There is an angle of the 1962Sino-Indian that conflict has been insufficiently studied. What were Beijing’s motivations to go to war? Who decided to inflict the worst possible humiliation on India?

Historical sources are still sparse, but going through some available documents, one can get a fairly good idea of the Chinese motivations or more exactly the ‘political’ compulsions which pushed the Great Helmsman into this venture.

Click for IDR subscription

Mao Temporarily Leaves the Stage

It is fashionable to speak of crimes against humanity. One of the greatest, known as the ‘Great Leap Forward’, began in China in February 1958 and resulted in the largest man-made starvation period in human history. By initiating his Leap Forward, Mao Zedong’s objective was to surpass Great Britain in industrial production within 15 years. For the purpose, every Chinese had to start producing steel at home, with a backyard furnace. In agriculture, Mao thought that very large communes would achieve manifold increase in the cereal production, turning China into a heaven of abundance. Introduced and managed with frantic fanaticism, it was not long before the program collapsed.

At the beginning of 1962, as tension was increasing on the Indian border, did Nehru realize that China was a starving nation? Very few knew that, by the end of 1961 Mao was practically out of power.

One man tried to raise his voice against the general madness and sycophancy. This was Peng Denhai, the Defence Minister and old companion of Mao during the Long March. Marshal Peng, who was a simple, honest and straightforward soldier, wrote a long personal letter to Mao on what he had seen in the countryside and the misery of the people. Mao immediately ‘purged’ old Peng; the Great Leap Forward however continued till 1961/1962. Today it is estimated that between 40 and 50 million people died of hunger in China during these three years.

At the beginning of 1962, as tension was increasing on the Indian border, did Nehru realize that China was a starving nation? Very few knew that, by the end of 1961 Mao was practically out of power.

Dr Zhisui Li, Mao’s personal physician recounts how in 1961 Mao was: “…depressed over the agricultural crisis and angry with the party elite, upon whom he was less able now to work his will, Mao was in temporary eclipse, spending most of his time in bed.”

At the beginning of the fateful year 1962, Mao’s situation had not improved. Dr Li noted: “1962 was a political turning point for Mao. In January, when he convened another expanded Central Committee work conference to discuss the continuing disaster, his support within the party was at its lowest.”

During the Conference, known as the 7,000 Cadres’ Conference, Lui Shaoqi declared: “…man-made disasters strike the whole country.” He was targeting Mao. After a month, as the meeting could not conclude, Mao decided that it was enough: he would temporarily ‘retire’.

Mao’s physician remembered: “In the summer of 1962, [Mao] emerged from his retreat. …I knew that his counter offensive was about to begin.”

The conflict with India is closely linked to his comeback.

The Three Reconciliations and One Reduction

In the early 1960’s, Wang Jiaxiang was still one of the senior-most leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Two decades earlier, he had attended Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, a Soviet institution which trained young revolutionary leaders. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Wang was appointed first as the People’s Republic of China’s Ambassador to Soviet Union, and then returned to Beijing to work in the Foreign Ministry.

Wang’s grand idea was to reconstruct China. For this, it was necessary for the People’s Republic to have a ‘softer’ foreign policy line towards the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. Wang also thought that China should spend less on ‘foreign aid’, at a time China itself was going through such difficult times. Wang believed that peaceful coexistence needed to be stressed.

His theory became known as the ‘Three Reconciliations and the One Reduction’. The three reconciliations were with the US, the Soviet Union and India and the reduction referred to unnecessary foreign expenditures.

The Chairman continued: “We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with Japan, and one with America. During none of these, did we fear. And in each case, we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us..."

Wang Jiaxiang spoke with President Liu Shaoqi who apparently agreed with him. On 27 February 1962, Wang put his thoughts in a letter to Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders. The letter was not sent to Mao who had ‘withdrawn’ after the Seven Thousand Cadres’ Conference.

Wang’s policies however became visible at the World Peace Congress held in Moscow from 9 to 14 July; according to the US scholar MacFarquhar in his Origin of the Cultural Revolution 1: “[China and Soviet Union] acted with restraint. Though both sides maintained their positions some agreements were reached.”

Regarding India, the same scholar explained: “Wang Jiaxiang seemed to be seeking at least a partial revival of the ‘Bandung line’ of the mid-1950s, according to which non-communist independent nations of the Third World were regarded as allies in the overarching struggle against imperialism.

…In his argument with Khrushchev, Mao had rejected the possibility of ‘peaceful transition’ from bourgeois regimes like Nehru’s India to proletarian dictatorship and insisted that they would have to be overthrown by revolution.”

On June 3, The People’s Daily published a rather moderate editorial on Sino-Indian relations; it was one more sign of the softer line in Beijing’s foreign policy.

Even as preparations for war were going on in Beijing, the Indian leaders were not too worried. They continued issuing orders to throw the Chinese out of the Indian territory. Unfortunately, the Indian Army was not physically equipped to implement the politicians’ order.

This policy unfortunately did not last long, mainly due to the internal power struggle and the return of the Great Helmsman, as we shall see. However, it seems obvious that the Sino-Indian conflict would have not degenerated the way it did, if Wang Jiaxiang’s policies had been followed.

Armed Coexistence, Jigsaw Pattern

The policy of the Chinese government in the initial months of 1962 followed the motto Armed Coexistence, Jigsaw Pattern. Practically, it meant that while both Armies were building their positions in the Western and Eastern sectors, the governments of China and India continued to ‘coexist’, exchanging voluminous correspondence, sometimes bitter, sometimes more conciliatory.

This jigsaw policy (opening new posts and offering negotiations) could have continued longer, at least till the winter, but this is without taking into account the ‘return of Mao’.

But Mao had decided to return to the center-stage. The occasion was the Beidaihe Conference2. Mao’s physician remembered: “In the summer of 1962, [Mao] emerged from his retreat. …I knew that his counter offensive was about to begin.” The worsening of the Sino-Indian conflict coincides with Mao’s return to the political stage in China.

Though more and more letters were exchanged between India and China, Nehru probably saw the increasingly frequent missives from Beijing as a bluff; the ‘Chinese won’t attack’ remained the leitmotiv, the ‘jigsaw’ could continue for months, he thought; in three months time, winter would settle over the Roof of the world and nothing serious could then happen.

Delhi nevertheless continued to talk of negotiations. As the Chinese ambassador Pan Zili was leaving his post in India, the Indian Prime Minister invited him for lunch. During the informal talks, Nehru confirmed that India was ready to discuss the border issue without precondition.

...“Prime Minister Nehru stated outright that on the Sino-Indian boundary question the Indian Government is following a ‘dual policy’ and intends to gain from China what it seeks to gain by political pressure, military pressure or other pressures.”

Around that time, on the sidelines of the Laos Conference in Geneva, the Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon met the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, and both decided to restart the negotiation process.

Unfortunately during a debate in the Parliament, Nehru had to backtrack on the preconditions; this probably helped Mao to insist that the Indians were unreliable.

Fire will eventually be consumed by fire

In September 1962, at the 10th Plenum of the Party’s 8th Central Committee, Mao regained the destiny of China into his hands; he denounced ‘the members of the bourgeoisie right in the party ranks’. He even attacked his mild Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. They were accused of trying to rehabilitate the intellectuals and the scientists.

In a Note dated September 13, 1962, Beijing hardened its tone vis-à-vis India. It quoted six recent incidents where India had trespassed into Chinese territory in the Ladakh sector. It cited a speech of Nehru in the Rajya Sabha on August 22 1962: “Prime Minister Nehru stated outright that on the Sino-Indian boundary question the Indian Government is following a ‘dual policy’ and intends to gain from China what it seeks to gain by political pressure, military pressure or other pressures.”

Though both parties continued to speak of negotiations, it was no longer under the same terms.

Around that time, Mao said that the Indians had been pressing the Chinese along the border for three years: “if they try it a fourth year then China will strike back,” he warned.

Internal Situation

By early October, Mao was again in total control of events and people in Beijing. He was assisted by his submissive servitor, Zhou Enlai and his new protégé and the heir apparent, Defence Minister Lin Biao. Several other leaders participated in the decision to ‘slap’ India. Some of the decisive meetings were attended not only Liu Shaoqi, still Chairman of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping but perhaps more importantly Marshals Liu Bocheng, He Long, and Xu Xiangqian as well as General Luo Ruiqing, the Army Chief.

Liu Bocheng was the main strategic advisor. Liu was against the idea of simply ‘throwing out’ the Indian troops from NEFA by pushing them back after ‘breaking up their attack, and surrounding them’. He wanted a more decisive victory.

Even as preparations for war were going on in Beijing, the Indian leaders were not too worried. They continued issuing orders to throw the Chinese out of the Indian territory. Unfortunately, the Indian Army was not physically equipped to implement the politicians’ order.

...the Chinese forces strictly followed the principle of not firing first, the situation in both sectors was fast deteriorating: the Indian Army had begun to concentrate troops and deploy artillery in both sectors...

Prime Minister Nehru had just left for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London, while Defence Minister Krishna Menon went to perorate at the UN in New York. By the beginning of October the Indian Army Chief was nervous; he began to insist on getting orders in writing from his political boss who lived in another world. No problem, said the Defence Minister, he would cable them from New York.

October 6: China Decides to go to War

According to the Chinese historians who wrote the history of the 1962 conflict, a first key meeting was held in early October, perhaps on October 6 in the morning.

Defence Minister and Deputy CMC chairman, Lin Biao reported about the situation in the Tibet and the Xinjiang Military Districts. Lin said that the Indians continued to advance and often opened fire on Chinese outposts; ten Chinese personnel had been killed or wounded during the last few days.

Though the Chinese forces strictly followed the principle of not firing first, the situation in both sectors was fast deteriorating: the Indian Army had begun to concentrate troops and deploy artillery in both sectors, said the Defence Minister.

Even more serious, the Chinese military intelligence had gathered that Indian forces were planning an attack on Thagla Ridge on 10 October. This information was absolutely correct, the Corps IV Commander, Lt Gen BM Kaul had planned to attack in Dhola post area on that day.

Mao then addressed his colleagues: “It seems like armed coexistence won’t work. It’s just as we expected. Nehru really wants to use force. This isn’t strange. He has always wanted to seize Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge. He thinks he can get everything he desires.”