Operation Tasha: The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted in Sri Lanka in July 1987, as per the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, to end the ethnic struggle that claimed many lives and ruined the country’s economy. Operation Pawan started with the induction of the IPKF on 29 July 1987. The de-induction started in August 1989 and the operation terminated on 24 March 1990. When the last elements withdrew, there still had been no solution to the political problem.

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Prior to the withdrawal of the IPKF5 from Sri Lanka on 23 March 1990, considerable anxiety was experienced by the State Government of Tamil Nadu in respect of likely LTTE activity in the immediate future upon termination of Ops PAWAN.

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Due to the proximity of the land masses and adjacent common fishing grounds, the Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar have been a haven for illegal trafficking of humans and material from both sides. The LTTE exploited this route freely for its logistical requirements.

IN and CG ships, operating ex-Visakhapatnam and Chennai, were deployed to provide continuous sea-borne patrol.

A formal request was made by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Ministry of Home Affairs in February 1990 for central assistance through the continuation of Naval presence in the detachment at Rameshwaram and the establishment of a Naval detachment at Point Calimere.

On 30 May 1990, the Central Government ordered the IN and the CG to institute joint patrols to interdict all undesirable activities (including influx of refugees) in the Palk Bay area, in addition to law enforcement tasks already being undertaken. In execution of Government’s directive, “Operation TASHA” was instituted on 21 June 1990. The requirement was envisaged by the Navy as a short-term requirement for 3 to 6 months and the expenditure was met from within Naval resources. Accordingly,

Prevent illegal immigration and infiltration of LTTE militants to and from Sri Lanka.

• Two Naval Detachments (NAVDETs), each deploying five trawlers hired from trade, were set up at Rameshwaram and Nagapattinam.
• The Naval Air Station which had been earlier functioning at Ramanathapuram (Ramnad) in support of the IPKF operations, was reactivated and operation of both fixed wing as well as rotary wing (helicopters) aircraft recommenced.
• IN and CG ships, operating ex-Visakhapatnam and Chennai, were deployed to provide continuous sea-borne patrol.
• Regular coordination meetings were held with the State authorities and State and Central enforcement, intelligence organisations.

Operation TASHA

An assessment-visit was made by the RM to the Palk Bay in June 1991 and the Government decided to continue the operation for a period of one year. The objectives of the operation were to:-

Prevent smuggling of arms, ammunition and contraband from the Indian mainland to Sri Lanka and vice versa.

• Prevent illegal immigration and infiltration of LTTE militants to and from Sri Lanka.
• Prevent smuggling of arms, ammunition and contraband from the Indian mainland to Sri Lanka and vice versa.
• Enforce air surveillance and seaborne patrol to curb activities of Sri Lankan Tamil militants in the Palk Bay.

Patrol activities were coordinated by Naval Detachments on the Tamil Nadu coast. The detachments hired trawlers from the fishing industry, fitted them with machine guns and utilised them for investigating boat traffic across the IMBL. Marine Commandos and a Naval diving team were positioned at selected detachments.

Patrols of the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) in the Palk Bay were carried out by shallow draft, minor war vessels (SDBs and LCUs) of the Navy and by patrol craft of the Coast Guard. Air patrols were carried out by Naval and Coast Guard aircraft and Naval helicopters.

Enhancement of Op TASHA

Consequent to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the security situation in the Palk Bay region was reviewed by the state and central government authorities. At the state level, the meetings were convened and chaired by the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and the state Government requested for enhancement of assistance for an additional short duration in June 1991.

Consequent to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the security situation in the Palk Bay region was reviewed by the state and central government authorities.

The surveillance plan envisaged a layered-concept to be executed in tandem with measures adopted by the State Government and involved:-

• Functional division of the Palk Bay region into two operational areas with Nagapattinam as Area HQ, North and Rameshwaram as Area HQ, South.
• Establishment of additional five NAVDETs along the Vedaraniyam/Palk Bay coastline at:-
  • Topputurai
  • Kodikkarai
  • Mallipattinam
  • Jagathapattinam
  • Tondi
• Deployment of five trawlers hired from trade and fitted with MMGs, from each of the seven NAVDETs with few armed naval personnel to effect close-coast patrol around the 3-metre depth-contour line.

The Naval Detachments were tasked to capture, destroy militants at sea in the Palk Bay area and assist the Tamil Nadu Govt to prevent movements of non-bonafide personnel and smuggling of contraband items in the coastal area between Karaikal and Land’s End.

• Deployment of IN/CG ships along the IBL to ensure that the five-mile “No-fishing/prohibited zone” established by the Tamil Nadu Government remained under surveillance.
• Enhancement of airborne surveillance being mounted from the Naval Air Detachment (NAVAIRDET) deployed at the Naval Air Station, Ramanathapuram (NAS Ramnad). Periodic but random aircraft sorties to be undertaken to cover the area between the 3-metre depth-contour and the IBL, as well as along the IBL.
• Augmentation of the communications network.

The Naval Detachments were tasked to capture, destroy militants at sea in the Palk Bay area and assist the Tamil Nadu Govt to prevent movements of non-bonafide personnel and smuggling of contraband items in the coastal area between Karaikal and Land’s End.

The detachments maintained the first barrier, of the three-tier surveillance of the Palk Bay area upto the IMBL, which required most intensive patrols. Each NAVDET maintained the patrol using armed trawlers in its respective area of responsibility along the three to five metre depth contour and upto six NM from the coast.

In a week, approximately 4000 trawlers were investigated and 1500 boarded by all seven detachments. The intensity of fishing operations varied from place to place but had been dense in the area around Rameshwaram.

Operational Constraints

Illegal Influx of Refugees. The escalating conflict between the Sri Lankan Army and LTTE added to the problems of the IN/CG patrols. Indian trawlers got involved in illegal ferrying of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from Talaimannar to Rameshwaram for monetary considerations. To avoid detection, these trawlers beached at night at Rameshwaram and near Adam’s Bridge where the water was shallow and naval boats could not chase them.

With the refugee influx into TN peaking in the mid 90s, the IN and CG patrols were found less effective in controlling the militant ingress along with the refugees since:-

• The SL Tamils caught in the line of fire between the LTTE and SL Army readily fled to Rameshwaram.
• Use of force against civilians during transhipment was not possible.
• Entry of illegal Tamil migrants was accepted on humanitarian grounds.
• The Police presence at the entry points was scanty.
• No effective mechanism was in place to check Indian fishermen involved in smuggling fuel (petrol, diesel, kerosene, urea used for making fertilizer bombs), contraband and human cargo. The apprehended boats were back in business within a short period.

The Kachchativu Problem. Traditionally, fishing by Indian fishermen in the waters of the Palk Bay in and around Kachchativu has remained a bone of contention between India and Sri Lanka for decades. Some fishing boats also indulged in illicit trade and transporting of personnel from Tamil Nadu to across the IMBL. Both these activities led to complaints by Indian fishermen of “harassment by the Sri Lankan Navy”. Despite adequate warnings not to cross the IMBL, the fishermen continued to do so. Consequently, an un-stated task of the Navy and the Coast Guard had been to offer some protection to Indian fishermen.6

Entry of illegal Tamil migrants was accepted on humanitarian grounds.

The Naval detachments played an active role in sensitizing Indian fishermen and educating them to desist from crossing the IMBL till such time an agreement was made between the two nations and fishing rights/permits were given. However, economic compulsions force fishermen from India and Sri Lanka to cross the IMBL to fish in each others’ territory. These attempts were spotted and foiled by the Naval Personnel on armed patrol in the area.

The Intelligence Problem. The lack of adequate intelligence in effectively combating illicit trade, gun-running and smuggling had been brought out by Mr. MK Dhar, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau:-7

The Police presence at the entry points was scanty.

“The pitiable condition of cipher breaking capability was exemplified by challenges posed by the LTTE cipher traffic between the island nation and Tamil Nadu. Some Tamil knowing officers laboured exclusively to decipher the traffic in Tamil. But they were incapable of deciphering alphanumeric, numeric and alphabetic and sign ciphers. Much crucial cipher traffic between the LTTE high command and its safe houses in the Southern Peninsula remained unbroken for months together, being tossed over between the IB, R&AW and the JCB.

The precious life of Rajiv Gandhi could have perhaps been saved had the intelligence organisation acquired the capability of breaking LTTE ciphers. Both the IB and the R&AW did not have powerful first generation computers and required software to break enemy codes.”

Organisational Structure

The overall operational and administrative control of Op TASHA was exercised by the FOC-in-C East through NOIC (TN) as the Zonal Naval Authority (ZNA). NOIC (TN) exercised its operational control on the NAVDETs through the Area Commanders, North and South. INS Adyar provided administrative support.

A post of Resident Naval Officer, Ramanathapuram, RNO(R) was created in 1996 and few officers and sailors were positioned under him. The RNO(R) was initially positioned at Ramanathapuram and functioned under NOIC (Chennai).

The Palk Bay from Rameshwaram to Nagapattinam was divided into two areas, with each area under the control of Naval Detachment Commanders at Rameshwaram and Nagapattinam. Area Headquarters, Nagapattinam exercises coordination control over Thopputurai, Kodikkarai and Mallipattinam detachments while Area Headquarters, Rameshwaram exercises coordination control over Jagathapattinam and Tondi Detachments.

The precious life of Rajiv Gandhi could have perhaps been saved had the intelligence organisation acquired the capability of breaking LTTE ciphers.

The Command structure in 1993 was shown in structure.

Major Anti Smuggling/Gun Trafficking and Operations

Major search operations for large LTTE gun running vessels bringing military supplies from Europe and South East Asia have resulted in their capture.

Apprehension of MV AHAT. Based on intelligence inputs in early January 1993 on the likely landing of arms and ammunition by an LTTE ship near Mullaitivu on the North East coast of Sri Lanka, ships were deployed to apprehend the contraband carrier. The ship was detected on the night of 13/14 Jan 93 by CGS Vivek approx 400 nm SE of Chennai and was directed to proceed towards Chennai escorted by Kirpan and Vivek.

On 16 January 1993, Ahat was observed to be on fire. While the crew members were recovered from the sea, it is believed that the hardcore LTTE members, including Kittu, perished in the conflagration. The crew were handed over to the police authorities in Visakhapatnam and subsequently to the CBI Special Investigation Team.