The relentless pursuit of Osama Bin Laden ever since 9/11 occurred and his elimination early May by US Special Forces in the spectacular ‘Operation Geronimo’ has been a landmark event in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations. That this dreaded terrorist was found hiding in Abbottabad, a cantonment city of Pakistan that also hosts Pakistan Army’s premier Military Training Academy, did not come as a surprise to India which considers Pakistan as a state that sponsors terrorism.

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The clinical precision with which US Navy SEALs carried out this midnight heliborne strike in an area bristling with air defences has rudely dented the credibility of Pakistan’s military, with many in India asking if we have the capability to do the same if circumstances so demand in the future. The short answer is ‘no’.

...when information about the siege was received, IAF’s heavy lift Il-76 Sqn at Agra was put on alert as was a collocated para unit of the Indian Army. Intelligence was negligible on the number of terrorists, their weapons and the extent of their operation.

Way back in 1976, the Israelis demonstrated their capability when four Israeli Air Force C-130J aircraft with 100 ‘special force’ personnel, took off from Tel Aviv and rescued 256 out of 260 passengers and crew of an Air France flight held hostage at Entebbe by Palestinian hijackers. All seven hijackers and 45 Ugandan troops were killed in the fire-fight that ensued during this operation carried out nearly 5000 km away from Israel.

Both these operations had clear objectives, were meticulously planned, rehearsed and carried out by highly trained military personnel. Many operational aspects of US SEALs action to eliminate Osama Bin Laden remain unexplained and will not be known for many years till more ‘Geronimos’ are conducted to ‘take out’ more terrorists.

India came closest to carrying out ‘special operations’ in 1985 when a group of terrorists beseiged the island of Male, the capital of Maldives in the Indian Ocean. Maldives is an archipelago with islands strung out along thousands of kilometers, with the island of Gan being south of the equator. Hulule, the island with the runway, is adjacent to the capital Male and at a distance of 800 Km from Thiruvananthapuram (TVM). On the morning of 03 November 1988, when information about the siege was received, IAF’s heavy lift Il-76 Sqn at Agra was put on alert as was a collocated para unit of the Indian Army. Intelligence was negligible on the number of terrorists, their weapons and the extent of their operation. No maps of Maldives Islands were available and planning had to done on tourist maps and guides.

All three services have got their individual Intelligence departments and after the Kargil fiasco, which was a result of poor or non-existent co-ordination among various agencies...

This resulted in many changes in plans but finally after rejecting other options it was decided that two Il-76 aircraft carrying 400 paracommandos would land at Hulule. The plan was to fly from Agra to TVM and then to Hulule. The Il-76 aircrew had to make do with the available tourist maps of Maldives to carry out a dark night landing at a strange 2300m airfield where armed opposition was likely. It is to the credit of the Il-76 aircrew and technicians that the mission was successfully accomplished. The two Il-76 aircraft took off from Agra at 1800 h on 03 Nov and landed at Hulule at 2150 h covering nearly 3000 km. The paracommandos then got into action and secured the island of Hulule. After commandeering boats, the commandos set course for Male which too was secured. Many terrorists were captured and others who were getting away on a ship along with some hostages, were captured by the Indian Navy. Three more Il-76 aircraft landed at Hulule, the last one at first light on 04 Nov . The mission was successful but revealed many weaknesses in our capability to conduct such operations. While piece-meal solutions were found, no holistic review was carried out.

Special Operations are demanding in nature and require the following:

• Clear objectives. The team must know exactly what is required of them.
• An effective and secure C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance) support at the operational level.
• Meticulous planning and execution.
• A force trained, equipped and organised to carry the tasks.

Both the Abbottabad and Entebbe operations score highly when rated against the above requirements. Objectives were crystal clear and both actions were planned and rehearsed with individual tasks, mutual support and fall-back options delineated. C4I support was available.

The US action, taking place 36 years after Entebbe, had the advantage of much improved technological assistance with the President and his staff able to watch the entire exercise in real time. Intelligence had been gathered over many preceding months and it has been stated that there was ‘human intelligence’ (humint) or visual surveillance of the compound housing OBL available to the task force. The US it reported to have about 9000 personnel deployed on the ground in Pakistan in pursuance of its interests. The success of the US and Israeli operations speak for themselves of the planning and execution of task. Both countries had highly trained personnel to carry out the missions.

Each of these bought the UAVs from Israel at different costs. Repair and maintenance facilities too were separately created with large financial implications.

The Maldives operation by India was a project hastily conceptualised and conducted without any hard intelligence available to the personnel involved in it. It was fortunate that the militants also did not plan their actions with any clarity or else the Indian operations could have had disastrous consequences. Another example of sloppy co-ordination was when the NSG action on 26/11 at Mumbai’s Taj Hotel was televised live helping the enemy to take counter-measures and possibly resulting in the death of Indian personnel.

Indian Army has highly trained Para-commandos from the Parachute regiments and MARCOS or marine commandos from the Indian Navy. IAF has the GARUDS trained mainly for assets protection and for specific tasks during conflict situations. The equipment available to these Special Operation Forces (SOF) is often dated compared to the weapons with their likely opponents. External intelligence, vital for any military operation, more so for special operations, has been India’s Achilles heel since Independence. Earlier the Intelligence Bureau (IB) was entrusted with this responsibility, but the 1962 Chinese aggression and the lack of its foreknowledge to India’s decision-makers resulted in the formation of Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). R&AW was given the task of external intelligence, but strangely, instead of being put under the Ministry of Defence, it was kept directly under the Prime Minister. Co-ordination of external intelligence with military requirements became problematic and the situation has remained unchanged.

All three services have got their individual Intelligence departments and after the Kargil fiasco, which was a result of poor or non-existent co-ordination among various agencies, a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created adding to the confusion. Apart from the lack of co-ordination, turf wars and ego problems result in wasteful expenditure. One example is the purchase of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, first by the IAF, followed by the Army and the Indian Navy. RAW and its technical successor, the National Technology Research Organisation (NTRO-created for strategic monitoring of satellite, terrestrial and internet communications) were not to be left behind and more UAVs were procured. Each of these bought the UAVs from Israel at different costs. Repair and maintenance facilities too were separately created with large financial implications.

The UAVs procured by NTRO at a cost of Rs.450 crores are reportedly lying as junk in some warehouse.

All this was avoidable if a central decision-making body had evaluated the strategic and tactical requirements flowing from national security imperatives, and made collective purchases of UAVs. The need for a CDS becomes apparent in such conditions. There is a strong case for a CDS who will be responsible to the GOI for security and technology environment study, long-term threat analysis and procurement of weapons and equipment based on this analysis. The operational aspects of the armed forces and conduct of wars should remain with the Chiefs of Staff.

The UAVs procured by NTRO at a cost of Rs.450 crores are reportedly lying as junk in some warehouse. The CAG is investigating this issue.

The Abbottabad action resulted from a ‘fusion’ of US military and the CIA at the highest levels. In the Indian context, harmonisation of military power with RAW is unlikely in the near future till a complete reorganisation and restructuring of our intelligence gathering agencies is carried out. Another aspect is the complete absence of ‘humint’ from our neighbouring countries. India had a modicum of ‘humint’ emanating from our western neighbour but an earlier Prime Minister, taking a very short-term view and disregarding national interests, had ordered the disbandment of this capability. The adverse effects have been acutely felt since then.