In all likelihood, in collusion with Pakistan, China is all set to arrive in Afghanistan in a big way drawn essentially by the huge mineral resources there that remain unexploited and access to the future energy resources of the Central Asian Republics (CAR).

US Plans for Withdrawal

Enunciating American policy objectives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region at the end of 2009, President Obama flagged important milestones of the new US strategy. The announcement rekindled hopes for troops that were bogged down in a quagmire with prospects for retrieval that till then seemed somewhat remote. Apart from inducting 30,000 troops by way of reinforcements to scale up of the offensive against terrorism in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the President went on to speak of enhanced efforts in Afghanistan to reverse the gains by Taliban countrywide. Simultaneously, there would be concerted effort at enhancing security of the civilian population and at assisting the Afghan government to progressively develop the capability to provide for their own security and take over withdrawing American forces.

...the entire scheme to create the Taliban to dislodge the Northern Alliance from power was approved by the US as it served their interest immensely to have a strong fundamentalist force in Afghanistan to checkmate Iran especially as Saddam Hussein was no longer available.

These pronouncements were a significant climb down from the fiery rhetoric of March 2009 wherein the President defined the US goal as “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent their return to either country in future”. Perhaps the most significant component of the strategy unveiled end 2009 was the intent to begin withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. Eight months later the President turned intent into resolve when in an address to the nation on August 31, 2010, declared July 2011 as the firm date for the cessation of combat operations and the commencement of withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Taking a cue from the announcement by the American President, other member nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition are also planning to wind up from Afghanistan by 2012.

Despite the most scientifically directed war on Afghanistan for a decade conducted with overwhelming technological superiority, the aims and objectives of the US military campaign, have not been achieved. Operations by the Taliban against the US and ISAF continue unabated and despite the proclaimed elimination of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda remains as potent a threat as before. The move to withdraw US forces is therefore in no way related to the ground situation in Afghanistan but more on account of domestic policy imperatives. The precarious state of the US economy that appears to be in complete disarray and opposition at home to a war that has turned out to be prohibitively expensive and unpopular, has rendered US position in the region untenable. The process of withdrawal of US forces, albeit slow, is therefore inevitable even at the risk of it being perceived as a military defeat. As per plans made public, the exercise is expected to be completed by 2014 by which time the residual US forces numbering around 20,000, will be limited to non-combat support and advisory role.

India’s Security Concerns

The Indian policy establishment is understandably wary of the power vacuum that could engulf war-torn Afghanistan in the wake of US withdrawal if and when it actually takes place. There are apprehensions and for good reason, that the ensuing power struggle triggered by power vacuum might unleash a new wave of conflict in an ethnically diverse society and plunge the nation into prolonged instability. Policy makers in India believe that turmoil in the region could spill over with serious security implications for India.

The Indian policy establishment is understandably wary of the power vacuum that could engulf war-torn Afghanistan in the wake of US withdrawal if and when it actually takes place.

There are apprehensions that there could be a surge in the level of terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir as also in other parts of India. The question that agitates the collective mind of policy makers is whether India can afford to remain passive and a mute spectator to the developments in the region or as expected of an emerging regional power, ought to play a proactive role including military intervention to safeguard her security interests? What then are the options before India?

The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan

In an effort to decimate Al Qaeda and stabilise Afghanistan, US forces have been battling essentially the Taliban, for a decade. Ironically, it was the US working behind the scene that helped Pakistan create the Taliban whom they dislodged from power post 9/11 for perceived complicity with the Al Qaeda in the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre. The ousted Taliban regime in Kabul was replaced by Hamid Karzai who was an American choice. A Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe from the Kandahar region, Hamid Karzai, believed to have been close to the CIA, lived mostly in Pakistan after completing college education in India.

After induction of the Taliban into Kandahar in 1994, its ranks swelled rapidly to 40,000 on account of the large number of jobless but armed Pashtun Mujahideen skilled only in the art of pulling the trigger, jumping on to the bandwagon.

At the outset, it would be necessary to understand the origin of Taliban in Afghanistan and briefly recapitulate the events that have led to the current situation before proceeding further. It would also be pertinent to mention that the Taliban in Afghanistan should not be confused with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which is an entirely Pakistan-based entity that unlike the Afghan Taliban, emerged spontaneously in 2007 to pose a serious challenge to the authority of the Government of Pakistan. The TTP also referred to as Pakistan Taliban, has its own independent agenda and despite commonality in name, has no overt linkage with the Afghan Taliban.

Now back to the Afghan Taliban. In the power struggle that ensued after the fall of Russia-supported Najibullah government in April 1992, the non-Pashtun (Persian speaking) Mujahedeen groups also referred to as the Northern Alliance or the Afghan United Front, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani duly supported by his nephew Ahmad Shah Massoud and the renowned Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum, captured power in Kabul. This was the second instance in the history of Afghanistan that a non-Pashtun government usurped power in Kabul. The first time the Pashtuns were out of power was for nine months in 1929. With a non-Pashtun government firmly in the saddle in Kabul by the second half of 1992, Pakistan not only suffered erosion of its influence in Afghanistan but also was denied unimpeded access to the Central Asian Republics, something it needed badly for economic reasons. A non-Pashtun government in the seat of power in Kabul was therefore not acceptable to Pakistan as it did not in any way serve her political, strategic or economic interests. However, all efforts by her to inspire the Pashtun Mujahideen to dislodge the Rabbani government from power, proved to be futile as they were no match for the powerful Northern Alliance.

It was in the context of this political and military stalemate that in 1993, Pakistan set about creating a new force to dislodge the Northern Alliance from Kabul. This new force consisted of just 5000 young men who during the decade long Soviet occupation had grown up in the Afghan refugee camps along the Pakistan side of the border and were educated in the numerous Saudi-run religious schools known as Madrassas. Already steeped and indoctrinated in Wahabism, this group was named as Taliban (plural of ‘Talib’ meaning ‘student’) was trained, armed and equipped by the ISI and the Pakistan Army. Funds came from fundamentalist regimes in the Middle East. Complemented by officers and JCOs of Pakistan Army, the Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Omar, a veteran of the war against Soviet Union, was inducted in 1994 into Kandahar, a Pashtun stronghold. Incidentally, this was the very route followed by Nader Khan in 1929 who raised a force in India to dislodge the non-Pushtun regime Bacha-e-Saqao in Kabul.

The presence of Osama bin Laden in a military cantonment near Islamabad should dispel all doubts about Pakistan’s true position in the US-led global war against terrorism.

After induction of the Taliban into Kandahar in 1994, its ranks swelled rapidly to 40,000 on account of the large number of jobless but armed Pashtun Mujahideen skilled only in the art of pulling the trigger, jumping on to the bandwagon. The highly motivated Taliban fought their way Northwards from Kandahar, often suffering very heavy casualties in several battles against the Northern Alliance that proved disastrous for them. Sustained by an endless supply of recruits from the refugee camps in Pakistan, by 1996, the Taliban had captured Kabul and set up a very cruel and oppressive government there. Guided and supervised by Pakistan, by 1998, the Taliban had established control over 90 per cent of the territory of Afghanistan. Incidentally, as stated briefly earlier, the entire scheme to create the Taliban to dislodge the Northern Alliance from power was approved by the US as it served their interest immensely to have a strong fundamentalist force in Afghanistan to checkmate Iran especially as Saddam Hussein was no longer available. The job done, the US turned away leaving Afghanistan to its own fate; but not for long. The attack of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Centre sent the US hurtling back into the Afghan imbroglio.

The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan

Even though Pakistan has been a staunch ally of the US and a partner in the global war against terror, the campaign by US forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan has not exactly been in Pakistan’s security or strategic interests. For Pakistan, the Taliban which consists of Pashtuns, is a strategic asset through which it was able to subdue the Northern Alliance and control practically the whole of Afghanistan. But the US launched an assault on the Taliban regime in October 2001 jointly with the armed forces of the United Kingdom and the Northern Alliance to disrupt Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power. Neither of these stated objectives of the US were congruent with Pakistani interests but having joined the global war against terror under threat by the US of being “bombed into stone age”, Pakistan had no option but to pretend to collaborate with the US in their campaign against terror. Thus it was that Pakistan resorted to a policy of duplicity i.e. “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds”.

The presence of Osama bin Laden in a military cantonment near Islamabad should dispel all doubts about Pakistan’s true position in the US-led global war against terrorism. The fact that the double game by Pakistan continued for a decade reveals an incredible level of ignorance or naivety or perhaps helplessness on the part of the US. Both Pakistan and the Taliban would like to see US forces depart Afghanistan early. The US is unlikely to make any headway in the ongoing talks with Taliban as the latter are already beginning to sense victory. Besides, the US is way off the mark in trying to distinguish between what they describe as ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban. Such a categorisation is not possible as Taliban is just one entity, ‘Good’ for some, ‘Bad’ for others. The US may well be barking up the wrong tree once again.