, have the effect of shifting the cross-Strait balance in Beijing’s favour. Chinese air, naval, and missile force modernization is making it increasingly critical that Taiwan strengthen its defences with a sense of urgency.

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Despite this imperative, Taiwan’s defense spending has steadily declined in real terms over the past decade. Taiwan has traditionally acquired capabilities, some asymmetric, to deter an attack by making it too costly, while buying time for international intervention. The growth of PLA capabilities is outpacing these acquisitions.

The Chinese Doctrine

Unsurprisingly, official Chinese views on potential conflict scenarios with Taiwan are difficult to come by. There is, nonetheless, a substantial body of writings produced by prominent Chinese thinkers and strategists. A recent RAND Corporation study analyzed these doctrinal writings, with their findings falling under five main strategic principles that Chinese military strategists lay out for engaging in any conflict with Taiwan that could potentially involve the United States.

Due to US Military superiority, Chinese strategists call for avoiding directs confrontation between sets of forces. This is consistent with the Chinese belief in the principle of limited strategic aims.

Seize the initiative early: The Chinese believe that surprise is important to maintain the initiative by forcing an adversary to react to China’s moves. The chances of achieving surprise are, in turn, greatly increased by preemptive action. Preemptive action, if it can produce a decisive outcome quickly, will also prevent superior US Forces from being brought to bear. Because China believes that the United States will inevitably intervene in a conflict on Taiwan’s behalf, Chinese planners see an advantage in attacking US Force prior to engaging in such a conflict. Whatever the historical examples to the contrary, some Chinese military strategists believe that a preemptive strike that causes many US causalities and high economic costs will dissuade the United States from further engagement, because the costs restoring the status quo ante will be high

Pursue Limited Strategic Aims: China believes itself still inferior to the United States militarily, and thus calculates that its best chances of winning and securing Taiwan lie in presenting the United States with the fait accompli that avoids harming any of the United States main interests. The speed required for such an invasion thus involves the use of covert operatives and special forces to attack such critical targets as aircraft; air bases, command and control facilities communications links, fuel storage distribution, and dispensing facilities and repair and maintenance facilities.

International sanctions against Beijing, either by individual states or by groups of states, could severely damage Beijing’s economic development. An insurgency against the occupation could tie up substantial forces for years.

Strike “key points”: The need therefore is to focus on striking five key points: command systems, information systems, i.e. weapon systems, logistic systems and the linkages around these. Massive destruction in these areas might be able to prevent the United States from bringing all of its fighting strength to bear in a timely fashion and discourage it from continuing the conflict.

Avoid direct Confrontation: The Chinese believe that they stand to gain more from defeating a handful of critical defenses, such as the “key point” enunciated above, than in directly confronting US and Taiwanese troops. Due to US Military superiority, Chinese strategists call for avoiding directs confrontation between sets of forces. This is consistent with the Chinese belief in the principle of limited strategic aims.

Utilize High Technology: Chi Haotian, a former state councilor and minister of defense said: “Our strategic principles must be based on the scenario of military intervention by United States at the deployment level. We should fight a high-technology war and more importantly be prepared against the military intervention by a bloc of countries led by the United States and fight modern, high-technology war of considerable scale.”

China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait

Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it sees the tendency of events to advance that goal, or the cost of conflict outweighing the benefits. The mainland employs all instruments of power political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military at its disposal in a coercive strategy aimed at resolving the Taiwan issue in its favor. In the near term, Beijing’s focus is on preventing Taiwan from moving towards dejure independence. However, China is unwilling to rule out the use of force to achieve this objective.

The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States.

China continues to offer a peaceful resolution under the “one country, two systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland. China’s military expansion and ongoing deployment of some 710-790 short range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force. China sees the threat of force as an integral part of its overall policy to dissuade Taiwan from pursuing independence and pressuring it to unite with the mainland. Beijing, in its March 2005 “anti-secession law,” codified this threat and attempted to legitimize it through legal instruments, as part of what some Chinese military strategists refer to as “legal warfare.”

The circumstances in which Beijing has historically claimed it would use force against the island include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei; undefined moves “toward independence;” foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and internal unrest on Taiwan. These circumstances are not fixed and have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations about its political status and other actions, changes in China’s own military capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’ relations with Taiwan. China’s “red lines” are vague, which allows Beijing to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response.

Beijing’s Options for Action against Taiwan

The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States. The PLA is simultaneously developing the capability to deter and/or slow third party, including US, intervention to assist Taiwan; to defeat such intervention in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fight to a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.

PLA’s special operation forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political and military sabotage. Beijing might also believe that it could use small numbers of coordinated SRBMs and air strikes against air fields, radar and communications facilities on Taiwan...

Persuasion and Coercion: With increased economic links, Beijing enjoys increased influence on Taiwan. It seeks to attract Taiwan investment in the mainland, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait will bring prosperity. At the same time, accelerating economic integration with the mainland also makes Taiwan increasingly vulnerable to Chinese economic leverage. Beijing is Taipei’s largest trading partner. It is Taipei’s largest destination for exports and foreign direct investment and the production site for many of Taipei’s most profitable information technology exports, Beijing is attempting to exploit these ties to press Taiwanese businessmen operating on the mainland to refrain from openly supporting pro-independence parties or persons in Taiwan.

Beijing has also intensified its campaign to further constrain Taiwan’s international profile. It competes with Taiwan in the developing world for diplomatic recognition and priorities. Its activities in these regions are to erode support among Taiwan’s 25 remaining diplomatic partners. In October 2005, Senegal became the latest nation to switch recognition to Beijing. China simultaneously employs diplomatic and commercial levers including its seat on the UN Security Council to increase pressure on other states to limit their relationships with Taiwan and discourage it from making any moves towards de jure independence.

The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves as an important backdrop to the overall political, economic and diplomatic campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises, deployments and media operation all contribute to the creation of an environment of intimidation.

Limited Force Option: A campaign employing limited force option could include computer network attacks against the Taiwan’s political, military and economic infrastructure to undermine Taiwan population’s confidence in its leadership. PLA’s special operation forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political and military sabotage. Beijing might also believe that it could use small numbers of coordinated SRBMs and air strikes against air fields, radar and communications facilities on Taiwan as non-war use of force to try to push the Taiwan leadership towards accommodation. Beijing might erroneously view such non-war uses of forces as a complement to non-military coercion and believe that such strikes would not trigger a response from either Taiwan or third parties. Resort to such uses of force could quickly risk escalation to a full-fledged military conflict.

Air and Missile Campaign: Surprise SRBM attacks and precision air attacks could support a campaign designed to degrade Taiwan defences, neutralize its military and political leadership and break its will to fight before the United States and other nations could intervene. China could employ SRBM to saturate Taiwan air defense system including air bases, radar sites, missiles and communications facilities.

Blockade: Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade either as a non-war pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict. On one end of the spectrum, Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspection prior to transiting on to Taiwan.

Alternatively China could attempt the equivalent of a blockade of Taiwan ports by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic, which it did with its 1995-96 missile firings and live- fire exercise. Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as air blockades, missile attacks and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches.