Indian Defence Review Online

Military Power

By Bharat Verma
Issue: Vol 22.1

On attaining independence, the first question that should have continually been thrown up was “What are the infirmities in our character that have made India remain under foreign rule and domination for almost 1000 years- the longest in known history?” An honest answer to this question was critical to help develop the ability to defend [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Pakistan’s Duplicity

By B Raman
Issue: Vol 22.2

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, while talking to some TV channels in New Delhi, hoped India will share the outcome of the probe into the Samjhauta Express blast before the March 6 meeting of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism so that ‘meaningful contribution’ can be made to the fight against terror. Asked whether the [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Time to Unshackle our Shipyards

By Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM
Issue: Vol 21.2

When Rear Admiral Ganeshan spoke to me about a seminar on Warship Building a few weeks ago, I conveyed the Navy’s wholehearted approval and support because I am convinced that we must open the windows of our mind to new ideas, and undertake serious introspection, if we are to improve our performance. I was, therefore, [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Military Lessons: Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-1

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

A classical response option for a country faced with an externally inspired Low Intensity Conflict (that can drag on for decades) is to conventionalise the conflict. In so doing, its strategic objective is to impose such heavy and deterrent costs on the perpetrators /external sponsors of the Low Intensity Conflict that they are forced to [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-2 - Israeli Response

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

The Air Offensive
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) put in a stellar performance in this war. Its prime target system was the known locations of the Hezbollah’s long range rockets like the Raad (45 km range) Fajr 3 (50 km range) Fajr 5 (70 km range) and the Zel Zal 1, 2 and 3 (with 120 [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-3 - Employment of Special Forces

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

Israel now escalated to the use of its Special Forces to raid these redoubts across the Lebanese border. 200 personnel of the Israeli Special Forces team of the elite “Sayeret Matkal“ and Sayeret Shaldag“ struck a Hezbollah logistics base at Baalbek in Bekka Valley (150 kms North of the Israeli border). They were helidropped [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-4 - Weapons Employment Profile

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

Employment of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
From the point of view of relevance to our context, the employment of Russian third generation Anti-tank Guided Missiles merits the closest attention. The Israeli made Merkava is said to be the worlds most highly protected/heavily armoured tank. Despite use of Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA), 45 percent of Israeli tanks that [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-5 - The Rocket Threat

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

The free rocket threat may not be relevant immediately in the sub continental context. However it is certain that terrorist organisations operating in J&K are likely to draw their lessons form this conflict.

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-6 - Anti-Rocket Solutions

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

Alon Ben David says overall some 4228 rockets were fired on Israel at the overall rate of almost 130 rockets a day Actually the rate averaged around 150 – 180 rockets per day for the first 10 days, with as many as 47 being fired in a single salvo. The rate peaked at 380 on [...]

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part 7 - Major Lessons Learnt

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

April 26th, 2007.

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-8 - Conclusion

By Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Issue: Vol 22.1

The Israel - Hezbollah conflict has spawned a rich harvest of military lessons that we must analyse and ingest at the earliest. In essence it was an attempt to conventionalise and thereby end a long running Low Intensity Conflict. This aspect merits serious attention from the cost-benefit analysis point of view. The fact that the [...]

April 26th, 2007.