OP TOPAC: The Kashmir Imbroglio

---

IDR think-tank war-gamed and published in July 1989 the anticipated course of action by Pakistan in Kashmir under the title OP TOPAC.. This came true in the subsequent years!. We reproduce this war gaming done by IDR, in original that was published in the issue of July 89 to show that New Delhi despite the warning by IDR Team,did not take counter measures and allowed the situation to deteriorate. – Editor

Operation Topac was named after Amru. an Inca Prince who fought an unconventional war against Spanish rule in eighteenth-century Uruguay.

The aim of ‘OP TOPAC’ is to draw attention of the free-thinker, policy-maker and the defence planner to the dangerous potential of the current developments in Jammu & Kashmir. Part fact, part fiction, the scenarios visualized have been based on the trends, which have become manifest in the subcontinent in the last few years.

Situation in Jammu & Kashmir in 1988-89

In the higher reaches of Jammu & Kashmir heavy snows generally commence in October and the falls carry on till May. However, thaw sets in on lower heights in April. This prolonged winter season results in disruption of surface communications and closure of passes for a period of almost six months. During this period the valley of Kashmir wears a thick mantle of white and remains largely isolated from the rest of the country. Air services also become irregular due to thick clouds over the valley and frequent heavy falls. The only winter route via National Highway lA which enters the valley through Jawahar Tunnel is also frequently disrupted during the period due to heavy accumulation of snow in the areas of Batot-Patni Top, Banihal Tunnel and Qazigund. Numerous landslides on lower heights along the river valleys cause further problems by blocking the road and hurtling down small bridges and culverts into deep ravine beds. Traditionally, mainly due to these conditions, the Jammu & Kashmir Government moves to Jammu for winter every year. This year winter was several over Northern India and snowfall was heavy in the Himalaya so in Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The snows started melting as usual in April on the southern face of the Pir panjal Range but within the valley neither the Pir Panjal, Kazinag, Shamsabari, or the high ranges connecting Pir Panjal to the Greater Himalayan Range, showed any signs of early thaw. It was apparent that the ‘gallies’ and passes across Pir Panjal and Shamsabari Range would not open till the end of May. The troops located across various passes. whether in Kayian Bowl. Tangdhar, or Gurez Sectors, would be short of supplies and other necessities long after the Pakistani troops opposite them on lower heights would be receiving regular supplies. In fact in April itself long convoys could be seen carrying winter stocks northwards on Neelam Valley highway and other subsidiary roads.

Zojila (pass), leading into Ladakh, remains closed for almost six months; but this year even Khardungla (pass) closed for over a month during April. This upset the road movement and stocking schedules of Shyok and Siachen garrisons. Paucity of air effort due to air-lift commitments in Sri Lanka. combined with days of bad weather, had created a large backlog of stocks and transients awaiting air-lift at various airfields/transit camps all along the line of communication to Ladakh/Kashmir Valley.

In this situation a series of bomb blasts ripped through the valley and on the national highways on both sides of the Jawahar Tunnel; random blasts near Srinagar Club, central telegraph office and transport yards were merely precursors. A powerful explosive device was found and defused in the Jawahar Tunnel itself. These activities were followed by prolonged hartals in major towns on one pretext or the other. In one incident unidentified gunmen on motor cycles opened fire at the sentry post outside the residence of the Sessions Judge who had passed the death sentence on Maqbool Butt. Later, fIring was also reported near the office of the Inspector General Kashmir Ranges. In the encounter one Ajiz Ahmed of MUF was reported killed. All this created panic in the valley but no one was clear as to the identity of the people responsible for these attacks. In another incident a car was blown up in La! Chowk and bombs were lobbed at a police piquet at Zaldagar bridge in downtown Srinagar. Yet in another incident at Srinagar, two extremists fired at a CRPF post located in the High Court premises. Several bomb blasts were reported in various tourist complexes in the valley and some groups of tourists from Gujarat and Maharashtra had a narrow escape. A few days later, extremists lobbed a hand grenade on the roof of the Doordarshan Kendra and made an attempt to blow up Badshah bridge in which a part of the parapet was damaged.

Intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of militant Kashmiri youth had sneaked back into the valley after receiving training in guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities in POK. Some persons arrested at Kupwara revealed that large quantities of automatic weapons with huge quantities of ammunition, hand grenades and plastic explosives had entered the valley through ‘Northern Gallies’ and had been dumped in the jungles around Kupwara and Handwara. It was believed that Amanulah Khan, a top leader of the KLF, had addressed several meetings in various mosques in Srinagar and Anant Nag and Kupwara urged the Kashmiri youth to be ready for Jehad. There was persistent bazaar gossip in all big towns of the valley about training camps in several places on both sides of the Line of Control (LC), some of which were manned by experienced Mghan Mujahids where every Kashmiri youth was made welcome and received gifts, provided he was ready to undergo guerrilla-warfare training. A newly formed outfit called ‘Ansar-ul-Islam’ supported by the Muslim Liberation Front was also reported to be enlisting and training youth in guerrilla tactics. This organization was reported to be in touch with Abdul Hamid and Dr Haider, two well-known leaders of a fundamentalist organization in POK. Intelligence reports suggested that the POK Government could be imparting training for subversive activities in J&K to about 500 Kashmiri youth in POK. It was also reported that the setting up and running of these camps has been entrusted to the President of POK, Sardar Abdul Qayum and the ISI as the Pakistani Government wanted no direct involvement. Sardar Qayum was reported to be taking a personal interest in the distribution of arms to the trainees. He frequently called upon businessmen in POK to donate liberally for the cause.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government, the police and the paramilitary forces were getting more and more tied down in putting down mob violence, rioting, vandalism and violent demonstrations. The urban population was steadily becoming defiant and aggressive and the rural folk were sulking. Mob violence erupted on the slightest pretext in which Government property and offices, transport and business establishments of certain communities became the main targets, Frequent incidents of violence, attack on public figures and police officials had succeeded in creating a fear psychosis in Government circles. This added to the existing threat from Sikh militants, creating a virtual state of siege in Jammu & Kashmir. With the aid of tip-offs from informers some arms and ammunition, along with subversive literature with a call from KLF for the liberation of Kashmir, were unearthed from Kupwara, Tangdhar and Keran areas. A leaflet simultaneously distributed at certain mosques at Srinagar contained the following message in Urdu:

• The Centre and the Abdullah Government are intensifying repression. The police round-ups, searches and arrest of innocent Kashmiri youth is making life unbearable in the cities. The obvious conclusion is that this Government is a puppet and it is incapable of solving our problems. It can merely resort to repressive measures to please its Delhi bosses. In such a situation the Kashmiris must rise in militant protest, reject any political solution and step up violence. When we get going our tools will be sabotage, terrorism and mob violence so that we hound out the puppet regime and establish a just Islamic order. Please remember that the more the repression the earlier we are likely to achieve our aim; so God be with you.

In subsequent months, more incriminating documents signed in the name of KLF and Muslim Liberation Front were distributed at some mosques and religious gatherings. The existence of special groups called ‘AI Harnzah’ and ‘Ansari-ul-Islam’ was confirmed.

The Union Home Ministry at this stage expressed its grave concern over the increased terrorist activities and asked the Jammu & Kashmir Government to take stern measures to curb them. In their assessment not only had there been an increase in terrorist activities but there was a qualitative change in the situation. They said they had received information to suggest that some Sikh extremists’ organizations operating abroad and groups of Kashmiri extremists had joined forces. The Union Home Ministry advised the State Government to strengthen vigilance on the border, improve intelligence collection and take steps to isolate the elements trying to whip up anti-Indian feelings. As the violence continued unabated and even spread to Jammu in winter, the Union Home Ministry once again issued a statement that it had no doubt that the secessionist movement was being escalated in a planned manner for which preparations had gone on for a long time.

The Union Home Ministry and other central agencies perhaps considered this kind of advice quite adequate to meet the situation. It seemed that the Centre still viewed the growing unrest in Kashmir as purely a state law and order problem of Jammu & Kashmir. No meaningful dialogue between State and Central agencies nor a joint assessment to tackle the situation seemed to emerge.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government on their part seemed content with heaping the blame on the MUF, Awami Action League and those forces which were anti-NC-Congress(I) alliance. A myriad of intelligence agencies operating in the valley without an overall coordinating authority added further confusion to the situation by working at cross purposes and sending conflicting signals to their bosses in Delhi. Editorial comment in influential Urdu dailies of Srinagar indicated that the Kashmiris held the State and Central Governments responsible for the chaotic conditions prevailing in the valley and very few people believed that Pakistan was out to create disturbances in the valley. One paper which is particularly popular amongst the middle-class Muslims of the valley suggested that like the AI-Fateh, which was supposed to have emerged in 1970, AI-Harnzah and Ansar-ul-Islam were also only a figment of the Government’s imagination. These, they said, were ploys to let loose a reign of terror on the peace-loving but independent-minded Kashmiris.

The sudden demise of General Zia in August 1988 created a kind of political paralysis in Pakistan for a while but this seemed to have little effect on the continued Pakistani collusion in subversive activities in Punjab or the Kashmir Valley; ISI, General Zia’s chosen instrument to handle covert operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Punjab, seemed even more powerfully independent and active.

The LC even at Siachen had been unusually quiet this year, except for more than the usual reconnaissance helicopter flights opposite Kargil sector and the usual sporadic firing in Rajauri-Punch areas. Forward brigades and units in most sectors in the valley reported an inexplicable but marked degree of bonhomie on the part of Pakistani troops all along the LC. Even messages of good wishes were sent’ across at Holi and Diwali festivals. Headquarters located at Kupwara and Chowkibal, however, seemed alarmed at the sudden mushrooming of madras-as (with multiple green flags fluttering over them) in their areas. This was not somehow considered very significant at higher levels. In fact the Divisional Commander and lower Formation Commanders had little or no opportunity to present their views on the overall security environment in the valley, in spite of various hartals and acts of violence in their areas of responsibility. It was the officers at the grassroots level, however; who had the most accurate information about their areas and were in the best position to judge the mood of the local population, as compared to the clinical intelligence summaries Composed at higher HQ. The intelligence summaries collated by 15 and 16 Corps really contained nothing more than what was publicly known. The layout and substance of most intelligence reports emanating from Corps HQ were nothing more than summaries of police, civil intelligence and newspaper reports. There was no in depth analysis of the situation, nor were any meaningful conclusions drawn.

In North-Eastern Ladakh, across Sasar La, except for small patrols coming to ‘Three Pimples’ area for observation over -Daulat Beg Oldi and ‘Track Junction’, the Chinese remained rather inactive. Even the so-called ‘forward posture’ adopted by the Indian Army in some areas did not seem to bother them.

In these circumstances, the Army leadership visualized no special problem except for the normal logistics problems of forward troops due to late opening of passes. The news of violent demonstrations and riots which stretched the state police resources to the limit did not come in for much comment and discussion in Army circles, as there was not even a hint of any hostility in the valley towards the Army. However, during a war game organized by 15 Corps, certain issues were raised by the local Sub Area Commander on paucity of paramilitary resources for internal security duties, under the prevailing circumstances. This was not disputed by the senior officers present but at the summing up it was made clear that the shortage of paramilitary forces at his disposal was fully appreciated but it was to be seen in the light of the overall requirement of such forces in the Punjab and elsewhere. No alternatives were offered, so the Sub Area was expected to make do with what it had. It was evident that the Army hierarchy foresaw no special problems in the valley as far as they were concerned. The attention of most senior commanders remained riveted on Siachen which had become a prestige issue since the last Pakistani attack on ‘Bana’ post. A firm conviction prevailed that nothing much could happen in the valley barring a stalemate even if Pakistan were to start full-scale hostilities. Anti terrorist operations were not the ‘Army’s baby’. In any case it could not affect the overall defensive posture,’ it was said.

The situation on the other side of Pir Panjal Range, especially after widespread violence in Jammu region, was somewhat different. The borders were active off and on and the Pakistani troops were seen carrying out various training exercises fairly close to the border, which indicated aggressive designs.

The line of communication to the Kashmir Valley through Udhampur-Ramban-Banihal this year had somehow become more prone to big landslides resulting in prolonged suspension of traffic. A new bridge at Khuninala had to be built as the old one was damaged by frequent landslides. Several smaller landslides kept blocking the road between Ramban-Ramsu and Banihal frequently. People of Doda, Kishtwar and Bhadarwa areas were on the war-path against the Jammu & Kashmir Government. As such there was a perpetual shortage of local labour to work on the roads.

In the Jammu-Pathankot belt there was a sudden increase in subversive and terrorist activities. Violence flared up in Jammu city on the eve of Gur-Purab and quickly spread to other parts of Jammu region. The Army had to be called out in several towns.

A little later violence recurred in the valley during a bandh which was observed in Srinagar, Baramulla, Anant Nag and Sopore to mark the anniversary of the hanging of Maqbool Butt. Violence broke out again after a short interval when rampaging mobs came out in the streets, ostensibly to protest against Salman Rushdie’s controversial book Satanic Verses. This agitation soon spread to all major towns in the valley and continued unabated for almost a week.

It was quite apparent by now that there was an overall method in this madness. Most national newspapers in their editorials spoke of the dangers from within in Kashmir and the Pakistani connection. The Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir was however reported to have said in a statement to the press that he had definite information that Pakistan was winding up camps where terrorists were being trained, after the recent meeting of our Prime Minister and Ms Benazir Bhutto.

Reacting to various statements issued by the Union Home Ministry indicating that a serious view of the situation in Jammu & Kashmir had been taken by the Centre, the Chief Minister said that both the State and Central Governments had responsibilities in this respect, and although the Prime Minister had once told him that there was the possibility of Pakistan creating disturbance in the valley, he blamed internal politics for the prevailing conditions.

The deteriorating law and order situation in the valley was generally attributed by the Centre and the national press to the ineffectual leadership in Jammu & Kashmir; but many prominent leaders of Jammu & Kashmir held that a constant drift in the Centre’s policies was largely responsible for the situation. At this juncture the attention of the Centre was mainly focused on Punjab and perhaps because of this no viable joint strategy for Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir was evolved. Creation of special forces or a joint intelligence network to tackle terrorism and anti-national forces in these states were not apparently formulated even at this stage. Evidently, it was not perceived that the escalation in the Punjab situation was correlated to the main objective of certain forces, of destabilizing and subverting the legitimate authority in Kashmir.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government continued to make bold declarations that they would come down on the trouble-makers with a heavy hand and that they would fight the extremists with full determination. They also often repeated that the use of sophisticated arms by the extremists showed a foreign hand. However, no one seemed to be any the wiser as to who was the master-mind behind these operations.

Pakistan’s Aims and Plans – I

A top-level meeting had been called in the President’s residential office by General Zia in April 1988. This was attended by selected Corps Commanders and top ISI bosses. Some other names mentioned in this connection were those of a prominent Afhan Mujahid leader and two Kashmir Liberation Front leaders. Whether they actually attended this meeting was not confirmed. The main contents from the President’s address which were leaked out, probably through a mole from a Third World country and became available to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents some time in September-October 1988, were as follows:

“Gentlemen, I have spoken on this subject at length before, therefore, I will leave out the details. As you know due to our pre-occupation in Afghanistan, in the service of Islam, I have not been able to put these plans before you earlier. Let there be no mistake, however, that our aim remains quite clear and firm-the liberation of the Kashmir Valley-our Muslim Kashmiri brothers cannot be allowed to stay with India for any length of time, now. In the past we had opted for hamhanded military options and therefore, failed. So, as I have mentioned before, we will now keep our military option for the last moment as a coup de grace, if and when necessary. Our Kashmiri brethren in the valley, though with us in their hearts and minds, are simple-minded folk and do not easily take to the type of warfare to which, say, a Punjabi or an Afghan takes to naturally, against foreign domination. The Kashmiris however have a few qualities which we can exploit. First, his shrewdness and intelligence; second, his power to persevere under pressure; and the third, if I may so say, he is a master of political intrigue. If we provide him means through which he can best utilize these qualities – he will deliver the goods. Sheer brute force is in any case not needed in every type of warfare, especially so in the situation obtaining in the Kashmir Valley, as I have explained earlier.

Here we must adopt those methods of combat which the Kashmiri mind can grasp and cope with-in other words, a coordinated use of moral and physical means, other than military operations, which will destroy the will of the enemy, damage his political capacity and expose him to the world as an oppressor. This aim, Gentlemen, shall be achieved in the initial phases.

In the first phase, which may, if necessary, last a couple of years we will assist our Kashmiri brethren in getting hold of the power apparatus of the State by political subversion and intrigue. I would like to mention here that as no Government can survive in Occupied Kashmir unless it has the tacit approval of Delhi, it would be unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organization can seize power through democratic or other means. In view of this,’ power must “apparently” remain with those whom New Delhi favours. We must therefore ensure that certain “favoured politicians” from the ruling elite be selected who would corporate with us in subverting all effective organs of the State. In brief, our plan for Kashmir, which will be codenamed as “Op Topac” will be as follows:

Phase 1

A low-level insurgency against the regime, so that it is under siege, but does not collapse as we would not yet want central rule imposed by Delhi.
We plant our chosen men in all the key positions; they will subvert the police forces, financial institutions, the communication network and other important organizations.
We whip up anti-Indian feelings amongst ” the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issues, so that we can enlist their active support for rioting and anti-Government demonstrations.
Organize and train subversive elements’ and armed groups with capabilities, initially, to deal with paramilitary forces located in the valley.
Adopt and develop means to cut off lines of communication between Jammu & Kashmir and within Kashmir and Ladakh by stealth, without recourse to force. The road over Zojila upto Kargil and the road over Khardungla should receive our special attention.
In collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu to divert attention from the valley at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even in the Hindu mind.
Establish virtual control in those parts of the Kashmir Valley where the Indian Army is not located or deployed. The Southern Kashmir Valley may be one such region.

Phase 2

Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen. Kargil and Rajauri-Punch sectors to force the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir Valley.
Attack and destroy base depots and HQ located at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara. Baramulla. Bandipur and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given time.
Some Afghan Mujahideen. by then settled in Azad Kashmir. will then infiltrate in selected pockets with a view to extending areas of our influence. This aspect will require detailed and ingenious planning. The fiasco of Op Gibraltar (1965) holds many lessons for us here.
Finally a Special Force under selected retired officers belonging to Azad Kashmir, with the hard core consisting of Afghans, will be ready to attack and destroy airfields, radio stations, block Banihal Tunnel and Kargil-Leh Highway.
At a certain stage of the operations Punjab and adjacent areas of Jammu & Kashmir will be put under maximum pressure internally by our offensive posture.

Phase 3

Detailed plans for the liberation of Kashmir Valley and establishment of an independent Islamic State in the third phase will follow.
We do not have much time. Maximum pressure must be exerted before the general elections in India and before Indian Army reserves which are still bogged down in Sri Lanka become available. By the Grace of God, we have managed to accumulate large stocks of modern arms and ammunition from US consignments intended for Afghan Mujahideen. This will help our Kashmiri brethren achieve their goals. Even if we create a kind of “Azad Kashmir” in some remote parts of Occupied Kashmir as a beginning, the next step may not be as difficult as it appears today. On the other hand, it should also be noted that a part of the Indian Army, particularly the Infantry, will be well trained by now for such a situation due to their experience in the North-Eastern Region and more recently in Sri Lanka. But the situation in Kashmir will be somewhat different; more like the “Infetada” of Palestinians in towns, and on the pattern of the Mujahideen in the countryside to attack hard targets. A. period of chaos in the State is essential in the circumstances.

And what of our Chinese friends? They can do no more than ensure that Indian forces deployed against them are not moved. out; but this may be required only at the last or the third stage of our operations. Of course, if we are in serious trouble, the Chinese and our other powerful friends shall come to our rescue one way or the other. They will ensure if we do not win -at least we don’t lose.

Finally, I wish to caution you once more that it will be disastrous to believe that we can take on India in a straight contest. We must, therefore, be careful and maintain a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre-empt us, by attacking at a time and at a point of their own choosing, at least before Phase 1 and 2 of the Operation are over. We must pause and assess the course of operations after each phase, as our strategy and plans may require drastic changes in certain circumstances. I need not emphasize any further that a deliberate and objective assessment of the situation must be ensured at each stage, otherwise a stalemate will follow with no good for Pakistan.

Pakistan Paindabad.”

General Situation in March 1989

The initial phase of Op Topac was apparently put into action in the latter half of 1988 as was evident from the course of events from July 1988 to March 1989. The death of General Zia in August 1988 in a PAF accident, and the new dispensation under Ms Benazir Bhutto appeared to make very little difference till March 1989. ISI has been rightly described as a ‘State within a State’. It has been said that soon after Ms Bhutto took over, at a stormy meeting, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yakub Khan urged that Afghan policy no longer be handled by ISI but even he was turned down and the attempt to curb the power of ISI did not succeed.
Significantly, Pakistani COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg, in his first visit to Siachen, was reported to have said that the Pakistani armed forces would not rest till an amicable solution of the Siachen dispute was found. This statement seemed to be a precursor of Ms Benazir Bhutto’s views expressed a bit later.
The emergence of Ms Benazir Bhutto as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan and the restoration of democracy could queer the pitch of ISI but Kashmir figures high on her priorities too as was evident from her statement that ‘Kashmir is a major dispute between India and Pakistan. It has led to three wars between our countries, to a never-ending arms race and to endless tensions. It is a problem we have to solve.’
‘Right now we have another serious matter, between us and that is the Siachen Glacier issue – but India and Pakistan are holding talks and we hope that we will be able to make progress on that particular issue,’ she had added.
It seemed that although the ISI would go ahead with its plan of action in Kashmir, the time- frame will be dictated by the course of events in Afghanistan and of course India’s reaction. Only if Pakistan is able to oust Najib-PDPA, establish a friendly Islamic regime in Afghanistan and ensure the return of Afghan refugees, will it be able to focus attention on Kashmir. ISI which runs the show in Afghanistan is well organized and trained, however, to launch effective covert operations in Jammu & Kashmir. General Zia had constituted it to be a combination of CIA, GSG9, SAS and Spetznaz. Spectacular initial success in Afghanistan showed its effectiveness and efficacy. It is well on the cards that this organization will continue to carryon Zia’s chosen line of action in Kashmir, notwithstanding the constraints which the precepts of the new regime may impose on it.

Pakistan’s Aims and Plans – II

It appears that Pakistan’s ‘Plan-X’ was prepared after a widely read fortnightly of New Delhi reporting on Exercise Brass Tacks gave brief comments on certain offensive plans for Northern Kashmir (POK) conceived during this exercise. The details of planning, if authentic, amounted to an astounding breach of security as sensitive material of this kind could not have become available to a news magazine in the normal course. True or false, this news item caused alarm bells to ring rather shrilly in the highest echelons of Pakistan’s defence planners. It seems, soon after the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was asked to produce comprehensive plans to counter such a threat.

After prolonged deliberations, JCSC submitted a plan which would pre-empt any Indian offensive in Northern Kashmir and in addition make her recoil from the Saltoro Crest Line and Siachen Glacier. This operation was codenamed ‘Plan-X’. The aim of this operation was to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on the Saltoro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers, by a surprise attack with a view to:

• trapping all Indian troops deployed in the Glacier areas, and

• enabling Pakistan to negotiate withdrawal of Indian forces from Siachen Glacier from a position of strength.

 The main features of ‘Plan-X’ made available to India by an Intelligence Agency of a third country appeared to be:

• To achieve surprise ‘Plan-X’ was to be see executed in deep winter, preferably at a time when flights between Thoise and the rest of India are unable to operate and Ka Khardungla is blocked.

• Capture of forward positions of Partapur Co garrison astride axis Siari-Tortuk and De logistics support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LC.
• Hell-landing/drop of specially equipped and trained troops east of Partapur-Thoise and Siachen Base Camp; with the task of capturing Thoise Airfield complex and Siachen Base Camp simultaneously.
• Interdiction of Khardungla by SSG after blowing up sections of road and important w culverts on either side of the pass.
• Actual concentration of troops and simulation of major attacks at an appropriate time in Dras, Kargil, Gurez, Tangdhar and Punch Sectors with a view to tying down Indian reserve formations.
• Raids and destruction of staging camps and gun positions located on the Siachen Glacier. Exert maximum pressure on Indian posts located on the crest line from both sides of the LC. Capture Sia La on the crest line in the northern Glacier area, if possible.
• Step up guerrilla and terrorist activity, raid airfields and radar facilities in the valley on given code words.
• Activate major disturbances and widespread rioting in all major towns of Kashmir Valley and Jammu Division.
• All forces to be prepared and trained to operate for a period of eight days without re-supply or land link-up.
• Plans for exfiltration of troops in unfavourable circumstances will be prepared but divulged only to a selected few.

 

Review of the Situation by the Defence Cabinet Committee, Pakistan

‘Plan-X’ had to remain only on paper, it seemed, due to various compulsions of the Mghanistan situation and later due to General Zia’s sudden demise. An overall review of the Kashmir situation in general and Siachen in particular was undertaken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and the Defence Council after Ms Benazir Bhutto came to power. In the analysis of options, one fact stood out clearly, that Pakistan was in no position to opt for a military solution of the Kashmir issue; even a limited military action in Siachen may not be feasible at present. Any military operation, however limited in scope, may open multiple options for India to gain a tactical victory in a sector of its own choosing. If pressed hard, India may even t widen the conflict with serious repercussions for Pakistan.
The political leadership appeared to be n totally against any military adventure in Kashmir. However, they were persuaded to W’ turn a Nelson’s eye to the ongoing covert operations in Kashmir. A summary of major conclusions drawn during various deliberations was as follows:

• Any major military confrontation with India over Kashmir was ruled out.
• The current situation in Afghanistan further limits a military option even in Siachen.
• A low-intensity conflict situation can be supported in Kashmir, provided the people of Kashmir Valley make a major contribution. No worthwhile conflict can be created or sustained from outside.
• The Government of Pakistan should leave all covert action to Azad Kashmir and ISI and maintain a position in which ‘plausible denial’ remains feasible.
• At a certain point of time, depending upon the Afghan situation and the success of insurgency in Kashmir, special operations may be undertaken by a mix of highly trained ‘Afghan-Kashmiri irregulars’ to hasten the collapse of the regime and to involve the Indian Army in a never-ending war and a ‘no win’ situation. The aim should be to focus attention of the world community on the Kashmir problem and mobilize support from its friends in the Islamic world.
• ‘Plan-X’ should be further critically examined for its feasibility and relevance in the changed circumstances. In any case, suitable helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and specialized equipment will have to be acquired for the visualized tasks and this process including training will take considerable time.
• In an overall assessment of the security environment both on the Eastern and Western borders of Pakistan, acquisition of nuclear weapons as ‘Bargaining Chips’ becomes all the more important.

A note of dissent

It appears that during various discussions, certain ‘Generals’ were not in favour of postponement of ‘Plan-X’. Their main argument was that India was bound to help the present Afghan regime militarily and must be taught a lesson in Siachen in such a situation. These Generals may not have their way immediately but it cannot be assumed that they will not have their way in the future.

General situation in J&K – The Next Twelve Months

The periodic eruption of violent anti-Indian sentiments had now become a permanent feature in the Kashmir Valley. The political leadership continued to be ambivalent, in spite of mounting evidence that Jammu & Kashmir was slowly drifting towards a total political and administrative collapse due to a ‘low-intensity conflict’ situation. If the Government had any action plan or had learnt any lessons from the havoc wrought by mob violence and ever-increasing terrorist activities, it was not much in evidence. As usual, complete bandhs were observed in all major towns in the valley on Republic Day and Independence Day. Violent incidents further marred these occasions. On Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August, a large number of Pakistani flags appeared on many public buildings and no one seemed to be in a hurry to pull them down. Local police appeared to be a demoralized force as it had to face the wrath of the people without let-up. A state of stupor seemed to have overtaken the whole Government machinery. The Secretariat had become a cauldron of intrigue and the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service were divided on Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri lines.
Terrorist activities continued unabated in the’ valley and caches of sophisticated weapons and explosives were discovered quite by chance in Bodh Bungus, Kanil and Gangabal areas. This indicated that large stocks of arms and ammunition were being built up in selected areas over a period of time. The tourist season opened with bomb and grenade attacks on tourist facilities, buses and shopping centres, in tourist resorts. Indian tourists were the main targets of attack. As only minor injuries were caused by these attacks the aim seemed to be to scare away the indigenous variety of tourists. Soon, however, shikarawaLas and petty shopkeepers were incited to block the roads in Srinagar and Pahalgam. The agitationists asked for subsidies and accused the Government of diverting tourist traffic to Patni Top and Batot, outside the valley, in order to punish the poor Kashmiri.
Strikes by lower Government employees and truck drivers came next. This created major problems for the Government as strikers frequently blocked the main highways and brought life in the vclley to a standstill. These strikes seemed extremely well organized and they started and stopped suddenly, as if on a signal. Another disturbing feature was the total passivity of the police during bandhs and strikes, which almost amounted to connivance.
A radio station calling itself Voice of Islamic Republic of Kashmir’ came on the air off and on from 15 August onwards. It exhorted the people of the valley to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic order.
In the first incident of its kind, a truck carrying three CRPF jawans and a Sub-Inspector was fired upon with automatic weapons. The truck suffered major damage but the men escaped with minor injuries. Immediately afterwards, baseless reports of atrocities purported to be committed by BSF and CRPF were circulated through leaflets and posters. Some similar reports appeared in the vernacular press also.
A powerful time bomb with a sophisticated fIring device was discovered at the Srinagar Airport Luggage Lounge. It was disarmed by an IAF expert squad which was luckily near at hand. A similar device was found in a room of the Press Information Bureau on the Residency Road in Srinagar. A number of noted journalists were present when the bomb, which was to explode soon, was found and disarmed. These discoveries pointed towards an increasing sophistication of means but the lack of expertise of the “saboteurs” was also apparent.
Towards the end of September, there were mob attacks on civil trucks carrying military stores, when they were passing through some crowded areas of Srinagar and Sopore. Military convoys were fired upon in remote areas of Kupwara district. In Bandipore area, grenades were lobbed on an ammunition dump. Gradually Paramilitary forces and some reserve Army formations were getting tied down with the ever-increasing static guard duties at vulnerable points and important bridges and culverts on the highways. The Army now started providing armed escorts to convoys, and guards at .rear depots and formation Headquarters were strengthened. This affected the fighting strength of combat arms on the posts. Normal maintenance and advance stocking schedules could not be kept due to various constraints and non-availability of civilian vehicles. Army convoys from base depots to Srinagar and to Ladakh were often delayed for more than twenty-four hours due to disturbances in the crowded areas, en route to Zojila. Plans for alternative routes to avoid these bottlenecks existed on paper for many years, but had remained unexecuted.
In a dangerous escalation of terrorist activities, the airfields at Avantipur and Badgam were subjected to commando-type attacks in which a couple of IAF transport aircraft and one IA Boeing were damaged.
It was obvious from a graduated escalation of insurgency that Phase 2 of Op Topac as visualized by the late General Zia-ul-Haq was taking concrete shape. In this crisis situation, there seemed to be a further falling apart of the Centre and State leadership, resulting in the lack of a well-coordinated plan or strategy to meet the situation.
Parleys on Siachen at the Secretary level made headway but Pakistan insisted on the status quo existing prior to 1984. The sequence of major incidents recorded in Jammu & Kashmir indicated a definite pattern leading towards the objective of destabilizing the Jammu & Kashmir Government and facilitating the passage of insurgency with the ultimate aim of creating an “Afghan-like situation”.

Details of Major Incidents in J&K

Kashmir Valley

Major fires broke out in J&K Road Transport Corporation (JKRTC) and Army Petrol Depot near Srinagar almost simultaneously. It seemed a hand:-held model, MZ-A17 Flame-Thrower, fired from a hill overlooking this depot, was used to start the fire. Even though the fire was brought under control within a few hours by an efficient Army fire-fighting organization, a large quantity of fuel was lost. It was also noted that the approach to this depot was through a crowded area, and as such fire-fighting vehicles and personnel had to force their way through a one-way, narrow and crowded street. This spot was obviously no longer suitable for a large FOL Depot.
The fire in JKRTC depot caused much greater damage and created panic in the town. It was evident that no serious attempt was made to fight this fire. A report suggested that the passage of fire brigade vehicles was obstructed en route by a violent mob.
Simultaneous attacks were made on Avantipur and Badgam airfields in which one AN-32, one Cheetah helicopter and one Boeing 737 were rendered unfit for flying due to major damage. It was apparent that small teams of specially trained terrorists had mounted rocket attacks on the aircraft parked on the tarmac. In the ensuing confusion, the terrorists made good their escape. A new variety of specially trained commando teams were obviously operating in the valley.
The staff of Radio Kashmir was held at pistol-point by a couple of intruders during the broadcast of the programme ‘Wadi ki Awaz’. An attempt was made to force the broadcasters to say ‘Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir apse mukhatib hai’ (This is Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir). This attempt, however, did not succeed and the intruders fled in a jeep after throwing two petrol bombs on soine transmission facilities. Significantly, no one either made an attempt to catch the culprits or offered any resistance. The armed guard at the gate remained oblivious of this incident, or so it was said.
Power stations and transmission towers were being regularly damaged in Baramulla district, Gund and Bandipur. In most cases high explosives were used. .
One tube of Banihal Tunnel was blocked for more than twenty-four hours when a truck blew up half-way. It seemed the driver of the truck had stopped the vehicle and walked away on the pretext that it was defective. Two vehicles behind this truck were badly damaged and the drivers/cleaners sustained serious injuries.
A number of houses in Karen Nagar were set on fIre in Srinagar. A number of cowsheds and grain bins were destroyed by fires in Pulwama, Bijbiara, Kulgam and Hajan in the southern part of the valley. Some reports suggested that some youths dressed in blue shalwar suits were collecting ‘taxes’ in the name of Islamic Republic of Kashmir. However, the police denied these reports.
Two civilian trucks which were part of ‘Up Convoy’ at Zojila were damaged by what seemed to be improvised mines planted at ‘Capt’s Mor’.
A spate of bank robberies were reported throughout the valley. In each case, cash was handed over without much resistance.
On a Sunday, fire from automatic weapons was directed on the offIcers’ mess in the Army ammunition depot at Khundru. Almost simultaneously, a devastating fire broke out in certain ammunition sheds. As there are only a few army personnel stationed here and the depot is located far away from any military station, major damage was caused before the fire could be brought under control. The majority of workers being locals, ran away at the first signs of trouble. A company had therefore to be located here for protection duties.
Two Army trucks carrying winter stocks to Keren Sector were fired upon and damaged near Sirpat. A similar incident took place near Lashdat in Gurez Sector, near Razdhani Pass.

 

Along the Line of Control

Pakistani troops remained unusually quiet all along the LC. There were no attempts at encroachment or the usual unprovoked firing. Any cattle straying across on the POK side were promptly returned. The company commanders on the LC were chatty and friendly. However, some additional stocking was noticed in Lipa Valley and some posts north of Jhelum River in Uri Sector. There was a marked increase in vehicles plying on the Neelam Valley road. It seemed a lot more ‘artillery ammunition’ was being stocked this year. .
Large-scale infiltration through ‘Northern Gallies’ was reported but remained unconfirmed. It was more likely that very small parties crossed the LC on days of bad weather over a period of time.

 

In Ladakh

Ladakh remained quiet as usual, except for one anti-Salman Rushdie demonstration in ‘Sum Valley’ which has a predominantly ‘Shia’ population, who even in normal times display posters and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini in their homes. A protest march was also held in Kargil demanding more water from the newly built canal and a road block was set on the highway near the Kargil airstrip.
A large number of tourists were stranded in Leh this year due to disturbances in the valley. There was a paucity of civilian trucks available to the Army as many owners did not operate from Jammu to Srinagar this year.

Along the Line of Control

There were reports of Pakistani encroachment in Dras/Kargil area as an outpost vacated by Indian troops in winter was found occupied by Pakistani troops. The incident however was not played up and was being dealt at the local commander’s level through flag meetings. This incident was preceded by frequent helicopter reconnaissances all along the LC in this area.
Saltoro Ridge in the Siachen area was also quiet except for a few exchanges of artillery fire. There was a marked increase ill-stocking convoys coming to the bases in Siari and Khapalu areas. Air transport sorties to Gilgit and Skardu airfields also showed an upward trend.
The Line of Actual Control (LAC) of the Indo-Tibetan border remained quiet except for normal Chinese patrols. Small parties were seen observing forward defences around Chushul and Hanle, from the distant ridges on the Chinese side of the LAC.

In Jammu

State Government offices were attacked with petrol bombs during the summer when the Government was functioning at Srinagar. No major damage was therefore caused. Sporadic bomb blasts in the crowded areas of Jammu, Akhnoor and Punch created occasional panic. A new temple. near Jammu was desecrated resulting in communal tension. Communal riots broke out in Rajauri during Holi and tension prevailed in other towns. An attempt to blow up a section of the railway line between Madhopur and Kathua was foiled by a vigilant track patrol. A bomb blast at the crowded Jammu Tawi station caused a large number of injuries to civilians and some military personnel proceeding on leave. This along with occasional bomb blasts in buses on the Pathankot-Jammu route imposed caution and created a fear psychosis.

Along the LC

Concentration of troops was noticed opposite Punch, Mendhar, Jhangar and Naushera. Dumping of artillery ammunition was also reported. Intermittent firing continued in the Punch-Rajauri area. Aggressive patrolling by Pakistani troops was reported all along the LC.

 

General Situation in J&K in the near future

In spite of an overall explosive situation prevailing in the valley, the escalation of conflict as visualized by the late General Zia at the end of Phase 2 of Op Topac did not fully develop. Firstly, the Mghan situation did not develop favourably for Pakistan. Secondly, the Kashmiris had neither risen in a mass revolt against the regime nor did they acquire an armed capability to confront the security forces. One of the main reasons for this failure on the part of ISI in their plans was the mature handling of the situation by the Indian Army, which did not quite react the way they were expected to. The Army, despite perpetual pinpricks, went about its tasks in a cool, businesslike manner and refused to be EP: provoked to take any harsh repressive An measures against the local population; in fact, they continued to help them as usual. Of course, this did not happen because of any deliberate attempt or directions issued from above, but only because of the self discipline and resilience imbued in all ranks of the Indian Army. ISI, it seemed, had miscalculated here.
However, what the insurgents had successfully achieved was to disturb normal life in the State, paralyse the administration and discredit the State Government. Some lobbies unfriendly to India, in certain countries, accused India of genocide of Kashmiri Muslims and published exaggerated reports of the Kashmir situation with a view establishing that Kashmir was like another ‘Afghanistan’. The Indian Army was compared with the Soviet Army and it was predicted that it would be forced to leave Kashmir soon.
The Pakistani Army brass, which was never very fond of ISI, openly blamed the latter for the mess in Afghanistan and the failure in Kashmir. In this respect, the attitude of the Pakistani Army and Ms Benazir Bhutto was almost identical. Some Generals were, however, itching to have a go at Siachen to retrieve what they called their honour. Despite things not going too well in Afghanistan, various offensive plans for Siachen were repeatedly discussed and reviewed to give concrete shape to Phase 3 of Op Topac. This would give the regular Army a bigger role and cut ISI down to size. The covert aid to Kashmir insurgency still continued, but a kind of stalemate set in due to diverse pulls and the expected results were still nowhere in sight.
Ms Benazir Bhutto, although keen to settle the Siachen Glacier issue, was not in favour of committing her forces in a military adventure, with no guarantee that it would remain confined to the Glacier area or even Jammu & Kashmir. But would she be in complete command of the situation?

Epilogue

Another kind of war

The likelihood of a conventional war over Kashmir has gradually diminished over the years due to India’s commanding military dominance and Pakistan’s increasing commitments on the Afghan front. The imminent nuclear capability of India and Pakistan could further lead towards a ‘stand off situation. The Kashmir dispute however tl remains. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it will continue to assert that a satisfactory solution must be found in the interest of peace. India does not accept this position because this, in essence, means reopening of the question of Kashmir’s accession to India.

The options of military confrontation in W various forms have failed in the past. The failure of infiltration of special groups of the ‘Gibraltar Force’ and its aftermath in 1965 finally convinced Pakistan that a successful uprising could not be created from outside. Zia eventually decided to wage another kind of war in Kashmir. He also decided to provide assistance to Punjab terrorists for good measure. He was, however, fully aware that as it would take a long time to indoctrinate and train the Kashmiri insurgents. The Afghan conflict provided him with an excellent lte opportunity to import the latest weapons for m, the Kashmiri insurgents, besides the expertise required to covertly fuel insurgency in Kashmir. According to General Zia and his advisers, this kind of war would be cheaper and far more effective in Kashmir.

A definition of Low-Intensity Conflict, once current in the US Army, will perhaps help us to understand the present scenario in in Kashmir a little better. Low-Intensity Conflict has been defined as:

• A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-Intensity Conflict is generally confined to a geographical area, is often characterised by constraints on weaponry, tactics and the level of violence. Low-Intensity Conflict involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities upto but not involving sustained combat between regular forces.

Dangers of inadequate response

The dangerous dimensions of the situation in Kashmir, it seems, have not been fully appreciated. It should be realized that this is not merely a ‘Punjab-like’ situation but something much more. A special kind of war has been initiated here of which assistance to Punjab terrorism is only an adjunct. In spite of clear indications that this ‘war’ has already crossed the initial threshold India’s response has been quite inadequate. No long-term strategy or action plan to fight the unrest, terrorism or insurgency is yet discernible. The recent announcement of the Government that IS I was involved in Afghanistan, Punjab and Kashmir was obvious for at least a year or so to any keen observer of the situation.

Belated reaction, misdirected drives, patchwork solutions worked out in isolation by various central and state agencies can lead to no crisp or clear-cut directions, so essential in such situations. An overall ‘strategic vision’ must therefore be evolved so that the problem can be seen in its proper perspective. A drift of the kind apparent today will allow the situation to slide into utter chaos.

Danger in Kashmir is real and unless effective steps are taken immediately, the separatist movement is bound to gather further momentum. A study of such situations the world over would indicate that force alone, however effectively used, can never suffice. To fight a movement and eliminate insurgency, the battle of the hearts and minds must be waged from ‘Day One’. This would require enmeshing of political, economic and psychological efforts rather than purely an armed response, in the shape of paramilitary forces or the army.

Essential steps

As no single ministry or agency can focus attention on the problems of Kashmir exclusively, a joint command, control and intelligence set-up should be established which should lay down the overall strategy and long-term aims. It may be desirable to associate certain ‘non-officials’ to provide inflow of fresh ideas.

A vigorous campaign for winning the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people should be initiated. This will require much more here than the normal techniques of ‘mass contact’.

The first step should be to objectively analyse the state of mind of various classes and the extent of disaffection in the valley. The population here is not as homogeneous in its political preferences as is generally believed. The Guj ars , Gaddis, Hanjis and Batals do not all have the same attitude and background as the urban Kashmiri Muslim from Srinagar, Sopore, Anant Nag and Baramulla.

Personnel of various central agencies functioning in Kashmir must learn the language and familiarize themselves with the customs and religious practices of various classes and castes if they have to break down the wall of misunderstanding being erected by false propaganda. Accurate and wide media coverage oriented towards the special tasks in hand must be planned and provided. This would prevent rumours and planted-information to be believed by people. Television and radio so far have played only a marginal role and must be utilized fully and effectively. At present, it is e~sier to receive Pakistani television programmes in the valley than our own national hook-up. The urban Kashmiri who is most affected by Pakistani propaganda will require proper presentation of facts. Newspapers, especially Urdu papers, can playa very constructive role but there is no such thrust at present, hence the local Urdu papers with an anti-India bias have a field day.

Special time-bound educational and socio-economic programmes should be launched through Government and non-Government agencies. The Kashmiri youth must also get a chance to see India (not only Delhi or Taj Mahal) through well-organized cultural exchange programmes.

The assistance of locals to insurgents either through propaganda or intimidation must be prevented. It should be clearly understood that widespread searches, suspicion of a class or community as a whole and repressive measures help the insurgents to gain local sympathy and support. The guerrilla and the insurgent would like to portray the Government as the enemy of the people and repressive measures will appear to confirm this.

The capacity and capability of POKj Pakistan to influence events in Jammu & Kashmir must be objectively assessed and measures to counter these influences be precisely stipulated. It may be worthwhile to use ‘think-tanks’ for this purpose.

The terrorists and guerrillas can playa deadly game of urban-cum-rural insurgency in Kashmir Valley with assured local support. Tactics to counter this twin threat must be worked out jointly by the civilian authorities with the Army and the Paramilitary forces.

A single specialized intelligence agency to deal both with Punjab and Kashmir is necessary. This agency should develop and deploy sources with the express purpose of dealing with the current developments. This should be capable of penetrating terrorist and insurgent organizations in both these states. The nexus between ISI of Pakistan, Kashmiri and Punjabi terrorists should be realistically assessed and countered through such an agency.

The role of the Army, intelligence agencies, Paramilitary forces and the local police in various scenarios and spheres should be worked out precisely and coordinated by a I central agency.

Considering the terrain and the weather I conditions it is obvious that special equipment and transportation system must be provided to forces operating against insurgents. Sophisticated communication network, helicopter and swift river transport systems suitable for this area must be planned and provided early for quick reaction by security forces.

A special force on the pattern of the Assam Rifles may be required. In the long run, such a force is likely to prove more effective than BSF or CRPF units inducted from outside for short durations.

In brief, India should:

• Develop suitable strategy, doctrine and tactics to deal with challenge in Kashmir.
• Establish priorities of requirements and ensure special budgetary support.
• Acquire special equipment and transport which can operate effectively in the valley and surrounding areas.
• Formulate intelligence support requirements peculiar to the situation.
• Foster amongst the mass of Kashmiri people a sense of anger against those who are out to destroy the peace and tranquillity of their valley for dubious gains.
• Keep the Kashmir situation above Party politics.
• Keep accurate information flowing; insurgency of this nature cannot be fought from a position of national ignorance.

In conclusion it may be befitting to quote Nehru who said, ‘’The strongest bonds that bind will not be of your armies or even your constitution-but bonds which are stronger than the constitution and law and armies-bonds which bind through love and affection and understanding.”