The grand strategy of a state may be described as a long–term plan to accomplish its domestic and external objectives. Policies flowing from the grand strategy must aim to promote the vital interests of the nation while preventing other nations from interfering with such interests. The power that a state wields and its foreign policy orientation are important in this regard. James Rosenau, in an article in the Free Press published 1971, describes foreign policy strategy as “any pre-designed set of moves, or a series of decisions, in a competitive situation where the outcome is not governed purely by chance.”

In international politics, over 100 nation-states, each pursues interests that conflict with that of other states, in a game where rules are largely unwritten and informal, evolving mainly through the wishes of the stronger players. In a broad sense, a foreign policy strategy is a plan for advancing ones own national interests (as one defines these interests) while preventing other players from impinging on them.

Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.

To analyse the dynamics of contemporary international politics, it would be necessary to understand the essentials of a ‘state’, the culture of ‘strategy’, the ingredients of ‘power’ and the orientation of ‘foreign policy’. The context of this analysis would be the current status of China and India and the requirements for India to address the negative asymmetry that has developed between the two nations.

State

Both China and India are very old civilisations. Both have a long history replete with successes, surrenders and subjugations. Both have witnessed victories and defeats, unifications and break-ups, and slavery and freedom. There are many differences also between the two countries and among these, perhaps the fundamental difference has been the understanding and realisation of being a ‘state’.

The consciousness of being a ‘state’ has existed in China and the Chinese for many centuries. And they believe in the centrality of the Chinese state. Despite the fluctuations of history this belief has survived. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, during a speech in the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1959, put it thus, “from fairly early in history, they have had a sensation of greatness. They call themselves the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and it seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupied a lower grade. That has made it difficult for us to understand the working of their mind, and what is more to the point, for them to understand the working of our mind.”

A similar consciousness of being a ‘state’ has not existed in India or Indians. Here, a clear distinction must be drawn between India the civilisation and India the state. India has the essentials of a ‘state’, it has a defined territory, it has a population, a government and it has sovereignty. But India does not display the attribute of toughness where its vital interests are concerned. After the Kandahar hijack episode, India was termed variously as a ‘soft’, ‘disjointed’ and ‘directionless’ state.

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China’s cohesiveness as regards language, ethnicity and culture (900 million Chinese belong to the Han grouping and speak Mandarin) is compared with India’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious status and offered as the reason for this widely differing perceptions of being a state, between the two countries. This is only partially true. Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.

Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies.

Thus, the centripetal forces prevailed on most occasions. In India it was the opposite. On the occasions that unity was achieved, centrifugal forces came into play and the process of disintegration began. Foreign forces took advantage of the situation, played one against the other and achieved their objective of domination. Distrust became endemic, severely hampering unity or the consciousness of being a state. It is only now, in modern India, that the younger generation, unencumbered by the baggage of the past, is developing a consciousness of pan-Indian unity. Perhaps cricket, connectivity and the media are hastening the process. Technology is transcending borders and it is China that is now feeling the pressure of centrifugal forces.

Strategy

Strategy has been defined as a plan designed to achieve a particular long term aim. It is also the art of planning and directing military activity in a war or battle. Sun Tzu, of China, authored the Art of War, sometime between the 8th and 5th Century BC, three or four centuries earlier than our own Kautilya, who wrote the Arthshastra during 4th-3rd Century BC. Both wrote broadly about strategy. They discussed statecraft, diplomacy, relationship with other nations and a host of other topics in their respective books. The prevalence of ‘strategic culture’ in the two countries can be gleaned from the fact that Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies and no serious attempts were made, either by the military analysts or other strategists to evaluate its practical applicability and pertinence to developmental changes in India.

The near absence of a strategic culture in India is further driven home if one scrolls down the Wikipedia listing of military strategists /writers over time. While Chinese names like Jiao Yu, Shen Kuo, Sun Bin, Sun Tzu, Wu Qi, Liu Ji, Wang Xiangsui, Zhuge Liang and Mao Zedong leap out at you, the only Indian in the list is Kautilya. China’s push to become a global power is based on a modern interpretation of Sun Tzu’s classic and Chinese scholars rely on historical strategic lessons and Art of War to develop strategies of the Chinese State and its leaders. In contrast, the strategic lessons India has learnt from its previous wars or international engagements lie locked in ‘Top Secret’ cupboards and Indian strategists and military analysts are denied opportunities to study the past and bring out lessons for the future.

China’s policy in South Asia–imposing deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962

The contrasting strategic cultures of China and India have strongly influenced bilateral relations in the past. The relations between the two countries will always have elements of competition and contest. Many international relations analysts maintain that given their geographical proximity and sheer sizes, China and India are natural rivals. Nancy Jetley, in her analysis of Sino-Indian relations, in an article written in 1992 stated that, “It needs to be clearly recognised that China’s claims to vast tracts of Indian land are related in the main to ideological intent. The Chinese strategy, as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few sq thousand miles of mountainous territory–not all of which was strategically vital to China–as to eliminate India as a power of consequence from the Asian scene.

China’s policy in South Asia–imposing deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962, tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its special ties with its Himalayan neighbours, exploiting sub-continental dissensions by embarking on a deliberate policy of collusion with Pakistan and above all weakening the political stability of India through its clandestine support to Mizo and Naga insurgents–has been essentially an exercise in isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.” India regained some of its lost stature displaying superior military strategy in 1971.

The relations between the two countries have improved over the years but land issues are yet to be resolved. China is a patient country with a long memory and Deng Xiao Ping with the usual Chinese farsightedness stated in 1986 that it would perhaps be better if the Sino-Indian border problem is left to be solved by future generations. Much can be read into this statement. Later, in early 1990s, Deng expounded his ‘24-Character Strategy’:

“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Later the phrase, ‘make some contribution’, was added.

The strategy suggests both a short-term desire to downplay China’s ambitions and a long-term strategy to build up China’s power to maximise options in the future. There is an ominous ring to this 24-character strategy and India would do well to take heed, even though China may have articulated the strategy with the superior power of USA in its sights.

India’s strategy of ‘non-alignment’ collapsed along with the Soviet Union and the country floundered about without policy moorings for a period. In the recent past measures like the economic liberlisation, declaring itself a nuclear-weapon state and the ongoing strategic nuclear deal have given India a semblance of strategic focus.