Use of Irregulars: Bane for the Pakistan Army

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The extensive use of irregulars and jihadis to incorporate J&K into Pakistan is not a machination adopted by Zia, as is generally believed. This has been a part of Pakistan’s strategic thinking since the 50s. In a review of the book, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (1 May-31 July 1957), Second Series, Volume 38, edited by Mushirul Hasan, Mr A G Noorani attributes to the author that Jawaharlal Nehru had referred to a pamphlet written by the former Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army in his address to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet with regard to the use of irregulars to destabilise J&K. Mr Nehru in the meeting said, “There was the pamphlet issued by ex-Major General Akbar Khan, wherein he defined his line of action. This was to have large-scale sabotage within Jammu and Kashmir State and at the same time trouble along the ceasefire line and attempts to push large numbers of people across that line. The objective appeared to be to weaken the Jammu and Kashmir government and at the same time to goad India into some kind of reprisal, which would then be met by the Pakistan Army.” 1

To offset India’s conventional military superiority, the use of irregulars has been a conscious strategic feature of Pakistan in achieving military objectives. Husain Haqqani in his book “Pakistan between Mosque and Military” quotes a senior official of Ayub Khan’s intelligence and research outfit – the Bureau of National Reconstruction, entrusted with the task of identifying and recommending solutions to Pakistan’s security problems : “In its manpower, Pakistan is very fortunate. In some of the regions, people have long traditions of irregular fighting. Now that they have got a homeland and a state based on their own ideology they are bound to show great courage and determination to defend them. Then why not train irregular fighters whom even the existing industries of Pakistan can well equip? Of course, they will have to be politically conscious. They will have to be aware of the stakes involved in such a struggle, which is bound to be protracted. Their training in warfare will have to be strenuous and wide in scope. The irregular fighter will have to be shrewd, familiar with local environmental factors, aware of the psychology of his own people and of the enemy and of the political consequences of the struggle. Irregular warfare can help in reducing the crucial nature of the initial battles of Pakistan. It can help in spreading out prolonging action. The essence of this irregular warfare is to deny the enemy and target and keep attacking him again at unexpected places … Lack of military formalities in the eyes of military experts seems to detract from the respectability of irregular warfare. But actually, it is this lack of formal logic and system which is making it increasingly important in this age of missiles and nuclear weapons.”2

Pakistan has shown unmistakable propensity in not accepting India’s conventional military and nuclear superiority. It has been contesting with India’s conventional superiority in Siachen Glacier even though it is in a tactically disadvantageous position. General Musharraf once remarked, “We have the upper hand here (Siachen), it costs the Indians more to fight on Siachen than us. Its all about the degree of difficulty we can create for the other side.”3 Within the internal and external constraints, Pakistan explores new ways to keep India off balance. It therefore uses asymmetric strategy by use of irregulars, or fomenting insurgencies and terrorism in India. Kargil was one such example of asymmetric warfare. The Pakistan military advocates this strategy to be perfectly legitimate and expects the people to appreciate it as such. Politicians, it feels are inept in handling this instrumentality of warfare.

The former Pakistan Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg sought to legitimise the use of mujahideen to occupy Kargil heights in an article, “Deterrence, Defence, and Development”, in a Pakistan Defence Journal. He wrote: “Just as India’s nuclear ego was deflated by appropriate counter blasts by Pakistan, the Kashmiri mujahideen have shattered the myth of the invincibility of the Indian Army. The 500 odd mujahideen (termed infiltrators as per Indian claim) could not be ousted from Kargil – Dras positions by massive Indian ground troops and commissioning of its air force and gun-ships. Dubbing them infiltrators or mercenaries is to blind oneself to the basic reality that the war of liberation of Kashmir, has altogether different dimensions, where jihad is linked with faith, conviction and commitment”.4

The Pakistan military derives immense pride in the fact that it overcame formidable challenges like the Non-Proliferation Regime in acquiring nuclear weapons capability, and delivery systems like missiles from China in violation of the Missile Technological Control Regime (MTCR). It is not abashed about any nuclear proliferation that may have taken place in the process. For Pakistan nuclear weapons capability removes the strategic asymmetry vis-à-vis India. It feels that it is in a position to calibrate conventional conflicts with this capability. It has not responded to India’s ‘No First Use’ doctrine, because with little strategic depth and all its strategic centres located close to the border, its main concern is the protection of its strategic assets.5

The Pakistan Army is unique with respect to its heavy reliance on irregulars, i.e. tribals and mujahideens in conduct of war. It has failed repeatedly to appreciate the diminishing returns and long term adverse affects on the professionalism of the army, because of the use of irregulars. It has failed to understand, that irregulars despite their fervour, have limited endurance during war, as unlike a professional army, they begin to crack as an entity when under pressure. It happened in 1947 (Operation Gulmarg), again in 1965 (Operation Gibraltar) and during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 (Operation Badr). The use of irregulars, more than leaving scope for diplomatic deniability, attracts adverse international attention. The increasing sophistication in technical intelligence and increased concern over non-state armed groups especially post 9/11, is bound to make this leverage increasingly difficult for the Pakistan Army.

The use of irregulars not only detracts the army from professionalism, it also infuses a sense of exaggerated importance and military prowess amongst them. They come to view themselves as equals, if not superior to the professional army, and as an indispensable tool to further Pakistan’s operational and strategic agenda. The key motivating factors for such groups can never be the same as a professional army, and therefore, their marriage is counter-productive, rather disastrous.

Since the 80s, irregular groups have been imbued with a global Islamic ideology and are willing tools in the hands of the Pakistan Army to serve the larger Islamic cause. On the other hand, for a professional army, the imperatives of attaining military objectives must override all other religious and social considerations. The motivational endurance of a professional army is much more since it is based on ‘pride in profession’, espirit-de-corps, martial history, traditions of regiments and units, officer-men relationship, training, camaraderie and above all unity of military purpose. Besides, military personnel need to posses a combination of courage, wisdom, fair play, judgement and administrative abilities. These qualities come into play during the various stages of war, i.e. the preparatory period, during actual conduct and after the war. It is for this reason that legitimate military machines, however sluggish in the beginning sustain momentum for much longer periods. For irregular groups, mobilised on a religious, ethnic or social theme; the momentum is predicated on the efficacy and life span of the theme. This was much in evidence, when tribesmen were used by Pakistan during the invasion of J&K in 1947. Rapaciousness overtook religious fervour, operational aim and purpose, once these tribesmen descended in Kashmir valley. They were non-partisan in choosing targets – Hindu and Muslims alike – for rape, murder, arson, and looting. Even a Christian missionary hospital – St Josephs Hospital, and seven nuns working there, were not spared. As a force, they soon became disorganised and began to crack when their sense of invincibility was put under test by the army of post-independent India. The infant Pakistan Army, which was orchestrating the campaign, was at sea in controlling them. The entire exercise proved to be counter-productive.

The tribesmen alienated the population in Kashmir and incurred their wrath. Not having learnt its lessons, Pakistan re-scripted the same in modus operandi while initiating  the 1965 war. It again met the same fate. Operation Gibraltar turned out to be a complete military fiasco.  During the East Pakistan crisis  the Paksitan Army used a Razakaar (volunteer force) comprising non-Bengalis settled in that part of the country. The Jamait-e-Islami  and its student wing Islamic Jamait Talaba contributed majorly to this effort. The Razakaar  were used as death squads of the Pakistan Army to eliminate rivals-the intellectual community, that espoused the cause of  Bangladesh. The Razakaar infact were more responsible than the Pakistan Army in alienating the populace, leading to the break-up of Pakistan.

When such a non-professional and irregular military machine takes over a country, as did Taliban in Afghanistan, the results have to be disastrous. Afghanistan has been a Muslim country since at least 1000 years, but it was only when an irregular force, i.e. Taliban was at the helm that the statues of Buddha at Bamiyan were destroyed. It is quite natural for like-minded irregular forces to be attracted to each other, as did Osama bin Laden with Taliban. A failed state, is therefore preceded by a failed army. Pakistan needs to be extremely cautious on this account. The frequent use of irregulars in effect also lowers the public confidence in the efficacy of the armed forces.

The frequent use of various irregular and Islamic groups as tools of war has impacted on the culture and orientation of the Pakistan Army. Having used the mujahideen in war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and in Kashmir, over the years the army personnel have developed a sort of admiration for the fighting abilities of the militant groups. Therefore, the army as such cannot remain insulated from the Islamic agenda that is the galvanising force for such groups. Islamic radicalism has made inroads into the Pakistan Army by sheer osmosis. For this mutuality to sustain, there has to be the constant feed, of visible and invisible, common causes and enemies, such as ‘infidel India’.

The religious glue between the Pakistan Army and Islamic groups will not disappear even if Kashmir, hypothetically, were to become a non-issue. Consequently, for the partnership to sustain, there will be constant need for creation of an enemy on the basis of religion. It cannot be just confined to India. New enemies will seek to be created, especially those who are perceived to be out of sync with the global Islamic scheme of the mujahideens and their benefactors. Pakistan’s cooperation with an outside power like the USA in the war against terrorism is therefore only a temporary arrangement due to compelling reasons rather than by conscious design or introspection.  There is little to suggest that the Pakistan Army has realised the pitfalls of forging partnership with the mujahideen or the irregulars, who are recruited and indoctrinated by various Islamic groups in Pakistan. The symbiosis of relationship between the army and the Islamic groups is evidenced in the Tanzeemul Ikhwan organisation located in a madrasa, approximately 150 km from Islamabad. This organisation mainly comprising retired Pakistan Army personnel also claims support of many serving officers. This organisation had threatened to storm Islamabad in December 2000 in order to usher an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. The mujahideen, therefore are not only impacting on the professionalism and orientation of the Pakistan Army, but also posing vicious threat to the religious and social fabric of Pakistan. The irregulars and terrorists, if persisted with, will not be successful in ‘bleeding India through thousand cuts’ but will certainly destroy the very lungs of Paksitan.

Notes

1. Frontline, March 9, 2007, p.79.
2. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp.47-48.
3. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan Eye of the Storm, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002), p.276.
4. General Mirza Aslam Beg, article on : “Deterrence, Defence and Development”, cited on : http://www.defencejournal.com/jul99/deterrence.htm
5. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/Khan2Oct05.asp, Strategic Insights – Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan.

RSN Singh, Associate Editor Indian Defence Review