The United States had engaged in a high profile coercive deployment of naval forces in the Gulf from end 2006 to early 2007 to deter Iran from proceeding apace with its nuclear enrichment programme.1 There was massive (planted) speculation in the media about an impending US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.2 Iran stuck to its stand that it was entitled to pursue peaceful development of nuclear energy and apparently refused to blink. There was tremendous speculation about the cost-benefit aspects of such an US attack. Air strikes would certainly have put back the Iranian nuclear programme by a few years.

However, the Iranian retaliation, primarily through means of asymmetric warfare options, and its capability to target shipping/oil lanes in the Gulf, threatened to entrain an escalator where the endgame would have become highly risky. It could have derailed the global economy and generated a world wide recession with the price of oil soaring beyond the US $ 200 a barrel mark.

US air strikes was only one scenario. The second and even more plausible scenario is the option of an Israeli air strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities.

With the US intelligence estimates that Iran had halted its drive for nuclear weaponisation the world heaved a sigh of relief and there was a visible de-escalation in the strident rhetoric for then. There are however some indications of a change in the scenario once again. US air strikes was only one scenario. The second and even more plausible scenario is the option of an Israeli air strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities. With the Israeli air strike on the Syrian nuclear facility at Al Kabir in September 2007, this scenario has become even more credible.

Israeli Rehearsals

The Times of India dated June 21, 2008 issue cited a report by Micheal R Gorden and Eric Schmitt that Israel carried out a major military exercise in the first week of June 2008, which appeared to be a full dress rehearsal for a potential bombing attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.3 US officials said that the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the country’s long range strike potential and demonstrate the seriousness with which it views Iran’s nuclear programme.4 Was it another coercive exercise to deter Iran or a full fledged rehearsal for an impending Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities?

Media reports speculated that over a 100 Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft had taken part in these manoeuvers over the Eastern Mediterranean over Greece and Crete.5 The exercise also included Israeli helicopters that could be used to rescue downed pilots. The helicopters and refueling tankers flew over 900 miles – the approximate distance between Israel and nuclear target sets in Iran.6

Glorious Spartan 08

In Athens, an official of the Greek Air Force Central Command, confirmed, that it had taken part in a joint training exercise with Israel off the Mediterranean island of Crete. Named Glorious Spartan 08. These exercises, were conducted from May 28 to June 12, 2008.7 It was a highly visible and coercive exercise intended to demonstrate Israel’s serious concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, on June 6, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, Shaul Mofaz, warned that Iran would face attacks if it pursues what he said was its nuclear weapons programme.8 The Mossad was said to be behind the car bomb attack that killed a top terror tactician of Iran (Imad Mug Niyeh) in Damascus on February 13, 2008. The Mossad Director Meir Dagan got an extension till 2009 which is being linked to Israel’s likely plans for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Some sources speculate that this would have to happen before September/October 2008 if the Iranian nuclear enrichment activity is to be effectively prevented.

Mossad Director Meir Dagan got an extension till 2009 which is being linked to Israel’s likely plans for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The escalator to a probable conflict has been entrained. A series of such exercises and naval demonstrations could be part of a coercive diplomacy exercise to deter Iran from the nuclear weapons option. Alternatively, a series of such exercises could generate ambiguity, and serve to desensitise the target over time, so that, repeated alerts on the part of the defender, lowers his arousal thresholds, and help in achieving surprise, when the actual attack comes.

This paper will steer clear of value judgments on the proliferation issues involved and focus on a purely military net assessment of likely conflict scenarios that could emerge in the Gulf in case of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the presidential elections in America, and the overstretch its forces are facing in Afghanistan and Iraq, the likelihood of an American air-land invasion, or pure air and naval aviation strikes, seem increasingly less probable. However, the Israeli option remains open and fairly credible.

This paper will employ the technique of pattern modelling 9 to discern the shape and basic contours of an Israeli air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Towards this end it will :-

• Study the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor.
• Speculate upon the likely details of an Israeli air strike option on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Briefly examine Iranian response options (this will merit a separate analytical paper).
• Examine the impact on India of such a hypothetical conflict scenario in the Gulf.

Osirak Redux

In a very meticulous paper entitled “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities”, Whitney Raas and Austin Lang (International Security Vol No 31. Spring 2007), have carried out an excellent analysis of Israel’s raid on the Iraqi Osirak Reactor of June 7, 1981.10 They have gone on to outline an equally credible net assessment of an Israeli directed strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The paper is rather insightful and revealing, and merits study in detail.

The Osirak Raid

On June 7, 1981, Israel had launched one of the most ambitious preventive attacks in history. Israel’s Mossad had sought to buy time by allegedly sabotaging the reactor cores before the French companies could supply them to Iraq and assassinated some key Iraqi nuclear officials. In Oct 1980, Mossad reported to the Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin that Osirak Reactor would be operational by June 1981. There was intense debate in the Israeli Government before the final clearance was given.11

Raid Modalities

The Israeli Air Force employed a strike package of 16 aircraft (8 x F-15s and 8 x F-16s). These took off from Etzion air base in the Sinai desert. Their flight profiles were low altitude across the Gulf of Aquaba, southern Jordan and then across northern Saudi Arabia to the target. The F-16s carried 2 x MK-84, 2,000 Ib bombs each with delayed action fuzes. Though these were dumb gravity bombs, the F-16 aircraft did have onboard targeting computer systems that could make their delivery fairly accurate. However, such accuracy was required that the planes get close to the target.12 The strike package arrived near the Osirak reactor completely undetected. The F-15s then climbed up to establish a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to intercept any Iraqi fighters that would attempt to challenge the mission.

Also read: Low Intensity Conflict revisited

The F-16s formed up at predetermined points to begin their bombing runs. About four miles from the target, the F16s climbed to 5,000 feet to dive at Osirak and release their bomb loads. Despite some navigation problems and Iraqi air defenses, at least 8 of the 16 bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. The strike package then turned and climbed to high altitude and returned to base along much the same route it had adopted for entry. All the 16 aircraft returned safely to base. The results were spectacular. Bomb damage assessment showed that the Iraqi reactor was totally destroyed.13

Israeli Strike on Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Target Analysis

For this analysis, this paper will rely on the excellent net assessment of Whitney Raas and Austin Lang that has been cited earlier.

Iranian Target Sets

The Rass and Lang paper states that Iran has obviously learnt the lessons of the Osirak raid. Its nuclear facilities, it claims, are widely dispersed. The paper asserts that Iran is pursuing multiple pathways to nuclear weapons capability to include Uranium enrichment and Plutonium production concurrently. The Uranium enrichment pathway, it avers, is significantly more advanced than the Plutonium production route presently.14 As such, the paper identifies the following Iranian target sets (the three critical Iranian nodes for the production of fissile material):-

• Isfahan Uranium conversion facility at Isfahan.
• Natanz The large uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.
• Arak Heavy water (HW) plant and plutonium production reactors under construction at Arak.
• Bushehr The paper analyses the projected plans for construction of the light water reactor with Russian aid at Bushehr. However, it feels that this is not a hardened site and being on the coast, could be better struck by submarine launched cruise missiles.15 A detailed analysis of the three earlier target sets would now be essential.